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Abstract
Software maintenance accounts for the most part of the software development cost and efforts, with its
major activities focused on the detection, location, analysis and removal of defects present in the software.
Although software defects can be originated, and be present, at any phase of the software development life-
cycle, implementation (i.e., source code) contains more than three-fourths of the total defects. Due to the
diverse nature of the defects, their detection and analysis activities have to be carried out by equally diverse
tools, often necessitating the application of multiple tools for reasonable defect coverage that directly increases
maintenance overhead. Unified detection tools are known to combine different specialized techniques into a
single and massive core, resulting in operational difficulty and maintenance cost increment. The objective
of this research was to search for a technique that can detect dissimilar defects using a simplified model and
a single methodology, both of which should contribute in creating an easy-to-acquire solution. Following
this goal, a ‘Supervised Automation Framework’ named FlexTax was developed for semi-automatic defect
mapping and taxonomy generation, which was then applied on a large-scale real-world defect dataset to
generate a comprehensive Defect Taxonomy that was verified using machine learning classifiers and manual
verification. This Taxonomy, along with an extensive literature survey, was used for comprehension of the
properties of different classes of defects, and for developing Defect Similarity Metrics. The Taxonomy, and the
Similarity Metrics were then used to develop a defect detection model and associated techniques, collectively
named Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis, or SRTA. SRTA relies on Symbolic Analysis, Path Summarization
and Range Propagation to detect dissimilar classes of defects using a simplified set of operations. To verify
the effectiveness of the technique, SRTA was evaluated by processing multiple real-world open-source systems,
by direct comparison with three state-of-the-art tools, by a controlled experiment, by using an established
Benchmark, by comparison with other tools through secondary data, and by a large-scale fault-injection
experiment conducted using a Mutation-Injection Framework, which relied on the taxonomy developed earlier
for the definition of mutation rules. Experimental results confirmed SRTA’s practicality, generality, scalability
and accuracy, and proved SRTA’s applicability as a new Defect Detection Technique.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With their advancement in time, software systems are becoming progressively complex and this complexity
is observed in both their use and structure. Existing systems, through enhancements and improvements, are
turning into more complex ones while sophisticated new systems are being developed both as replacements
to the older systems, and under completely new requirements. This ever-increasing complexity of existing
systems, and the development of new and more complex systems, as apparent from Lehman’s assumptions1
[98], are natural part of the evolution of software technology and are not expected to cease.
As an increasing number of critical processes starts relying on software systems, emphasis on the quality of
the software increases to match the trend. To guarantee and maintain a high quality of the finished product,
application of quality assurance activities, such as software inspection and testing, is of crucial importance
[54] and is enforced through various methodologies.
One of the major tasks in software quality assurance is the prevention, detection and correction of defects
present in the system. Defects are defined as artifacts that can occur in any phase of the software develop-
ment process and are known to cause implications from mere nothing observable to critical failures. Severe
complications resulting from software defects include a number of spacecraft accidents [100] and even human
casualties in the U.S.A. and Canada [101]. Over the decades, the term defect has become an umbrella term
encompassing any abnormality introduced or incorporated at any stage of the software development process
and is known to be originated by a variety of factors, from simple human errors to complex architectural
problems.
Although defect is a valid term to be applied to any phase of software development, implementation
(i.e., source code) accounts for more than three-fourths of the total defects found in software systems [99]
including at least half of the critical security problems [25, 117]. For the defects that are not originated
in the implementation phase, often the most observable traces are found at implementation, a phenomenon
explained using the notion, “syntax as a carrier of semantics”[44]. Consequently, detecting defects from
source code has become the recipient of much research attention - resulting in the development of a large
number of strategies, techniques and tools over the last few decades.
The diversity of the nature of defects has been counterbalanced using equally diverse techniques. The task
1A set of eight laws on software evolution published by Lehman and Belady in the period 1974-1996. Three of the laws state
that (a) software complexity is always increasing, (b) software size and number will continue to grow and (c) software quality
will depend on more rigorous maintenance as the software evolves.
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of detecting source code defects has been tackled from many directions, by applying numerous techniques and
strategies including various flavours of static, dynamic and hybrid analyses. Each of the strategies, techniques
and tools enjoys its own unique combination of advantages, while suffering from an equally unique and diverse
set of drawbacks. The narrow focus and specialized treatment of available tools towards particular defects
have made their application extremely dependent on specific scenarios. The application of a defect detection
endeavour with reasonable defect coverage on a project requires application of multiple tools - often diverse
in their nature, input requirements and outputs. Such multiple-tool approaches for defect detection often
require much human intervention through source formatting, annotation and input preparations. Detecting
multiple defects through a single tool can aid in such scenarios by reducing project overhead and effort
requirements. A few commercial tools exist that unify multiple detection activities into a massive internal
core (e.g., CodeSonar [63], Coverity SAVE [35], Polyspace C Checker [129], Frama-C [41]) that, in addition
to the considerably high cost of acquisition and maintenance, often end up into bizarre errors [29, 99].
Most dissimilar defects show similar characteristics over a certain level of abstraction, as was utilized by
most, if not all, of the defect taxonomies and exploited directly in the study by DeMillo and Mathur [44].
Being able to detect such defects using a single abstract model can serve as a low-cost, low-complexity and
easy-to-apply technique to simplify the task of defect detection. Such a technique is expected to improve the
state-of-the-art in multiple ways including, but not limited to, elimination of the need for different inputs
and formats for different defects, elimination of the need for different output interpretations and adaptations,
reduction of the complexities of the detection system making it more maintainable and cost-effective, and
improvement of the applicability of the process in general.
1.1 Motivation
Software maintenance accounts for a significant portion of the software development activities, often claiming
50%-80% of the total development cost [142, 96] over 80% of the development efforts [139, 2] for successful
legacy systems. A major part of the maintenance activities concern the detection and removal of defects that
were introduced to the system as “inevitable artifacts” [25]. A failure in the proper detection and removal
of the defects can have considerable impact on the quality of the software. A study applying a hypothetical
model on real data predicted as much as 33% profit-loss for a moderately sized non-mission-critical software
due to improper defect treatment [161].
Automatic defect detection can greatly reduce maintenance overhead and aid in quality assurance, and has
been the focus for much research activities. As software is ubiquitous in its nature [93], the defects also tend
to get diverse and domain-specific, forcing the detection techniques to be domain-specific and specialized over
single or few similar defect types. To provide a reasonable defect coverage, a software needs to be inspected
by a number of detection tools coming mainly from proprietary sources. Applications of such diverse tools
and techniques also require much external efforts as their input formats and requirements often differ (for
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example, for the tools that depend on code annotation, a number of different annotation vocabulary and
techniques have to be applied).
Unified detection tools (i.e., the tools that detect multiple defects) usually merge the diverse techniques
into a single massive core. Such tools tend to be expensive (primary source: [64], secondary source: [86])
and provide with a slow or resource hungry performance portfolio [168]. A workaround to this is to be
able to apply a single technique to detect multiple defects. Although a similar approach is used in various
flavours over a few existing tools, the application of unified detection so far was restricted over similar defect
classes (e.g., different memory defects). Being able to use a technique over dissimilar defect classes thus can
greatly simplify the software maintenance activities, providing with attainable and easy-to-use solutions. This
research proposes a new technique that combines path summarization, state-space abstraction and symbolic
analysis into a scalable, practical and generic defect detection mechanism that can serve as a unified detection
approach.
1.2 Research Overview
This section provides an overview of the research questions, describes the problem and solution approach,
and describes the contribution of this research.
1.2.1 Research Questions
In this research, the primary objective was to search for a technique to apply to the detection of dissimilar
classes of defects. The research questions can be summarized as:
RQ1: Can a specific abstraction provide sufficient means for detecting multiple dissimilar
classes of defects?
This question has been treated as the primary research question. A technique was developed with a
combination of path summarization, state space-modelling for atomic identifiers, and symbolic analysis that,
in both theory and practice, was able to detect a number of dissimilar classes of defects. This research
question was answered in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
Once the technique was developed, the research then focused on answering the questions that become
relevant over the proven existence of such a technique,
RQ2: To what length can such a technique go in terms of dissimilar classes of defects?
After the development of the technique, different evaluation procedures were conducted to assess its
effectiveness. The developed technique was found to cover most of the defect classes that do not depend
extensively on design or other non-code artifacts. This question was answered in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
RQ3: What is the general effectiveness of such a technique in terms of accuracy and per-
formance?
The accuracy of the developed technique was tested through extensive experiments against existing tools
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and techniques, and against large-scale fault injection procedures. The results confirmed that it is indeed
possible to use an unified technique, like the one developed in this research, that would perform as good as,
if not better than, the existing tools. This question was answered in Chapter 6.
RQ4: What is the effect of system complexity on the applicability of such a Technique?
A study was conducted to test the effect of the scalability-accuracy trade-off on the developed technique.
The technique was found to be resistant to structural and performance complexities of the system it processes,
and to scale to large systems without a compromise of performance. This question was answered in Chapter
6 using experimental data.
In order to properly define the objectives, a prerequisite was to establish defect similarity (and dissimi-
larity) criteria. This was treated using the last research question,
RQ5: What are the criteria and procedure to determine similarity in defect classes?
To answer this question, extensive surveys were conducted on defect classification schemes. Based on the
information obtained from the survey, a semi-automated framework was developed to map defects and to
create taxonomies in the process. The framework was applied on a large scale real dataset and a taxonomy
was generated. The taxonomy was then used to define defect similarity over different coefficients, to define the
technique of defect detection, and to define mutation rules used in experiments using the Mutation-Injection
framework. This question was answered in Chapter 3.
1.2.2 Problem Description and Solution Strategy
Automated detection of defects from source code is usually done through either of the two code analysis
techniques, or their combination. The first of these two, dynamic analysis, analyzes a software’s response
during execution and is able to uncover defects at a later phase of development [96]. Dynamic analysis is
able to provide low false positive rate2 and is usually more efficient, but usually has high false negative rate3,
requires complete code that can be built and executed, and has no means to analyze execution paths that
have not been taken during the particular execution. The second of the techniques, static analysis, analyzes
the actual source code. Static analysis usually has low false negative rate, can reach to any execution path
through the software but usually suffers from a high false positive rate. As the requirement is to detect
defects from source code, static analysis was the compelling candidate for this research.
A problem of static analysis is the phenomenon called “Path Explosion”, or the overwhelming number of
possible execution paths through a reasonably sized software [60]. Although it is possible for static analysis
to check all these paths, it is often infeasible to do a complete check due to the very large set of candidate
paths that demands high resources and impractical execution time. To cope with this situation, most static
analysis tools reduce the state-space for the software through a compromise between scalability and accuracy,
often sacrificing accuracy to scale to large applications.
2The ratio of incorrect detection over all detection. Described in Chapter 6.
3The ratio of missed detection over all problems present. Described in Chapter 6.
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Although static analysis retains the ability to check incomplete code, unless a code is executed, the exact
flow of data in the code cannot be determined. To mitigate this scenario a technique named Symbolic Analysis
is used. Symbolic analysis is traditionally considered a variant of static analysis as it uses source code to
build up symbolic execution values for processing.
Symbolic analysis suffers from the same drawbacks of static analysis, that is, the very large number of
paths to check. Techniques often select a subset of the paths to analyze that brings the resource requirements
within practical limits. Such techniques often suffer from the cases of a defect hiding in one of the paths
that were excluded. On the other hand, as symbolic analysis uses inferred or abstract values instead of
the real data, it provides the flexibility of applying arbitrary abstraction to the analysis process. It has
been proven that if symbolic analysis can be used as a compositional tool, it can alleviate the path explosion
problem effectively [59]. One of the objectives of this research was to utilize this property of symbolic analysis
to overcome its own limitations that has been achieved using path summarization - a novel application of
compositional analysis.
Defects in source code often manifest themselves in a local context [96]. This nature of defects requires
path and context sensitive analysis techniques to be applied to make the detection effective and efficient. The
requirement of path sensitivity, and the nature of defects in staying in local contexts, are outlined in a recent
research work by Le and Soffa [96]. Again, to address this issue, symbolic analysis plays the crucial role due
to its flexibility to abstraction. To provide path sensitivity, context-awareness and wide-expanse capabilities,
symbolic analysis was chosen as the analysis technique.
Often balancing the scalability-accuracy trade-off results in sacrificing one in lieu of the other. Many
of the widely used tools sacrifice accuracy to achieve scalability [163]. Still, only a few tools ensure good
scalability [168]. In this research, the target was set to provide better accuracy, without deliberately sacrificing
scalability. The solution proposed by this research is realized through a framework, SRTA4.
Figure 1.1 describes the solution in a three-layer diagram, the top being the research goals, middle layer
showing the specific components of the solution towards achieving that goal and the bottom layer listing the
results obtained in the particular objectives.
Main goals for this research can be summarized into four parts - Accuracy, Scalability, Generality and
Practicality. The term ‘Accuracy’ is used to denote both a low false positive and low false negative rate. Path
summarization, context-sensitivity, and complete path envelopment in a form of inter-procedural analysis have
been used to tackle the problem of accuracy. Path summarization acts as a countermeasure to false negative
errors as it does not exclude any path from the analysis, as well as balancing the path explosion problem
by introducing summarized representations. Context-sensitivity and path envelopment both act in favour of
reducing false positives by taking the context into account, and by considering the exact sequence of events
that led to an entity’s states in the program.
‘Scalability’ of a system denotes the ability to retain its qualities against a varying range of properties.
4Abbreviation for Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis / Analyzer. Details are provided in Chapter 5.
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Figure 1.1: Solutions Provided by the Approach (Adapted from the Dissertation of Wei Le, 2010)
In this context, scalability is used to denote the capability of successful processing with codebases of various
sizes, and with various degrees of information that can be inferred from the codebases. A scalable technique
should be able to process small and large software systems alike. Path summarization, as used in this
technique, contributes in ensuring scalability by simplifying and reducing the path explosion problem. The
state-space model used with path summarization and symbolic abstraction also contributed in making the
system scalable.
‘Generality’ is used to describe the technique’s ability to be adapted in different situations. The mecha-
nism proposed in this research does not use source code directly, rather converts the code into a simplified
intermediate model related to the software state-space, and uses symbolic analysis techniques instead of pure
static analysis. This approach ensures the adoption of the technique over different software systems, different
languages and across different degrees of completion for the systems.
‘Practicality’ is the applicability of the technique over real-world scenarios, that is, the ability to function
within reasonable environmental bounds. The technique developed in this research is practical in the sense of
resource requirement and execution time, covering more defect classes as compared to most existing tools and
in an execution environment with reasonable bounds. The state-space abstraction and completely soft-coded
specifications aided in making the system practical.
1.2.3 Contribution of this Research
(1) The primary contribution of this research was to develop a symbolic analysis technique, SRTA, to detect
dissimilar classes of software defects. The technique relies on path summarization and state-space abstraction
and was proven to be applicable on dissimilar defect types, incorporating generality and scalability.
(2) After the development of the technique, extensive experiments were conducted to verify its aspects.
The experiments were performed on widely used real-world open-source projects, against a benchmark suite,
through a large scale fault-injection procedure involving a Mutation-Injection framework, and in a controlled
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experiment devised to check resource consumption. The experiments confirmed the practicality of the tech-
nique.
As a prerequisite to the research, a measure was required to establish defect similarity, which, as its
requirement, relied on a custom developed defect taxonomy. The other three contribution of this research
was in achieving this goal.
(3) A framework, FlexTax, was proposed to develop extensible defect taxonomies. The framework is a
new concept in that it deals with extensible and flexible taxonomies and utilizes objective similarity metrics
to classify defects. The concept addresses at least three of the major issues related with taxonomy generation
- orthogonality, completeness and non-redundancy.
(4) A defect taxonomy was developed using FlexTax and later used in comparison and assessment of the
different tools and techniques described in this dissertation. The taxonomy was validated against real world
data and was found to be flexible, extensible, complete, orthogonal and non-redundant.
(5) Based on the Taxonomy, defect similarity was evaluated against custom designed, and industry stan-
dard similarity coefficients. The evaluation was able to point out similarity criteria that were used in the
research.
1.3 Organization of this Dissertation
This dissertation is organized in seven chapters, with the current chapter being the brief introduction to the
rest.
Chapter 2 provides the background to this research. It includes definition of common terms used in the
dissertation and provides a brief description of the research methodology.
Chapter 3 Provides the description of the prerequisites to the research - that is, a taxonomy generation
framework, a taxonomy, and defect similarity measures. The chapter describes the most relevant among the
existing categorizations of defects and analyzes their properties. The chapter then proceeds on proposing a
framework for developing extensible defect classifications and describes a defect classification scheme devel-
oped using the framework. Tests and analyses were conducted using the taxonomy before adopting it as the
taxonomy for the rest of this research, and the data from the tests and analyses is presented in this chapter.
Finally, the chapter describes the measures for defect similarity and establishes common similarity criteria.
Chapter 4, using the taxonomy established in Chapter 3, discusses the current state-of-the-art. It
describes and compares relevant tools and techniques that have been employed by defect detection activities
in the academia and industry. The techniques and tools were analyzed with respect to their reported strengths
and weaknesses. Chapter 4, along with the first part of Chapter 3, contributes to the literature review for
this research.
Chapter 5 gives the details of the proposed mechanism, SRTA, with its symbolic framework. The chapter
details the specifics of the adopted symbolic analysis, abstraction and the underlying model. The chapter
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then proceeds on describing the use of SRTA in detecting dissimilar classes of defects. The chapter includes
brief description of a prototype implementation of SRTA.
Chapter 6 details the experimental setup, data, and analyses on the data to assess the developed defect
detection technique. The technique is compared with existing tools using open-source projects, and through
a large-scale fault-injection experiment conducted with the aid of a Mutation-Injection framework.
Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Background
This chapter provides the background to this research. In Section 2.1, common terminology used in this
dissertation is provided. The next section, Section 2.2, provides an overview of research methodology and
research phases, including notes on information source selection, data acquisition and analysis, and specific
development information.
2.1 Terminology
This section describes the general terminology used in this dissertation. In addition to the ones presented
in this section, relevant terms and definitions are included in appropriate places in later chapters of the
dissertation.
2.1.1 Defect
Software defect has been the subject of multiple definitions. The definitions come from individual research,
as well as from standardization organizations like IEEE.
Fault
A fault is an accidental condition that causes a functional unit to fail to perform its required operation
[73, 122]. Often the fault leads to a failure [122] thus acting as the underlying cause of the failure.
Failure
A failure is an event where a system or a component of the system stops performing a required function within
acceptable boundaries [73, 122]. Failures are often classified as the breakdowns of the system functions or
the observable points of deviation from its expected course during execution. In summary, it is the observed
impact of faults.
Error
An error is the human action that results into a fault in the software - it can be an omission or misinterpre-
tation of user requirements in the software specifications, incorrect translation, or omission of a requirement
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in the design document [73, 122]. In summary, an error is the action that creates a fault.
Adopted Definition of Defect
Often the term “defect”, analogous to “fault” and “bug”, is defined differently by different sources - including
the mention as “a product anomaly” [73] or “the imperfections found in the code during technical reviews”
[122]. In the context of this study, a more elaborate definition relevant to source code is adopted.
Our adoption of the term source code defect indicates defects detectable from source code. In extended
definition, the term is used to indicate an artifact that,
(a) Exhibits its presence in source code, regardless of the origin,
(b) Is not a result of a language or environmental constraint beyond the control of the developer.
(c) Either produces wrong output or deviates the behaviour of the software from its expected course,
(d) Or provides a way to externally initiate or exploit the (c) above.
Throughout this dissertation, the term ‘defect’, unless mentioned otherwise, was used to indicate the
source code defect as described in this section. Clause (a) of this particular definition for defect was adopted
to ensure the defect come from source code only (that is, not policy problems or architectural violations).
Clause (b) excludes the cases where the developer was restricted by unsolvable constraints by the language
or environment. Clause (c) defines the generic nature of the defect, for proper identification. Finally, clause
(d) was included to include vulnerabilities in the set of defects.
Defect Location
Defect location is the process of isolating the specific locations or regions of source code that contain the
defect footprint and have to be modified for the removal of the defect [88]. Defect location complements defect
detection by adding the location information with the presence of defects. The location can be reported in
various granularities, to statements, functions, class definitions, files or modules.
2.1.2 System Qualities
Scalability
The term “Scalability” is defined for a system as, “a quality of software systems characterized by the causal
impact that scaling aspects of the system environment and design have on certain measured system qualities
as these aspects are varied over expected operational ranges” [46]. A scalable system is a system that can
accommodate this variation in a way that is acceptable to the stakeholders [46].
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In the present context, the phrase “aspects of the system environment” means the subject system’s size
that can be expressed as any software size metric (e.g., LOC1, Complexity, NASA’s Object Oriented Quality
Metrics [123]). The “measured system qualities” denote the capability of successful detection, with varying
size of the codebase and inferred information.
For this research, lines of code was adopted as the size metric and scalability was considered over a range
of the software LOCs.
Accuracy
Accuracy of detection refers to detection of the relevant artifacts. In determining the accuracy of detection,
two established measures were used in this research.
One of the measures, Precision, denotes the probability that a detected artifact is relevant [61]. That is,
out of all detected artifacts, it specifies the probability of any artifact’s being a relevant one. In this context,
the term “relevance” indicates that the detected artifact contains the properties it is expected to contain
(i.e., a defect has the properties that make it a defect). The other measure, Recall, expresses the probability
that a relevant artifact is detected among all present artifacts [61]. The two associated terms, false positive
rate and false negative rate, are alternate ways of expressing precision and recall. A false positive rate is the
portion of artifacts that were detected incorrectly, over all detected artifacts (thus, 1 - false positive rate is
the normalized precision) and a false negative rate is the portion of artifacts should be detected but are not,
over all existing artifacts (thus, 1 - false negative rate is the normalized recall).
Detailed information on precision and recall, including the mathematical expressions used to estimate
their values and the specific procedures followed in this research, is presented in Chapter 6.
2.1.3 SRTA Specifics
This section describes the terminology specific to this research.
Artifact
The term artifact is used in this dissertation to mean any significant entity in the source code. The definition
spans to variables, constants as well as to statements and language constructs.
Entity
An entity is an artifact in the software that participates in operations. An entity can be an object (for
object-oriented / object-based systems), a variable, a constant, an array, a reference or a pointer.
1Lines of Code. Usually counted excluding comments. Two variants are in widespread use. (a) S-LOC, or Source Lines of
Code is the number of linebreaks in the source, and (b) L-LOC, or Logical Line of Code, is the number of logical statements in
the source
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Atomic Entity
An atomic entity is an entity that cannot be decomposed into a collection of same or different entities. Any
entity with the basic type permitted in the programming language is an atomic entity.
Collective Entity
A collective entity is an entity that acts as a common reference point for a collection of atomic entities. Any
array or a pointer (for C / C++) that points to an array is a collective entity.
Composite Entity
A composite entity is a collection of atomic entities grouped under a common name. Any structure / class /
union is an example of a composite entity.
2.2 Research Methodology
This section describes the methodology used for the research. Different phases of research involved the
following,
(i) Literature survey.
(ii) Problem selection, specification and analysis.
(iii) Framework development for defect classification.
(iv) Experiment concerning the framework for defect classification.
(v) Model generation and analysis technique development.
(vi) Experiment and analysis under the developed model and analysis techniques.
Figure 2.1: Solution Phases for the Research
Development of the solution was performed in three distinct stages, as showin in Figure 2.1. In the figure,
rectangles denote particular solutions and the rounded rectangles denote the approach or technique for the
solution. The main goal of this research is to search for a technique for detecting dissimilar classes of defects.
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The realization of this problem requires a definition on ‘dissimilar classes of defects’, which was provided
by the defect similarity study. The defect similarity study, for its functioning, requires a suitable defect
taxonomy for the definition of defect classes and their properties. The bottom-up processing order of the
problems in the figure denotes the sequence of the steps.
Solutions to these problems are presented in the top-down approach on the same figure. FlexTax was
developed as a semi-automatic framework to create defect taxonomies. Once the taxonomies were generated,
similarity coefficients were applied to measure the similarity (and dissimilarity). These similarity measures
were then used to develop SRTA to solve the problem of detection. Literature Survey was involved in every
phase of the research.
2.2.1 Literature Survey
As the first part of our research, the approach to a systematic literature review [19, 80, 118] was followed
to collect, analyze and process information. We have conducted the step-by-step formulation of the liter-
ature study to make it unbiased, complete and comprehensive. The procedures we have followed in this
step comprise to the mandatory parts of the Planning-Conducting-Reporting methodology recommended by
Kitchenham et al. in their 2009 paper [80]. The steps included,
(i) Planning the review
(a) Identifying the need for a review
(b) Specifying the research questions
(c) Developing a review protocol
(ii) Conducting the Review
(a) Identification of research
(b) Selection of primary studies
(c) Study quality assessment
(d) Data extraction
(e) Data synthesis
(iii) Reporting the outcome
(a) Specifying dissemination mechanism
(b) Formatting the main report
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Table 2.1: Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
Property Item Inclusion Criteria Exclusion Criteria
Type Research Articles Peer Reviewed Position and Student Papers
Technical Reports
Magazine and Newspaper
Articles
Objective Reports Subjective Opinions
Content Tools / Techniques Address Source Code Defects Do not apply to Source Code Defects
Applicable to Source Code Defects Deprecated
Adaptable to Source Code Defects Proven Invalid
Relevance Year of Publication On or after 1990 Before 1980 (with notable exceptions)
Information Source Selection
We have used well known publication repositories to collect the published information that corresponds to the
research questions. In the fields of relevance, the ACM Portal and IEEE XPlore have been sources of interest
for their large collection of published articles and ranking flexibilities. We have complemented the search
using Google search and Google Scholar search to find relevant publications. Our effort built a repository of
more than 200 published artifacts that we have analyzed to prepare this study.
Our searching methodology was twofold. First, we searched the repositories for predefined search strings
that correspond to our research questions. Our search strings were formulated using original form, alternate
phrasings and synonyms for the structure (“bug”, “fault”, “defect”) (“”, “detection”, “analysis”). Second,
while exploring the papers that were collected from the first methodology, we have marked and collected
the relevant papers that did not turn up in the first search but were referred in the papers we have been
exploring.
Primary Studies Selection
To collect the data and information, we selected the publications for consideration based on defined inclusion
and exclusion criteria as summarized in Table 2.1. Our studies resulted on a large publication repository
that we have rigorously analyzed, categorized and included in this study. The studies conducted using the
materials are presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
Data Extraction and Analysis
We have collected the data from the publications that primarily reported the data on a tool or technique, or
performed an experimental study involving the tool or technique and reported data from the experiment. The
biggest ordeal for us was that, not all publications report the data on the parameters we are interested in, and
although sometimes it is possible to map or derive the data from the ones provided, there also are situations
where no direct data was provided by the publications to use in assessing specific tools and techniques.
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2.2.2 Problem Selection and Analysis
After the comprehensive analysis of the literature, we identified the issues and open problems relating to defect
detection, which defined the need for a unified detection approach for software defects and set the objectives
for this research. From the information we analyzed, it was clear that defect similarity metrics need to be
established before approaching the main problem of unified detection. Consequently, the prerequisites for
the main objective emerged as the establishment of a defect taxonomy and similarity metrics under a defined
framework.
2.2.3 Taxonomy Generation Framework and Taxonomy
To focus the research effort, a taxonomy on source code defects was necessary. Existing taxonomies, although
vast in numbers, do not usually provide separate treatment to source code defects. Thus, we required
a taxonomy to be constructed to cater for our need, additional to the requirement of defect similarity
assessment.
Instead of generating a specialized taxonomy suitable only for the current research, we have instead
proposed a framework for generating extensible taxonomies to suit general needs. The framework is gen-
eralized, flexible and automated to generate complete, orthogonal, non-redundant and abstract taxonomies
from earlier taxonomies or real defect data or a combination of both. The framework was used to generate
a taxonomy out of a large quantity of real defect data and evaluated against real data sources following
multiple procedures, including the use of machine learning classifiers and manual analysis. The taxonomy
generated by the framework was then used to analyze and compare existing tools and techniques with the
one developed. The Framework was described in Chapter 3.
2.2.4 Model Generation and Analysis Technique Development
To facilitate detection of dissimilar defects, source code needs to be incorporated into an abstract model that
enumerates necessary features required for the detection. A symbolic analysis model using range tuples was
designed for the purpose.
The model was used in multiple customizable analyses to detect the presence of the defects. The model
and the analyses were developed with the objective of generating high precision results with considerable
scalability across software sizes and implementation technology. The model and analysis techniques were
described in Chapter 5.
2.2.5 Experiment and Analysis
The model has been realized with a working prototype and applied on real-world systems to assess its
generality, detection capability, accuracy and scalability. The test systems were chosen from widely used
open-source projects and from diverse functional domains.
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To incorporate a comprehensive testing of the system, the experiment was performed in multiple different
sub-experiments. First, the prototype was applied on open-source software systems implemented across
two general purpose languages and the accuracy of detection was analyzed. To assess the false negative
performance, the prototype was evaluated against a benchmark, and was separately evaluated using a large-
scale fault injection experiment. Additionally, the prototype was compared against other state-of-the-art
tools through direct experiments, and through secondary data.
For each of the sub-experiments, a case-by-case analysis was performed to describe the prototype’s be-
haviour, limitations and advantages. Chapter 6 describes the experiment and analysis.
2.3 Summary
In this chapter, common terminology, and an overview on research methodology were provided. The chapter
started by providing the definition of common terminologies as they are used in this research and then contin-
ued on describing the research methodologies and phases. The methodologies provide details of information
sources, inclusion and exclusion criteria, research phases and sequence and analysis techniques.
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Chapter 3
A Taxonomy of Defects and Defect Similarity
This chapter describes a taxonomy of defects and a study on defect similarity. The chapter begins by
a section on the chapter-specific background (Section 3.1), and then continues on with a description of
taxonomy structures (Section 3.2) and the trend of taxonomy development with their desirable properties
(Section 3.3, Section 3.4), following the methodology outlined in Chapter 2. Using the notion of the outlined
properties, descriptions of notable defect taxonomies are provided next (Section 3.5). Next, aiming on
utilizing the analyzed features of defect taxonomies, a framework named FlexTax is proposed and described
along with the details of its underlying model and analysis techniques (Section 3.6). Next, the description
proceeds in detailing the experience of using FlexTax over the 25k real-world defect data of the CVE [119]
dataset (Section 3.7). This case study generated a taxonomy of software defects which is described in details
using examples and formal definitions (Section 3.7.3). This taxonomy’s evaluation using machine learning
classifiers and manual analysis against established databases is described in the next section (Section 3.8).
Finally, using this taxonomy, and considering the underlying principle of FlexTax, a study is described to
find defect similarity (Section 3.9).
3.1 Chapter-specific Background
This section provides chapter-specific terminology, definitions and descriptions, in addition to those provided
in Chapter 2.
Defect Class: A defect class, as it is used throughout this dissertation, is the description of a specific
phenomenon that has resulted from the underlying causes that count as defects. The defect class is the
description of the phenomenon, rather than the exact anomaly that results into the defect. One defect class
may contain one or more defect types. An example for a defect class is the ‘Undefined Outcome’, that
describes a situation where the outcome of an operation cannot be determined.
Defect Type: A defect type is an exact anomaly that is considered as a defect. A defect type describes one
specific problem in the code that, in effect, creates the detectable defect. One defect type contains more than
one defect instances. Continuing the example defect class from the previous definition, a defect type under
the class “Undefined Outcome” can be a division-by-zero, the use of an uninitialized value in an operation,
or performing undefined arithmetic operation.
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Defect Instance: A defect instance is the occurrence of an anomaly, belonging to a defect type, in the code.
Every single occurrence of an anomaly counts as a separate defect instance. Continuing the example from
the previous two definitions, every single division-by-zero instance counts as a defect instance.
As an example to illustrate the three terms, if a software’s code contains ten divisions-by-zero and ten
uninitialized value usage, it should count as twenty defect instances, two defect types and one defect class.
3.2 Taxonomy and Taxonomy Structures
A taxonomy is a classification system that allows one to uniquely identify the subjects of interest, often
depicting the subject of interest and its classification category as an ordered tuple [13]. In other words, a
taxonomy assigns a set of defects to a set of distinct classes or categories under a given rule. Taxonomies can
be formed for multiple purposes, and in three different structures, as reported by the literature.
3.2.1 Flat or Non-hierarchical Taxonomies
Flat taxonomies ideally contain one single set of distinct categories without any overlapping criteria. Such
taxonomies realize only one point-of-view at a time.
The advantages of flat taxonomies are the easier generation and simplified decision making - as there is
only one level of hierarchy, a new class can be added with the consideration of basic properties. The strongest
disadvantage of such taxonomies is the restriction on the freedom of interpretation. As such taxonomies (e.g.,
[82, 44, 10]) are developed only through one point-of-view, most often that of the developer, they are usually
not adaptable to other’s needs.
3.2.2 Hierarchical Taxonomies
Hierarchical taxonomies arrange the categories in different levels, where each level generalizes the levels below
it and specializes the levels above it. Hierarchical taxonomies can (but do not always) realize more than one
points-of-view at a time.
The most prominent advantage of hierarchical taxonomies is the increased degree of freedom of interpreta-
tion. The disadvantage of the hierarchical taxonomies is the more complex structure than the flat taxonomies.
Addition of a new class has to be decided from a number of different directions, should it contain more than
one views. Additionally, such taxonomies (e.g., [6, 116, 162, 99, 140, 120]) tend to suffer from difficulty in
completeness.
3.2.3 Matrices
Matrices arrange different perspectives or properties through different directions of arrangement, and use the
combinations of the cross-cutting directions to define defect categories. Matrices always realize more than
one points-of-view for classification.
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The advantage of matrices is that, they fully realize different points-of-view, providing room for later
interpretation. The disadvantage is that, based on dimensions, matrices can be complex to map into. The
addition of a new class on a matrix is dependent on the interaction of a number of different points-of-view.
Such taxonomies (e.g., [62, 28, 89]) tend to be the most flexible and extensible.
3.3 The Trend of Defect Taxonomies
In commercial software development projects, statistical fault density metrics act as tools of cost estimation
and decision support [128] and often suffice in achieving the goals. However, it is argued that a comprehensive
defect taxonomy is a necessity, and not just a supportive measure, for proper software quality assurance
activities [128, 140].
A number of defect taxonomies are in existence and being used, varying both in their content and intent
- focusing in areas such as errors, behaviours, functionalities, vulnerabilities, and, incidents and attacks
[156, 155]. The diversity of defects and their specialized attachments to different projects made it difficult
to apply the same set of defect classes to all, or most, projects and thus has contributed to the large
set of parallel taxonomies in existence today. None of the classifications has become a truly and broadly
applied practice, with their practical application restricted mainly on severity or impact only [159]. The
taxonomies are used much discretely by different organizations, sometimes having different branches of the
same organization adopting different taxonomies to describe the same defects [140]. The reasons for the
emergence of parallel taxonomies are attributed to different factors by the literature, including the diversity
of data sources and formats [140], independent applications of quality assurance techniques [54], lack of
orthogonality [54, 140, 124], use of parallel terminology [140], ambiguities or unclear descriptions [54], non-
standard documentations [54] and a learning curve associated with defect categorization at the early stages of
the projects that compel developers to record defects without properly classifying them [140]. Nevertheless,
whatever the reasons for not having one may be, the need for consistent defect taxonomies can neither be
denied nor ignored.
Although a few taxonomies like the Hewlett-Packard Defect Taxonomy and the Orthogonal Defect Clas-
sification Scheme have established themselves as prominent tools for defect analysis [54], it is difficult, if not
impossible, to develop a single taxonomy for all software systems of the world due to their extreme diversity
in technologies, objectives and tasks. Existing defect taxonomies for the implementation artifacts (i.e., source
code) have the same limitations, as it is apparent from multiple taxonomies that are in effect today. Although
the complete taxonomies that span all phases and artifacts of a software life-cycle differ due to the extremely
diverse tasks a software system achieves, different source code defect taxonomies do share similar elements
that can be generalized into a higher level of defect classifications with widespread applications.
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3.4 Criteria for Developing a Taxonomy
A number of factors have driven the defect classification objectives. Schemes have been developed focusing
on defect origin [89], essential functionalities [82], effects [89], activities to fix the defect [44] and the impact
the defect may cause [6]. Although different criteria are considered for different defect taxonomies and there
is no unanimous agreement by researchers about the complete set of properties that will identify a perfect
taxonomy, a number of desirable qualities were established and agreed upon by most of the concerned.
3.4.1 Desirable Properties
A study by Freimut [53] investigated the properties of defect taxonomies, along with those of the defects,
and made a number of recommendations that afterwards have made their way into notable research in
the field [140]. According to Freimut’s original recommendations [55] and a later follow up study [53], a
defect taxonomy should contain at least five desirable properties - Clearly Defined, Exemplified, Orthogonal,
Complete and Small in Number of Categories.
Clearly Defined: Each category in the taxonomy must be clearly and precisely defined [53]. This quality,
if ensured, can eliminate a number of problems prevalent in existing taxonomies, including the ambiguity
and strictly subjective usage.
Exemplified: Each category should be provided with example(s) [55, 53]. This recommendation aims
to establish that no hypothetical category is included, ensuring the non-redundancy of the taxonomy.
Complete - The categories should be complete in a sense that, a category exists for every defect encoun-
tered along the process [53].
Orthogonal - Categories should be mutually exclusive, so that only one category is applicable to a defect
[53].
Small Number of Categories - The number of categories should be small, typically from five to nine
[54]. We disagree with this particular recommendation as it is not always possible to ensure this property
over different points-of-view, and on different projects. Furthermore the term “Small Number”, due to its
subjective definition, can lead to confusion in taxonmies.
Additional to this set of properties, other researchers [12, 72, 107, 87] have proposed a number of properties
for good taxonomies that comply with this set of properties. A number of researchers seem to converge in one
opinion - that taxonomies should describe the properties of the elements they classify, and not the individual
problems themselves [111, 87, 12, 13].
3.4.2 Additional Properties
In addition to the proposed properties of taxonomies, we argue that two more properties need to be complied
with to make a taxonomy effective and useful.
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3.4.3 Flexibility
By the term ‘Flexibility’, we mean the ability of a taxonomy to accommodate itself with changing situations
without altering its base structure. In other words, flexibility means the ability of the taxonomy to reconfigure
its defect mapping based on the need. The rationale behind this argument consists of two points. First, while
developing a taxonomy, a developer may find situations that require a reinterpretation of previous decisions.
If a taxonomy is not reconfigurable, this reinterpretation usually requires discarding the unfinished taxonomy
and develop another from scratch. A reconfigurable taxonomy can avoid such workload by accommodating
the new interpretations and by remapping the defects as required.
The second argument is, as taxonomies are developed to serve subjective interests [90], often the taxonomy
developed by one do not suffice for the need of another on a similar endeavour. If the taxonomy is flexible,
the later user can reconfigure it according to the need and make it a better suited device for the task.
3.4.4 Extensibility
‘Extensibility’ is a common term in Software Engineering used to indicate the property of a software system
of being extended to encompass new requirements. In the present context, it is used to denote the means
to add new categories to taxonomies should the need arises. This property is required because, due to the
ubiquity of the nature of the software, it is not often possible to predict what situation may arise in future,
for other software or for the future versions of the same software. Such unforeseen situations also bring in yet
un-encountered defects. If a taxonomy does not provide a mechanism to extend itself to the need of the new
requirement, it runs the risk of being obsolete. In such cases,the efforts involved in developing a taxonomy
may be required to repeat for developing a new taxonomy for the same purpose for every new release of the
same software system. To preserve the consistency of the taxonomies, extensibility must be ensured over
defined and formal rules.
3.5 Existing Taxonomies
From an overwhelming number of present taxonomies, twelve taxonomies were chosen for analysis of their
properties. The taxonomies were chosen if they provided a specific treatment to source code defects, and
if they complied to any of the four additional criteria - (a) Developed in recent time (within 5 years),
(b) Received considerable citations, (c) Reported to have considerable success either in the industry or in
academia and (d) Provided an unusual treatment of the problem.
The discussion on the taxonomies include the reason behind its selection, a general description and the
taxonomy’s strengths and weaknesses.
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3.5.1 Taxonomies Focused on Specific Software
This section describes the taxonomies that apply to specific software only. The taxonomies discussed in this
section were either developed using a single software system, or were developed to be applied on a single
software system.
Errors of TEX
Published by Knuth [82] in 1989, a description of errors in the popular typesetting system TEX created one
of the earlier examples of defect taxonomies. This classification scheme was based on essential functionality
rather than being based on the external observable artifacts of the program [6, 82].
The Errors of TEX creates categories with the names, “An algorithm gone awry”, “A blunder or a mental
typo”, “A clean up for consistency or clarity”, “A data structure debacle”, “An efficiency enhancement”, “A
forgotten function”, “A generalization or growth of ability”, “An interactive improvement”, “A language lia-
bility”, “A mismatch between modules”, “A promotion of portability”, “A quest for quality”, “Reinforcement
of robustness”, “A surprising scenario” and “A Trivial Typo” [82, 6].
However, this classification is focused on TEX system only and is difficult to apply on systems where
the original code writer is not the one applying the classification [87], making it strongly subjective. The
taxonomy is complete till the time it was applied, with no possible extension in future - thus having a
tendency towards incompleteness once a new feature is added or the software is reimplemented. It is strongly
non-orthogonal as multiple categories overlap with each other.
DeMillo and Mathur’s Classification
DeMillo and Mathur [44] proposed a grammar based defect classification scheme as the basis of an automatic
defect classifier and applied it on the Errors of TEX [82]. Their scheme classifies a defect into one of the
four major classes - “Missing entity”, “Spurious entity”, “Misplaced entity” and “Incorrect entity” where an
entity is a representation of the defect [44]. Among their classes, missing entities are the ones that require
the introduction of an element in the code to correct it [44], encompassing all kinds of omitted checks and
cleanup codes. The second of the four, spurious entity, indicates those faults that require a removal from its
characteristic elements from the code [44] - thus many security flaws, code clones [137, 133] and performance
bugs qualify for this category. Third in the category, misplaced entity, denotes those cases where an element
is required to be relocated inside code to remove the defect [44] and the fourth and last category, incorrect
entity, is described simply as the defect that cannot be classified into any of the other three [44].
This taxonomy is strongly objective, requiring minimum human supervision, and no subjective discretion,
in its generation process. However, the taxonomy suffers from an extremely concise structure involving four
categories only, which may suffice for a single system like TEX, but are not applicable to larger and more
diverse systems like the Unix.
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3.5.2 Taxonomies Focused on Organizations and Processes
This section describes the taxonomies that were aimed at specific organizations or engineering processes.
The Hewlett-Packard Scheme
The Hewlett-Packard Taxonomy includes all phases of development [54]. A defect is described using three
attributes - “Origin”, “Type” and “Mode”. Origin refers to the phase of introduction for the defect, type
describes a particular origin in more details and mode describes the reason for which the defect is considered
a defect [54]. The choice of origin specifies a set of values that further elaborates the origin [53].
In the predefined six choices for origin, only one is dedicated to code. The types associated with code
draw from the set containing “Interprocess Communications”, “Data Definition”, “Module Design”, “Logical
Description”, “Error Checking”, “Standards”, “Logic”, “Computation”, “Data Handling” and “Interface
Implementation” with the first six shared with design defects [53]. For each of the types, a single attribute
from the list of “Missing”, “Unclear”, “Wrong”, “Changed” and “Better way” can be assigned [53].
The HP Taxonomy provides a generic structure applicable across software development companies in their
tasks, and is generic to be adopted to other granularities. But the taxonomy is neither flexible nor extensible,
limiting its applicability beyond the range of application software.
The Orthogonal Defect Classification Scheme
Introduced by IBM, the Orthogonal Defect Classification scheme (ODC) was developed focusing on the
defects found in code [54]. ODC associates a defect with a set of orthogonal attributes that identify the
process requiring attention, in the same way of characterizing a point using n values in an orthogonal n-axis
Cartesian space [28].
The ODC identifies eight defect types to be applied on the processes [28]. Coding is described as a process
thus the defect types do apply to code defects, along with their relevance to other artifacts, processes and
phases of the software life cycle. The scheme focuses on the existential attributes of defects instead of the
inference based approximate location of its injection [28].
Of the eight defect types, the first is “Function”, that denotes a problem in a new feature added to
the software. The second type is “Interface”, that accounts for both the internal and external interfaces
of the components. The third defect type, named “Checking”, refers to the validation rules in the code.
The fourth type, “Assignment”, denotes all kinds of data assignment operations. The fifth type, “Timing
/ Serialization”, denotes the defects that occur in concurrent or distributed programming where resource
sharing and parallelism are in effect. The sixth type, “Build/Package/Merge”, includes defects in build
systems, libraries, version control and migration. The seventh type, “Documentation”, is the set of defects
that affect both publications and maintenance notes and the last of the types, “Algorithm”, describes a
code defect in its pure form - any logical or arithmetic error that affects the efficiency or effectiveness of the
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software and can be fixed by correcting or at best, re-implementing a module [28].
A notable point about the ODC is that it is not a concrete or fixed defect classification scheme. Rather
it is more of a concept that was instantiated through the eight defect types, and that includes room for any
adoption in compliance with its basic requirements, the requirements being orthogonality, consistency across
phases and uniformity across processes [28].
3.5.3 Taxonomies Focused on System Aspects
This section describes taxonomies that were developed on generalized system properties, instead of a specific
software, engineering process or organization.
Unix Security Taxonomy
Published by Aslam in 1995 [6], this taxonomy focuses on security faults present in Unix Systems and takes
an approach to classify defects through software fault analysis. The faults are classified into three distinct
groups - “Operation faults”, “Environment faults” and “Coding faults”, of which coding faults are directly
relevant to our current study. This taxonomy relies on a defect database [6] and employs objective decision
making processes [13].
One strict criticism of this taxonomy is that, despite the incorporation of real world data, the taxonomy
was designed for implementation specific UNIX faults only [13]. A second issue, as pointed out by Bishop [13],
is that the Unix Security Taxonomy contains very prominent ambiguities due to its insufficient specification
of the point-of-view.
Extracted from the taxonomy, we found the relevant-to-code elements to be two types of coding faults, the
“Condition validation error” and “Synchronization error”. The condition validation error is defined to contain
two categories, “Failure to handle exceptions” and “Input validation error”, with the latter further subdivided
into “Field value correlation error”, “Syntax error”, “Type and number of input fields”, “Missing input” and
“Extraneous input” [6, 156]. Synchronization errors contain “Improper or inadequate serialization” and
“Race condition”.
Landwehr’s Program Security Flaw Taxonomy
Landwehr [89] developed a taxonomy from three different angles - “Genesis”, “Point of introduction” and
“Location” [156]. Of the three, a number of defects correspond to the source code defects. These defects,
even if they do not get exploited as security flaws, can cause improper behaviour by the software and thus fall
into our interest. Categorized under the super-category “Inadvertent Flaws”, these types include “Incom-
plete or inconsistent validation”, “Domain error”, “Serialization or aliasing”, “Inadequate authentication”,
“Boundary condition violation” and “Exploitable logic errors” [89].
This taxonomy is specific in its task, focusing on security flaws only. Although its three-tier consideration
of the defects provides a different approach towards the classification problem, it is not applicable beyond
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small-scale desktop systems.
Basili and Pericone’s Taxonomy
Published in 1984, Basili and Pericone’s Software Fault Taxonomy classifies the faults based on environmental
factors [10]. Although the taxonomy suffers from a few ambiguous definitions [44], it provides five classes
that all relate to code defects. The classes of defects are mentioned as “Initialization”, “Control structure”,
“Interface”, “Data” and “Computation” [10, 44]. This taxonomy is notable for its unusual treatment of
software defects in relation to environmental cause.
3.5.4 Classification of Unusual Code Defects
This section provides an additional classification of software defects.
Bohrbug
Bohrbugs, named after the Bohr Atomic Model, are trivial defects that exhibit themselves subject to a set
of conditions and can be detected easily [65]. Bohrbugs are often described as permanent defects [83] that
do not change their nature with changes in the environment.
Heisenbug
Heisenbugs are defects that elude detection by changing nature through the change in execution environment,
thus making their observation and correction difficult at the same time. Named after the Heisenberg’s
Uncertainty Principle, these defects are transient defects [83] that depend on the execution configuration and
thus are often observable in a finished product, but not in its development version. A study [65] argues that
all software defects are either Bohrbugs or Heisenbugs, with another [83] supporting the claim after almost
two decades, using the experience over grid applications. Based on the observations made on defect types
that are described later in this chapter, this research agrees with the observation that defects can be either
transient or consistent (i.e., permanent), thus agreeing with the statement.
3.5.5 Other Taxonomies
Apart from the ones already described, a number of different taxonomies exist that involve code defects, that
we do not describe as their types are covered one way or the other by the ones described. The taxonomies
focusing on generic software defects are rare, but most of those focusing on software security include software
defects in their classification scheme. A number of dissertations [72, 87] that focused on computer or network
security taxonomies, included code defects either directly or through some indirect form.
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Table 3.1: Properties of Analyzed Defect Taxonomies
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1. HP Scheme [62] HP G#  10(21) M G# G# G#  G# G# G# G# [53, 54, 153]
2. ODC [28] IBM G#  5(8) M G#     G# G#  [53, 28, 153, 156, 114, 99, 140, 128]
3. Errors of TEX [82] TEX  # 9(15) F # # G# # # # # # [44, 156, 128]
4. DeMillo & Mathur [44] TEX #  4(4) F  G# G# #   # # [44, 128]
5. Unix Security Taxonomy [6] Unix G# G# 9(12) H # G#  #  # # # [6, 156, 162, 13]
6. Landwehr [89] Security  # 10(13) M G# G#  #  # # G# [89, 156, 162, 6, 12, 72, 107]
7. Basili & Pericone [10] Complexity  # 5(5) F # G#  #  # # # [44, 99]
8. Mariani [116] Components  # 10(18) H G#   #  # # # [140]
9. Weber [162] Security  # 17(17) H # G# G# #  # # # [162]
10. Leszak et al. [99] Projects  G# 11(21) H G# # # # G# G# G# G# [140]
11. Seaman et al. [140] Projects G# G# 10(24) H G# G# G# G# G# # # G# [140]
12. Nakamura et al. [120] Projects  # 8(9) H G# # # # #  # # [120]
Legend:  = Strong, G#= Weak, #= None
# Categories: Categories related to source code (Total number of categories) - counted at the most elaborate level
Model: F = Flat, M = Matrix, H = Hierarchical
3.5.6 Prominent Issues with Present Taxonomies
Table 3.1 lists a comparison of 12 existing taxonomies that treat source code defect either exclusively, or
with a considerable coverage. The leftmost column lists the taxonomies, or the name of the authors in case
the taxonomy is not referred by a generic name. The second column, focus, mentions the target of original
taxonomy development - which is either a specific system, or specific type of projects or organizations. The
Subjectivity and Objectivity columns describe the development bias of the taxonomy.
Implicit Focus to Source Code
Most defect taxonomies focus on defects in the entire system, with minimal, and often no focus, to source
code defects. Despite the fact that source code contains 75% of the total defects of the software system [99], it
is not the focus of an equal share of taxonomies. In Table 3.1, the column ‘#Categories’ shows the analyzed
taxonomy’s focus on source code.
The taxonomies that do focus on source code (e.g., [54, 28, 6, 82, 44, 10]) suffer from other issues, as
pointed out by a number of studies [44, 140], and described in subsequent sections.
Subjectivity and Objectivity
Table 3.1 shows the subjective and objective bias of taxonomies. In the table, the bias for both subjectivity
and objectivity were denoted using one of the three symbols - ‘strong’, ‘weak’ and ‘none’. The term ‘bias’ is
used to express the actual methodology of developing the taxonomy - a subjective bias being the application
of developer’s discretion in the generation process, and an objective bias being the application of automated
or automation capable rules or methods in the generation. A strong bias in any of the column indicates that
the bias denoted by the column is a necessary and sufficient element in generating the taxonomy. A weak
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indicator denotes that the bias can be applied, but is not sufficient to generate the taxonomy on its own. A
no bias indicator expresses the absence of the particular bias in the generation process. For example, a strong
subjective and weak objective bias means that the developer’s discretion and objective rules both can result
in the taxonomy, but developer’s discretion alone can generate the complete taxonomy, while the objective
rules require the discretion as its supportive mean to achieve the goal.
As it is apparent from Table 3.1, most taxonomies have strong bias towards subjectivity. The taxonomies
that are developed entirely on subjective discretion (e.g., [82, 10, 89]) tend to be specialized, and are often
obscured for later interpretation, as can be inferred from the columns grouped under ‘scope’. The human
centric procedure for subjective development may also introduce more inaccuracies into the taxonomies
developed in this way than their objective counterparts.
Taxonomies that focus entirely on the objective end (e.g., [44]) are likely to result in extremely concise
structures that can only be used by specific software systems and groups that develop the system, as it
is apparent from the ‘number of categories’ column. The advantage it offers over the purely subjective
taxonomies is that the procedure can be applied on similar systems, but it does not create a single taxonomy
that can be applied on more than one systems.
Regardless of the development process, it is argued that taxonomies are developed to serve subjective
interests [90] by providing insights into the subject of interest. This argument can be extended in having
taxonomies to incorporate subjectivity in their construction. Most widely adopted taxonomies (e.g., HP,
ODC [28]) incorporate both the subjective and objective activities into the development process - which
seems to be an inevitable quality for any taxonomy intended to be generalized over multiple subjects.
Specialization
The columns grouped under ‘Scope’ in Table 3.1 show the generality of the taxonomies across four perspectives
- Organizations, Systems, Projects and Processes. Business entities were considered as ‘Organizations’ (e.g.,
HP, IBM or NASA), specific computer software groups or frameworks were included in ‘Systems’ (e.g.,
UNIX), specific standalone software were considered in ‘Projects’ (e.g., TEX) and the more general processes
of development were included in ‘Processes’. A taxonomy’s compliance to generality across each perspective
is marked as either ‘strong’, ‘weak’ or ‘none’. A strong value in any of the perspectives denotes that the
taxonomy is ready to be used across different entities in that perspective. A weak association is used to denote
cases where a taxonomy cannot be readily applied, but can be adapted into one, across that perspective. A
no association denotes that the taxonomy can neither be applied nor adapted across the perspective. For
example, in row 6 of the table, Landwehr’s taxonomy is reported to be applicable to different systems, with
no application across organizations, processes or projects.
Most taxonomies are developed with a narrow focus for the defect targets. Often, the focus is on specific
software systems [44, 155, 6, 12], specific technologies [116, 114, 115], and specific defect types, most often
security faults only [162, 111, 89, 155, 6, 12, 72].
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Violation of Desirable Properties
Most of the taxonomies are criticized for violating the desirable properties for effective taxonomies. Many
of the taxonomies, especially the ones that are created via purely subjective discretion, are criticized for
having unclear definitions, confusing mapping and overlapping categories - thus violating the orthogonality
principle.
In Table 3.1, the last three properties grouped under “Properties” show the compliance to desirable
properties. A strong indicator indicates that the taxonomy completely complies with the mentioned property,
a weak indicator indicates the taxonomy attempts to comply with the property but contains problems that
prevent its complete compliance, and a none indicator indicates the taxonomy does not attempt to comply
with the property.
Most taxonomies violate the orthogonality principles by one way or the other, often through ambiguities
present in their definitions, as pointed out by numerous studies [44, 6, 12, 89, 116].
The phenomena that “views to the systems have different levels of abstraction” and “the same defect may
belong to different classes due to different abstraction levels” were observed as a problem to the validity of
a taxonomy by Bishop and Bailey [13] but argued against by Weber [162]. Weber’s argument was that, if a
defect manifests this property of being classified in different groups at different abstractions, it is due to the
property of the defect and not the flaw of the taxonomy.
Extensibility
Extensibility is a feature overlooked by most taxonomies, as Table 3.1 displays. In the ‘Extensibility’ column, a
strong indicator is used to express that the taxonomy explicitly considers extensibility as one of its objectives.
A weak indicator means the taxonomy does not consider extensibility as a development objective, but provides
a degree of extensibility using an “Others” category or a similar construct. A none indicator indicates the
taxonomy is completely non-extensible.
A question may arise at this point about our advocacy of Extensibility that we consider as a desirable prop-
erty for taxonomies. The “Others” category clearly goes against the desirable property of non-redundancy
while providing a degree of extensibility. The extensibility we speak in favour of, is not reflected in the
extensibility provided by the “Others” category. Our argument was in favour of ‘Controlled and Specific’
extensibility, while the one provided by including an “Others” category in the taxonomy is both uncontrolled
and unspecific. Such inclusions can create inconsistencies in the taxonomies in future, which our recommen-
dations do not intend to. The controlled and specific extensibility that we recommend ensures the taxonomy
is extended following strict rules, and under defined formal methodologies, ensuring the preservation of
consistency.
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3.6 A Framework for Developing Extensible Defect Taxonomies
This section describes FlexTax (FLexible EXtensible TAXonomies), a human supervised automated system
for defect mapping into flexible and extensible taxonomies that are generated as the defects are being mapped.
3.6.1 Development Objectives
The development objectives of FlexTax can be summarized as,
(i) Defining objectivity of an automated system within subjective bounds of a human supervisor.
(ii) Balancing the workload between the automated system and human supervisor.
(iii) Representation of multiple points-of-view.
(iv) Ensuring flexibility and extensibility.
(v) Providing perfectly orthogonal defect mapping, instead of perfectly orthogonal definitions.
Software is ubiquitoes and it is not possible to enumerate all tasks a software performs or will perform in
the future. This translates to the statement that ‘all’ future defects cannot be identified. Therefore, trying to
develop a taxonomy that can be applied to all situations of the present and future is impractical. However, a
workaround to this matter can be developed. If a taxonomy is flexible and automated, it can at least become
consistent for the present situation, without a guarantee of future performance. And if it is extensible, it
can provide a way to accommodate future change. The combination of flexibility and extensibility thus can
make a taxonomy resilient to invalidation - although cannot guarantee its being perfect or everlasting.
Objectivity within Subjective Bounds
Quantification, classification and definition of individual defects are often subjective notions [90]. Being
developed for human interpretation, it is not always possible for a taxonomy to leave off all subjective
elements. On the other hand, to be precise and non-redundant, a defect taxonomy requires the employment
of objective methods. In the framework, an effort was made to balance and formalize the subjectivity, instead
of trying to eliminate it altogether.
FlexTax aims to define the objectivity within the bounds of subjective requirements - making the process
of classification automation-possible, while retaining the flexibility of interpretation offered by subjective
choices.
Workload Balance
The working principle of FlexTax aims to balance the workload between the human supervisor and automated
processes. The supervisor defines the boundary of processes and specifies the directions of the processing,
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Figure 3.1: Functional Structure of FlexTax
while the automated system handles the tasks that have high effort requirements - like mapping, determining
the point where a new category is required, or the reconfiguration of the taxonomy if required.
Figure 3.1 shows the concept of FlexTax. In Figure 3.1(a), specific tasks are shown for the human
supervisor and the automated system and Figure 3.1(b) shows the flow of operations. As shown in Figure
3.1(a), the tasks that require high efforts, like re-configuring the entire taxonomy when a new class is added
or determining the requirements for a new class, are left to the automated system while the relatively less
effort heavy tasks, like approving weights and determining properties are left to the human supervisor.
FlexTax implements the development objectives through a set of perspectives, a set of attributes, one
conversion function and one mapping function, as described in subsequent sections.
Multi-layered Taxonomy Representation
Different taxonomies correspond to different points-of-view and all except flat taxonomies may accommodate
more than one points-of-view. Often inputs to the same classification process come from multiple and
different perspectives, generating different versions of the same taxonomy. To develop a taxonomy that
serves or accommodates multiple interests, a mechanism is required to represent the taxonomy in multiple
directions at the same time.
To make a taxonomy beneficial through different phases of the defect reporting, detection and removal
process, FlexTax considers different perspectives through different directions of the taxonomy. A perspective
is considered as a subjective interpretation of a defect’s nature from one specific point-of-view and is realized
through a set of attributes that corresponds to the perspective. In other words, the attributes to defects
and defect classes are chosen with a view to realize a specific perspective. A perspective is not meant for
processing by the automated framework, and can be free-form.
For flat taxonomies, FlexTax uses exactly one perspective that describes the general direction of the
classification. As flat taxonomies do not incorporate more than one points-of-view, one perspective suffices
for its need.
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For hierarchical taxonomies, multiple perspectives are used with relation to each other - each perspective
being applicable to one level of classification. Every perspective except the one corresponding to the topmost
level elaborates the perspective above it, and every perspective except the one corresponding to the bottom-
most level generalizes the perspective below it.
For matrices, FlexTax uses multiple perspectives without relation to each other. That is, every single
perspective describes the taxonomy from a different point-of-view and even though one might generalize or
specialize another, it is not an explicit relation.
Perspectives are realized through a set of Attributes, which are features describing the defects and classes.
The attributes, like the perspectives, are meant for the human supervisor and do not require a strict structure
(can be natural language constructs). However, the compliance of the defects and classes need to determined
with respect to these attributes, and thus their definitions are not entirely free-form like those of the perspec-
tives. An attribute definition is required to provide exactly one comparable feature for the class or defect.
For example, “Assigning an entity a value larger than its maximum capability” can be an attribute, while
“Assigning an improper value to an entity” is not, because the first statement can be utilized to find a strict
compliance while the second cannot be as it contains the ambiguous term “improper” which might mean a
number of situations.
Characterization
A defect can be characterized in many ways - and it has been done in previous research from the point of
effect, root cause, or technicality. Considering the scope of the defect in this study, a single characterization
approach might pose a problem with orthogonality, and may hinder the extensibility.
FlexTax considers a defect class as a quantitative characterization of a set of attributes selected in com-
pliance with the perspectives. The collection of attributes represent a set of features determined through the
specific perspectives. Any two perspectives may share attributes, but the two sets of attributes correspond-
ing to any two perspectives are not identical. The attributes are assigned numerical weights that distinguish
every combination of attributes from all other combinations. Every defect has a corresponding compliance
vector that denotes its compliance to the set of attributes. This compliance vector is then converted, through
a conversion function, into a point in an n-dimensional Euclidean Space that denotes the characteristics of
the specific defect.
Defect classes, like defects, are represented under the same Euclidean Space and through the same mech-
anism. A defect class is simply an ideal defect of that class, one that complies with every single attribute
relevant to that class. This approach was chosen to facilitate a few benefits. First, it classifies defect classes
and defects under the same framework - making it possible to build the taxonomy from earlier taxonomies,
real world defects, or a combination of both using the same techniques. Second, it provides a way to resolve
the orthogonality problems with carefully chosen values for specific attributes. Third, it provides a way of
prioritizing specific classes by segregating planes that contain the defect classes through any dimension.
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To make classes distinct from one another, FlexTax segregates the attributes relating to a class as a
set of Essential Attributes and a set of Optional Attributes, with the sets being mutually exclusive to each
other. An attribute belonging to the set of optional attributes for a class can be an optional attribute for any
number of other classes, but an attribute being an essential attribute to a class is exclusive to that class’s
essential attributes only, although it can be an optional attribute for any other class. To become a member
of a class, a defect has to contain the same essential attributes, although may not have all or any of the
optional attributes.
The characterization of the defect and defect class is done through a conversion function that accepts
the defect and defect class’s compliance vectors and computes an intermediate representation using a defined
mapping function. The intermediate representation is a vector expressed in an n-dimensional Euclidean
space - with each dimension expressing one perspective. Thus the intermediate representation’s projection
on any axis denotes the affinity of the defect or defect class towards the perspective represented by that axis.
The definition of the conversion function remain fixed for any taxonomy, but are not restricted by FlexTax.
Different taxonomies may have different mapping functions based on the situation under which the taxonomy
is developed.
After the conversion function’s characterization of a defect, a mapping function performs the mapping of
a defect to a defect class under defined criteria. These criteria involve the intermediate representations and,
like the conversion function, are not restricted by FlexTax, although must remain fixed for one taxonomy.
Orthogonality
A problem of orthogonality immediately arises from the procedure mentioned in the previous section. If a
point corresponding to a defect (a defect-point) is equally associative to points corresponding multiple defect
classes (defect-class-points), then the classification becomes undecidable. Often it is not possible to provide
completely orthogonal definitions for a defect, owing to the different interpretations by different users. To
account for this reality, FlexTax does not aim to eradicate all traces of non-orthogonality from a defect class’s
description, rather focuses on assigning the defect to the most relevant defect class should a situation with
multiple associations arises.
Often, orthogonality cannot be ensured as a strict rule for taxonomies. An example is shown in Listing
3.1. A buffer overflow means accessing a piece of memory beyond the permitted range, and an off-by-one
error is the offset of a desired value by one. There can be a situation where an off-by-one error results into a
buffer overflow, as is depicted in the listing. Still, it is not possible to substitute the definition of one by the
other because off-by-ones are not the only causes of buffer overflows, and not all off-by-one errors result into
buffer overflows. If they are merged into one class, the class has to exclude situations of arithmetic errors
that do not contribute to buffer overflows. To accommodate such situations, deliberate overlapping regions
have to be kept in defect class definitions. FlexTax realizes this practical situation, and focuses on completely
orthogonal mapping instead of completely orthogonal definitions.
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Listing 3.1: Code Listing Showing Situation of Non-orthogonality
1 int a [ 1 0 0 ] ;
2 for ( int i = 0 ; i <= 100 ; i++)
3 {
4 a [ i ] = 0 ;
5 }
The fact that different types of defects correspond to different levels of response (e.g., complete failure,
major deviation, minor deviation) can be characterized through prioritization of defect classes according to
severity. The prioritization, in addition to expressing the relative defect severity, can also solve the problem
of orthogonality to some degree by identifying the most bizarre effect resulting from a defect. FlexTax’s
concept of Essential Attributes assigned to classes and defects eliminate any confusing mapping scenario,
where non-exclusive properties for a class are included in the optional attributes.
FlexTax considers numerical weights assigned to the defect classes - in the form of the values in the
characterization vector. The defects are thus segregated into different lines (if taxonomy contains two per-
spectives), planes (if the taxonomy contains three perspectives) or hyperplanes (if the taxonomy contains
more than three perspectives) (hereinafter, the generic term ‘plane’ is used to mean either of the three). Any
two planes across a perspective contain two different groups of classes based on their relative importance, as
set by the weight setting policy. The values are set so that the distances between planes that hold defect
class points of different priorities are at least twice the maximum distance between any two defect class point
on the same plane through the same perspective. The reason for this adoption is to force the defect points
to be closer to the maximum significant, or maximum prioritized defect classes. Thus for confusing defects,
the defect gets associated with the most severe defect class, nullifying the effect of other associations.
To implement the weight for a class, the attributes are assigned weights through a weight assignment
policy. This weight assignment policy, in addition to the conversion and mapping functions, is the third
configurable aspect of FlexTax that can be modified with need, but should remain constant for a single
taxonomy.
Extensibility
To create extensible taxonomies, there has to be a mechanism to determine the point where new defect classes
need to be incorporated into the taxonomy. In congruence with the prioritization scheme set in the previous
section, it can be safely assumed that in case a defect’s proximity to the nearest defect class is bigger than
the distance of the prioritized planes, a new plane with higher/lower priorities needs to be introduced - that
is, a new parent class needs to be introduced.
If a defect is not close enough (by means of Euclidian Distance) to any defect class under a perspective,
but is not distant enough to form a new plane, a new defect class needs to be introduced under the same
parent class.
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Figure 3.2: Structure and Representation of a Multi-layer Hierarchical Taxonomy
Figure 3.2 shows a conceptual view of the multi-layer taxonomy. With Figure 3.2(a) denoting the struc-
ture of a three layer hierarchical taxonomy and Figure 3.2(b) showing the representation in FlexTax. The
representation shows three planes prioritized along perspective 3. A defect point would have the same priority
as its closest plane.
3.6.2 Formalization
This section provides the formal framework for FlexTax. The expressions written in this section followed the
conventions - using upper case letters to denote sets, upper case letters with subscripts to denote subsets,
lower case letters with subscripts to denote set elements and Greek letters to denote constants.
Let,
(i) D = {d1, d2, ...} a set of defects existing in code.
(ii) P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} a set of n perspectives (i.e., subjective directions) to categorize those defects.
(iii) A = {a1, a2, ..., am} a set of m attributes for defects, determined with respect to the set P . For every
pi ∈ P , there exists a subset Ai ⊆ A. For i 6= j, Ai and Aj may not be mutually exclusive.
(iv) W = {w1, w2, ..., wm} a collection of m numerical weights corresponding to the attributes in set A. For
every ai ∈ A, there exists a wi ∈W .
(v) C = {c1, c2, ..., cx} is a set of defect classes, where, for any perspective pi, there exists a Ci ⊆ C. For
i 6= j, Ci and Cj are mutually exclusive.
(vi) B = {b1, b2, ..., bm} is a collection of m values to denote a single level compliance to each element ai ∈ A.
Naturally, a Bi ⊆ B exists for every Ai ⊆ A. Unlike W and A, B has to have separate instance Bci for
every single ci ∈ C and Bdi for every single di ∈ D.
(vii) M = {m1,m2,m3, ...} is a collection of intermediate values for defects and defect classes. The set M
can be considered a model to represent any entity, that is, any defect or defect class.
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(viii) Weight : W → R, where R is the set of real numbers, is a relation that assigns weights to different
members in the set W.
(ix) Convert : D → M is a conversion function that converts the defect features into an intermediate
representations.
(x) Map : M → C is a mapping function that maps a defect’s intermediate representation to a specific
defect class.
(xi) α is a predefined minimum separation between any two classes on the same plane.
Defect Characterization
For any defect di and defect class cj , there is an Euclidean Vector V
d
i = {vdi (1), vdi (2), ...vdi (n)} and V ci =
{vci (1), vci (2), ...vci (n)} where every value in the vector corresponds to a real value determined by the associa-
tion of the vector to one pk ∈ P . The association, in this case, is denoted by the position of the point along
the particular axis that represents the perspective pk.
The values vi(n) are determined by analyzing the compliance of the defect or defect class to the set of
attributes, and through association of the attributes to the set of perspectives. The conversion function
accepts the compliance vector for a defect, or class, and produces the vector V di or V
c
i .
The conversion function can be customized to realize different conversion policies (e.g., defining preemptive
attributes, creating prioritized relations or creating attribute dependency). For this experiment, however, a
simplified conversion scheme was adopted that sums up all corresponding weights towards a perspective.
vi(n) =
m∑
k=1
bk ∗ wk ∗ z(k) for every bk ∈ Bi (3.1)
where,
z(k) = 1 if ak corresponds to pn, 0 otherwise
Algorithm 3.1 shows the conversion algorithm in pseudocode.
Relating defects with classes
A mapping function decides the association between a defect and any corresponding defect class. In case a
reasonable mapping cannot be defined, a new class is incorporated to the set of classes. The new class is
derived from the defect that posed the requirement for the new class, and thus contains the same attributes
the defect contains.
The mapping function is a configurable entity that has two distinct parts. The first part is the comparison
metric, and the second part is a criterion to satisfy for the mapping. There can be a number of mapping,
including average, weighted average, different distance metrics and other combinations. For the experiment
to test FlexTax, a simple mapping was adopted. For the current experiment, the mapping is done through
computing the Euclidean Distance between the two vectors.
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Algorithm 3.1: ConvertDefectToModel
Data:
d: The defect to be mapped
P: The set of Perspectives
A: The set of Attributes
W: The set of Weights
Bd: The compliance vector for d
Result:
M(d): Interpediate Representation of d
1 Let val(p)← The value across perspective p;
2 for each p ∈ P do
3 Set val(p)← 0;
4 for each ai ∈ A do
5 if a corresponds to p then
6 Set z ← 1;
7 end
8 else
9 Set z ← 0;
10 end
11 set val(p)← val(p) + Bdi ∗ wi ∗ z;
12 end
13 end
14 return val(p) as M(d);
Considering dist(V1, V2) to be the Euclidean Distance between the two vectors, that is,
dist(V1, V2) =
√√√√ n∑
k=1
{v1(k)− v2(k)}2 (3.2)
and,
proximity(di, cj) = min(dist(Vd(i), Vc(k)) for all ck ∈ C) (3.3)
The mapping condition, for the current research, is defined as,
proximity(di, cj) ≤ Tp (3.4)
where,
Tp = a threshold used to validate proximity.
The weights wk assigned to the attributes have the purpose of distinguishing one defect attribute from
another, and do not quantify any concrete measurement. This matter can be exploited by assigning arbitrary
values for different attributes over a particular perspective.
To put the framework to use in generating a taxonomy, we have used the following rule. For all unassigned
weights wk associated with the attributes for a new defect class, if the attribute is not among essential
attribute, the weight 1 is assigned. For the attributes that belong to the set of essential attributes, a total
weight is distributed among them. The total weight is calculated as α more than the maximum of total
attribute values of all other classes. Algorithm 3.2 shows the weight assignment policy.
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Algorithm 3.2: WeightOfAttribute
Data:
x: The attribute to assign weight to
P: The Set of Perspectives
E: The set of Essential Properties
O: The set of Optional properties
Result:
w: Weight of x
1 Let α← The minimum distance between two classes ;
2 Let κ← Number of elements in E ;
3 if x ∈ E then
4 Let p← The perspective associated with x;
5 Let v ← The maximum value towards p for all c ∈ C ;
6 return v+ακ ;
7 end
8 else
9 return 1.
10 end
Figure 3.3: The Procedure of Mapping Defects to Classes
3.6.3 Procedure for Mapping Defects
Mapping of the defects, and building and extending the taxonomy in the process, is interactive with the
requirement of feedback from the end user. In the entire process, users’ feedback is used to determine the
attributes and to find the affiliation to the attributes.
Figure 3.3 shows the procedure for mapping a defect. Rounded rectangles denote sets, rectangles denote
functions and arrows denote the association between different artifacts. The diagram shows the set of Defects
D, the set of Classes C, and six attributes a1-a6 distributed over three perspectives p1, p2, p3. p1, p2 have
common attributes a2, a3, while p2, p3 have common attribute a5. The defect d3, being associated to the
attributes a1, a3, a5, is converted into the model entity M(d3) by the Conversion Function and then passed
on to the Mapping function. If a defect class c2 happened to be containing the same essential attributes as
d, in a previous phase, it would have been converted into the model entity M(c2) by the same procedure,
and in this case, the mapping function would map the defect d3 with the class c2 (or any other class) based
on their similarity. In case no mapping was found, FlexTax would create a new defect class, denoted as cx
that has the same attributes as d, the defect being mapped, and incorporate the class into the set of classes.
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Any future defect that resembles similarity with d will then be mapped into the new class.
Algorithm 3.3: MapDefectsToClasses
Data: C,D,A,Bdi ,W,Tp
Result: None
1 for each d ∈ D do
2 if C = ∅ OR proximity(d, C) > Tp then
3 Let Ed ← The Essential properties for d;
4 Let Od ← The Optional properties for d;
5 Let X ← Ed ∪Od;
6 Set A← A ∪X;
7 for each ai ∈ A do
8 if ai ∈ X then
9 set (bi ∈ Bdi )← 1;
10 set wi ← Weight(ai, Ed, Od);
11 end
12 else
13 set bi ∈ Bdi ← 0;
14 end
15 end
16 Designate c← d;
17 Set C ← C ∪ c;
18 Associate d to c;
19 end
20 else
21 if More than one c ∈ C has proximity ≤ Tp then
22 Let cx ← The one with most priorities among all matched c ∈ C;
23 end
24 else
25 Let cx ← c;
26 end
27 Associate d to cx;
28 end
29 end
3.7 Case Study
This section describes a case study conducted to validate FlexTax, and a two-layer hierarchical taxonomy
that was generated from that study. The study was conducted using real world defect data obtained from
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposure, or CVE, dataset [119].
3.7.1 Experimental Setup
CVE [119] is a dictionary that defines common vulnerabilities in software systems. It is not intended to be a
data repository, but it provides useful defect information as a catalogue to list common vulnerabilities. We
have used more than 25000 reported cases from CVE as experimental data to evaluate FlexTax.
There are multiple reasons for selecting CVE as the test repository. First, CVE contains well formed and
verified descriptions of defects, and provides a defect classification of its own. Although the focus of CVE
is on vulnerabilities, the originators of the vulnerabilities are defects in source code. Second, CVE contains
defects from multiple systems, in contrast to the bug repositories that contain data from specific projects.
Using CVE’s reported instances can encompass the same dimensions as multiple bug repositories would have
provided.
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3.7.2 Parameter Estimation
FlexTax requires the structure of the taxonomy to be determined before the development starts, to realize its
subjective dimensions. For this experiment, as the data to CVE are reported from system users / maintainers
and used by developers / maintainers, a two-layer hierarchical approach (that is, one with two perspectives)
was used. First perspective described the most visible effect of the defect from a professional’s point of view.
Second perspective described the details for the developers.
The value Tp is the threshold of proximity used to measure a defect’s association with a class, and is
required to be estimated before development. For this, a small experiment was conducted with three sets of
50 random defects each. The results were used to estimate initial Tp that best minimizes the incompleteness
and it was found to be 50% of the predefined minimum distance between two classes, α.
64 attributes were used to classify the defects, of which 59 were used for the second perspective. For sim-
plicity, the attributes were specified as subjective descriptions that can form a strict compliance relationship
with the defect - that is, a defect either fully complies with the attribute or does not comply at all.
3.7.3 A two-Layer Hierarchical Taxonomy
The application of FlexTax over the dataset of CVE resulted into a taxonomy of 22 classes grouped under
5 groups. Following sections describe the Taxonomy. Layer-1 categories (belonging to perspective 1) are
identified with an alphabetic character and the subcategories under each category (belonging to perspective
2) are marked with a number. For each category, a definition and example defects were mentioned. For
clarity, these examples were chosen as simple ones for demonstrating the situation and were selected from
assignments submitted by students in University of Saskatchewan’s introductory programming courses1. The
code listings provided as examples were also chosen from the same source. As an annexure to this chapter,
Appendix A provides the details on the actual attributes and other parameters for developing the taxonomy.
The defects were described using three terms,
Definition 3.1. An ‘entity’ is a symbolic representation of data in source code. It can be a variable, a
constant, or an expression, and may denote a single value or a collection of values such as an array or a
pointer to allocated memory.
Definition 3.2. For any entity e, the set of permitted data values P = {p : p is a single value for e} is the
set of all defined values e can assume over its build environment.
Definition 3.3. For any entity e, the set of expected data values V = {v : v is a single value for e} is the
set of values for e in its context assumed under the correct behaviour of the software. For any single entity,
V ⊆ P .
1CMPT 111 (Introduction to Computer Science and Programming), 2011 and 2012. CMPT 115 (Principles of Computer
Science), 2011, 2012. Both obtained from the submitted assignments by the students and analyzed anonymously.
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3.7.4 Computation (C)
Computation defects are defects that produce incorrect output due to an anomaly present in specific values
of identifiers, or calculation results. FlexTax proposed three defect classes for computation defects.
Value Representation Defect (C.1)
A value representation defect is caused by the representation of values to a different set than what is expected.
Such representation often truncates a range of values to a subset of itself, or generates a completely non-
matching value than the entity that receives it expects. As a generic statement, a wrong value representation
defect can be defined as,
Definition 3.4. For an entity e1 with the set of expected values V1, a value representation defect occurs if
the value of e1 is represented to fit an entity e2 with set of expected values V2 such that, V1 6⊆ V2.
Common examples of such defects include, but are not limited to,
(i) Type casting a value to a type able to hold only values smaller than the one being cast.
(ii) Representing a floating point value as a binary number for which the binary representation is non-
terminating (not all floating point numbers fall into this category).
(iii) Type Overflows.
(iv) Integer Divisions.
(v) Assigning unsigned values to signed types (risks changing the sign).
(vi) Comparing floating point numbers as exact values.
A point to note about this defect type is, not all instances of the same statement results into a defect.
Listing 3.2 shows two instances of the situations. The first instance, in line 1, is a defect because the binary
representation of 0.1 is a non-terminating fraction. The set of expected values for f is, Vf = {x : 0.1 ≤ x ≤
0.5}, while, due to the addition of the extra values due to the non-terminating fraction, the actual set of
values will be Wf = {0.1, 0.2 + δ1, 0.3 + δ2, 0.4 + δ3, 0.5 + δ4}, making the last value out of range for the loop.
However, in line 4, the defect does not exist as the values now accommodate the entire range as was defined
that is, the applied values Wf = {0.1, 0.2 + δ1, 0.3 + δ2, 0.4 + δ3, 0.5 + δ4}.
Listing 3.2: Sample Code Listing Showing a C1 Defect
1 for ( f loat i = 0 . 0 ; i <= 0 . 5 ; i += 0 . 1 )
2 {
3 }
4 for ( f loat i = 0 . 0 ; i <= 0 . 6 ; i += 0 . 1 )
5 {
6 }
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Value Offset Defect (C.2)
Value offset defects are introduced by a specific offset of values in any entity. These defects are usually
introduced by two phenomena. First is using a constant in an operation that is off by its actual point and
Second is using a wrong comparison operator introducing an off-by-one defect. In its generic form, these
offsets can be positive or negative, and can be of any magnitude.
Definition 3.5. For an entity e with set of expected values V and set of permitted values P , a value offset
defect occurs if, for determinable and defined values w for e, it holds that ∃w : w ∈ P,w 6∈ V .
Examples of the defect includes, but are not limited to,
(i) Considering the minimum array index as 1 while it is actually 0 (and vice versa).
(ii) Considering the maximum array index as the number of elements of the array, while it is one less (and
vice versa).
(iii) When counting number of elements in a range, not considering both of the terminal entities.
Listing 3.3: Sample Code Listing Showing a C2 Defect
1 #define SIZE 100
2 int a [ SIZE ] ;
3 for ( i = 0 ; i <= 100 ; i++)
4 {
5 a [ i ] = 0 ;
6 }
The Code Listing 3.3 shows a common off-by-one error as the limit of the for loop is one step more than
it should have been. Other varieties of the value offset defects occur in estimating a value and in recurrent
structures.
Undefined Outcome (C.3)
This class includes defects that result into undefined states or undefined results from operations performed
on them. Undefined states can originate by using an entity whose initial states are not known and no
determinable operation has been performed on it before its use as an r-value, or by using an entity that had
been subjected to an operation for which the outcome is not known. The generic form of this defect can be
described as,
Definition 3.6. For any entity e with set of expected values V and set of permitted values P , an undefined
outcome occurs if for applied values w of e it holds that ∃w : w ∈ P but w ∈ V is undecidable
Common examples of this defect includes, but are not limited to,
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(i) Division by zero.
(ii) Using an uninitialized value.
(iii) Using an entity that suffered from Defect C1 in an operation.
Listing 3.4: Sample Code Listing Showing a C3 Defect
1 int Sumup( int n)
2 {
3 int sum ;
4 for ( int i = 0 ; i <= n ; i++)
5 {
6 sum = sum + i ;
7 }
8 return sum ;
9 }
Listing 3.4 shows a situation where the use of an uninitialized value results into the defect. The value
returned in this case cannot be determined due to the initial undetermined value in sum, and the outcome
of the defect will propagate through any statement and scope this function’s return value is used in.
3.7.5 Logic (L)
Logical defects are defects that arise from logical constructs and control flow. FlexTax proposed eight logical
defect classes.
Improper Checks (L.1)
This class includes the defects where the omission or an error in the check for an entity results into an
improper validation of any data. The defect can exhibit itself as either an absence of a validation, or by using
a condition as a validation artifact that has either improper operator or operand. In generic form, it can be
defined as,
Definition 3.7. If a validation statement allows a set of values W for an entity e with expected set of values
V and permitted set of values P where it holds that, ∃w : w ∈ W,w 6∈ V OR w 6∈ P , then the validation
statement suffers from an improper check.
Common examples of the Improper Checks include, but are not limited to,
(i) Not providing a check in a necessary place.
(ii) Creating a check with wrong, but relevant, operator (i.e., the operator does not create a compile error
as it is relevant, but introduces a flaw due to being incorrect).
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(iii) Creating a check with wrong, but relevant, operand (i.e., the operand does not create a compile error
as it is relevant, but introduces a flaw due to being incorrect).
(iv) The C2 Defect occurring in the condition part of a validation statement.
(v) Using an irrelevant operator (e.g., = in case of ==).
Listing 3.5: Sample Code Listing Showing an L1 Defect
1 int f unc t i on (void )
2 {
3 int value , check ing va lue ;
4 . . .
5 i f ( va lue = check ing va lue )
6 {
7 . . .
8 }
9 else
10 {
11 . . .
12 }
13 }
The code fragment presented in Listing 3.5 shows a common defect drawn from the submitted assignments
in one of the undergraduate introductory programming course in the University of Saskatchewan. The check
results into a tautology as assignment operators always return a reference to the object assigned to, which
can only be interpreted as a true value.
Improper Terminal Condition (L.2)
This class includes the defects that are introduced in case of recurrent structures by improperly estimating
the terminating condition. The defect can exhibit itself as an infinite loop or recursion, as a loop or recursion
that terminates early or fails to terminate at the proper point.
A difference with the previous class (L1) is that, the L1 defects result in wrong outcome or execution
path, but does not involve controlling recurrent structures. In its generic form, this defect can be described
as,
Definition 3.8. For any recurrent structure control entity e with the set of expected values V and the set of
permitted values P , an improper terminal condition occurs if for w as values assigned to e, ∃w : w 6∈ V holds.
Prominent defect types under this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Not using any terminal condition.
(ii) Exhibiting a C1, C2, C3, or L1 defect in the terminal condition.
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(iii) Making a terminal condition an tautology or a contradiction.
(iv) Not updating a loop controller inside the loop.
Wrong Operation (L.3)
This class includes defects that involve doing one operation where another was appropriate. Such action
either makes the value deviate from the expected set of values or, in case of repetitive code, violates the
expected relation between the consecutive values inside the set of expected values. In its generic form, this
defect can be described as,
Definition 3.9. For any entity e that is a resultant from any operation with the set of expected values V ,
the operation is a wrong operation if any value of e does not comply with the values v ∈ V or, for any value
vi, vj ∈ V , the relation vi → vj is violated for j = i± 1.
Listing 3.6: Sample Code Listing Showing an L3 Defect
1 for ( i = 0 ; i < 10 ; i−−)
2 {
3 . . .
4 }
Prominent defect types for this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Using = in place of == and vice-versa.
(ii) Using < in place of > and vice-versa.
(iii) Using ++ in place of −− and vice-versa.
Flaws in Algorithm (L.4)
This category includes the defects that are originated from a flaw in the algorithm but are traceable from
source code. There can be many different defect types constituting to this class, and not all can be listed
(due to the infinite possibilities of algorithm design). Often the comprehension of this defect requires design
knowledge for its comprehension.
Definition 3.10. For any entity e with the set of expected values V , if the relation vi → vj between any two
values of V , vi and vj becomes different that what is expected, it denotes a flaw in algorithm.
The flaws in algorithm is not strictly a source code defect (although it is often traceable from source
code) because detecting such defects require the knowledge of the algorithm or design in addition to the
information inferred from source code.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
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(i) Not saving a value when required.
(ii) Not updating a value when required.
(iii) Not setting a value when required.
(iv) Any of the other defects if introduced by the algorithm.
Performance Issues (L.5)
This class includes defects that do not cause a wrong output or deviated behaviour, but could be implemented
in a better way. An example is running a loop more than it should be run (not an Improper Terminal
Condition, as it doesn’t violate the expected values). A classic instance of the defect is a brute-force prime
number checker that checks every factor of a number to determine if it is prime while it suffices checking only
the factors that are as large as the square root of the number2.
Definition 3.11. For any entity e with the set of expected values V , if the same set V can be, but is
not, achieved with a mechanism less burdensome in terms of resource usage, execution time, or any other
performance measure, then the present implementation denotes a performance defect for e.
Performance issues can be caused by a number of faults in the program, starting from benign issues
like keeping unused variables, using redundant variables or using extra complex logic. For the most part,
detection of performance issues requires knowledge of the architecture and design of the software and thus
these defects are not strictly source code defects.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Declaring never-used entities.
(ii) Allocating more than required.
(iii) Not using part of the allocated memory.
(iv) Making more than one conditional branch to do the same task.
Improper Exception Handling (L.6)
This class includes defects that result from exception handling problems. Three situations may be considered
as problems with exception handling, the first is handling an exception for a code block that does not generate
any exception under any condition, second is not handling an exception for a code block that might generate
an exception, and the third is handling a wrong exception for a code that generates an exception. In its
generic form, this defect can be described as,
2This particular performance issue exists in case of the brute-force algorithm only, and does not affect the advanced or
efficient algorithms.
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Definition 3.12. For any block of code, if the block is able to generate a set of exceptions EG and the exception
handling code considers the set of exception EH where EH 6= EG, the situation denotes an improper exception
handling defect.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Not catching an exception.
(ii) Catching a wrong exception.
(iii) Catching an exception, but not handling it.
(iv) Catching the right exception, but handling it wrong.
Control Flow Error (L.7)
The control flow error for any part of the code is a piece of code that results into an improper control flow.
Examples include making a condition a tautology or a contradiction or creating a branch of code that will
never be reached. The difference between the Improper Checks and the Control Flow Error is that, unlike
Improper Checks, Control Flow Errors use valid constructs, but the semantics are invalid for the checking,
while the Improper Checks defect involves operators that can be detected from the compiler’s perspectives.
Definition 3.13. If, for a validation statement, the outcome has a set of expected values V , while the actual
values that are produced as the outcome has a set W , and W 6= V , then the statement suffers from a Control
Flow Error.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Making an always-taken branch.
(ii) Making a never-taken branch.
(iii) Creating unreachable code.
Design Non-conformance (L.8)
This category includes defects that are resulted from the difference from design. These defects differ with the
other logical defects in that, they do not always result into non-functioning code, or in any code that in itself
can indicate the problem. The examples can be an improper module interface definitions where the module
is functioning and can be used, but not in the way the design document specifies - creating problems in other
parts of the software implementation. This type of defects are not present entirely on the source code.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Replacing efficient sorting with inefficient ones.
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(ii) Changing design data structures
(iii) Introducing new code.
(iv) Not implementing part of the design code.
Memory (M)
Memory related defects are defects that involve the access or manipulation of the computer’s memory. Flex-
Tax proposed four defect classes for memory defects.
Invalid Memory Reference (M.1)
Invalid memory references occur when a piece of non-existing memory is referred in either a read or write
operation, or a read-only memory is accessed for a write operation. Examples include referring to unallocated
memory or referring to a memory that has been deallocated. Often exhibited as a null pointer dereference,
this defect can be caused by the undefined outcome defect on a memory entity.
Definition 3.14. For an atomic or collective entity e denoting a memory region for use with the set of
permitted values P and the set of Expected values V, if, for applied values w for e, it holds that, ∃w : w 6∈
P OR w 6∈ V , the operation denotes an invalid memory reference.
Listing 3.7: Sample Code Listing Showing an M1 Defect
1 void f unc t i on (void )
2 {
3 char ∗p ;
4 c in >> p ;
5 return ;
6 }
In the code fragment shown in Listing 3.7, the pointer p contains a garbage value that, while trying to
be accessed, will result into a segmentation fault. In case p was initialized to 0, it would have caused a null
pointer dereference.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Null-pointer dereference.
(ii) Invalid pointer dereference.
(iii) Using an incompatible value as a pointer.
(iv) Creating a C1 or C2 or C3 defect in a memory entity.
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Improper Deallocation (M.2)
An improper deallocation occurs when a piece of memory is tried to be deallocated in the wrong way.
This defect can be introduced by a number of mechanisms, including, deallocating a non-existing memory,
deallocating an already deallocated memory, trying to deallocate a null pointer or deallocating a memory
with a wrong operator (malloc() vs. delete, new vs. free()).
Definition 3.15. For an entity e denoting a memory region for use with the set of expected values V and
set of permitted values P , an improper deallocation occurs if P = ∅ or a value w is deallocated for e where
w 6∈ P .
Listing 3.8: Sample Code Listing Showing an M2 Defect
1 void f unc t i on (void )
2 {
3 char ∗p = new char [ SIZE ] ;
4 . . .
5 d e l e t e [ ] p ;
6 . . .
7 d e l e t e [ ] p ;
8 return ;
9 }
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Deallocating deallocated memory.
(ii) Deallocating unallocated memory.
(iii) Using wrong deallocation procedure (new − > free(), malloc() − > delete, new[] − > delete, new − >
delete[])
Memory Leaks (M.3)
This category includes defects that result from not releasing an allocation memory after the operations
finishes. Ideally, if M is a set of allocated memory for an operation, M = ∅ should hold when operation
finishes.
Definition 3.16. For an entity e denoting a memory region for use with the set of permitted values P and
a set of expected values V , a memory leak occurs if, after deallocation, P 6= ∅ OR V 6= ∅.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
1. Not deallocating an allocated memory.
2. Deallocating only part of an allocated memory.
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Over/Underflow (M.4)
A memory overflow occurs when a piece of memory is accessed with more data than it can hold, or is accessed
beyond its maximum limit. An underflow is the same condition occurring beyond the minimum limit of the
memory.
Definition 3.17. For an entity e denoting a memory region for use with the set of expected values V and
the set of permitted values P , if for an applied value w it holds that, ∃w : w 6∈ V but w is adjacent to V , the
operation denotes a memory over/underflow.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Accessing an allocated memory beyond the last valid address.
(ii) Accessing an allocated memory before the first valid address.
(iii) Trying to write data bigger than the size of allocated memory.
(iv) Not terminating the allocated memory with right marker.
3.7.6 Data, Interface and Input/Output(D)
This group of defect classes contains defects that arise from data usage, interface specification and usage and
the input/output to the software or a specific module. FlexTax proposed five defect classes under this group.
Interface Mismatch (D.1)
This defect type denotes a mismatch between the interfaces of a system. The difference is often an archi-
tectural or design issue and are not usually traceable from source code. The ones that can be traced from
source code exhibit discrepancies in either parameter numbers, types, values or ordering for function usage.
Definition 3.18. An interface mismatch occurs where, for any invocation of an interface that require the
set of entities ER the actual used set of entities is EA and ER 6= EA
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Calling a function with wrong parameter types.
(ii) Calling a function with repeated parameters.
(iii) Using default values for parameters.
(iv) Creating a C1 defect in the parameter of a function.
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Data Mismatch (D.2)
A data mismatch is the use of data values not proper for the use in an interface. The difference between
interface mismatch and data mismatch is that, interface mismatch uses wrong entities for an interface, but
data mismatch uses right entities, with wrong states.
Definition 3.19. A data mismatch occurs when, for an entity e1 required to invoke an interface, the set of
expected values as used in the interface is V1, but the interface is invoked with an entity e2 with the set of
expected values V2 for which it holds that, V2 6⊆ V1.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Calling a function with right parameter types, but wrong values.
(ii) Creating C3 defects in the parameter of a function.
(iii) Casting pointers / values to fit function call.
Improper Input Validation (D.3)
This defect occurs from not validating the inputs to a module or program before they are processed. This
defect is actually an L1 defect applied on the input to a module or the entire software.
Definition 3.20. An improper input validation defect occurs if, for a module or program with the set of
input entities E, there exists an L1 defect for any e ∈ E.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Not validating an input before use.
(ii) Using an invalid validation for an input.
Missing or Extra Input (D.4)
A defect in this category occurs if the software or any module is put to work with insufficient or extra input
required for processing. A missing input can cause the software to crash, while an extra input may introduce
an error in computation.
Definition 3.21. A missing or extra input defect occurs where, for any invocation of an interface that require
the set of entities ER the actual used set of entities is EA and |ER| 6= |EA|
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Not providing enough inputs.
(ii) Missing fields in composite entities used as input.
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(iii) Providing extra inputs for variable list modules.
(iv) Providing extra fields in composite entities used as input.
Improper Abstraction (D.5)
This defect arises from providing improper access to a data member of a module. The term improper access
means either to provide access to a data member that should not be accessed, or to restrict access to one
that should be accessed.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Failing to provide access to a member.
(ii) Passing an entity by-reference that should be passed by value and vice-versa.
(iii) Returning reference to a private/protected entity by a public function.
(iv) Not providing an interface to interact with a private data member.
3.7.7 Synchronization (S)
Synchronization defects are defects that occur in a multiprocess / multithread software and involve the
sequencing or interleaving of the processes or threads. FlexTax proposed two defect classes under this group.
Prohibitive States (S.1)
This category contains the defects that result into a prohibition on any block of code into completing its
task. Examples include deadlocks, process starvation and improper priority assignments.
Definition 3.22. A prohibitive state occurs if the software’s execution reaches a point where no further
execution is possible until a certain condition is satisfied, and the condition cannot be satisfied immediately
under the current situations.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Deadlock.
(ii) Data Race.
(iii) Process Starvation.
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Improper Sequencing (S.2)
This category includes the defects that results into effects coming from improper sequence of execution for
different blocks of code. Examples include atomicity violation, improper serialization and lock-and-release
problems.
Definition 3.23. An improper sequencing defect occurs if, through the interactions among multiple entities
or processes, the order of execution impels the software to enter into undesirable states which could not have
occurred had the sequencing been different.
Prominent defect types in this class include, but are not limited to,
(i) Atomicity Violation.
(ii) Unsynchronized update.
(iii) No Locking mechanism for critical objects.
3.8 Evaluation of the Taxonomy
This section describes the evaluation of the taxonomy generated by FlexTax to verify its effectiveness. FlexTax
cannot be directly evaluated as it is a framework and it possibly is the only one of its kind. The taxonomy
was evaluated to point out its strengths and weaknesses which, in turn, would assess FlexTax.
3.8.1 Evaluation Directions
The two-layer taxonomy developed using FlexTax has been evaluated from three perspectives
(i) Completeness: There must not be any defect unaccounted for.
(ii) Non-redundancy: There must not be a defect class with no defect mapped in it.
(iii) Orthogonality: There must not be a confusion in mapping defects to classes.
For a comprehensive evaluation, two different evaluations were done.
(i) Verification using Machine Learning Classifiers
(ii) Manual Cross-matching with established defect databases
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Table 3.2: Results of the 10-fold Cross Validation
Pass
# Classifier 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Avg.
1. J48(C4.5) 0.92 1.0 0.98 0.95 0.99 0.97 1.0 0.99 0.94 0.94 0.968
2. Naive Bayes 0.97 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.99 1.0 0.996
3. Bayes Net 0.99 1.0 0.98 0.97 1.0 0.97 1.0 1.0 0.99 0.99 0.989
3.8.2 Verification Using Machine Learning Classifiers
FlexTax uses defect features in the form of Attributes to specify the defects and classes, and the defect
feature comparison as the classification metrics to determine the defect’s affiliation to a class. When it is
used for generating a hierarchical taxonomy (as was done for the current research), the approach becomes
an instance of classification using information gain (as new classes are added when there is significantly
different information to be obtained from them). This quality makes the taxonomy an appealing candidate
for a machine learning algorithm that works on information gain for classification. It was exploited in our
endeavour to verify the accuracy of FlexTax with a J48 machine learning classifier using the Weka Data
Mining Software [66].
A random sample of 1000 classified defect instances, along with their feature vectors (the compliance
vector, B) were chosen from the defects classified by FlexTax. The Weka Toolkit [66] was used to train a
J48 Classifier (a variant of the C4.5 machine learning classifier) and to apply it on a 10-fold cross validation
over this 1000 defect set. The results are presented in Table 3.2. The classifier was chosen for its explicit
treatment on information gain induced classification.
To further validate the case study, the same experiment was repeated under the Naive Bayes and Bayes
Net classifiers, with results presented in the same table.
As can be observed from the data, for 96.8% cases under the J48 classifier, the defects were mapped exactly
as expected. Of the remaining 32 defects that did not match, 29 were integer overflows (C1) mapped to
memory overflows (M4) - due to the similarity in their features. The other three involved confusing scenarios
that FlexTax resolved using prioritization, but J48 (C4.5) failed to handle as there was no equivalent scheme
for the classifier.
Both the the Naive Bayes and Bayes Net classifiers reported close to 100% accuracy, owing to the fact that
even though orthogonality problems may exist between defects, their feature sets are essentially independent.
However, we would like to consider the J48 classification as the most accurate one due to the particular
nature of the classifier.
The results from classification demonstrate that the classification mechanism for FlexTax is accurate
and feasible. The same machine learning classifiers could be used as the main classification technique for
FlexTax, but it could pose a problem in resolving orthogonality issues, or could alter the structure of the
already established taxonomy, against both of which FlexTax has its own specific mechanisms. FlexTax
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uses prioritization and proximity calculation to balance such scenarios. Prioritization helps to balance the
orthogonality problems, while proximity calculation preserves the consistency of the taxonomy.
Established Defect Databases
CVE is a dataset that defines defects leading to vulnerabilities for software systems and have been used by
many organizations. Among the over 50000 entries in CVE from multiple systems, more than 25000 belong
to source code defects and were processed. Rest of the entries, including repitition, fall under policy and
architecture related issues that fall beyond the scope of FlexTax. The classification generated the results
as presented in Figure 3.4 under ‘Set 1’. In the figure, classes C, L, M, D and S denotes the collective
(i.e., Perspective 1) Computation, Logic, Memory, Data and Synchronization defects with respect to the
total defects. The classes C1-C3, L1-L8, M1-M4, D1-D5, S1 and S2 denotes the specific classes belonging to
Perspective 2 and the corresponding bars show the defect distribution within the same group of classes (not
with respect to total defects). As a secondary set, the defect dataset recorded from the projects implemented
under this research was used. The secondary set, denoted as ‘Set 2’ in Figure 3.4, contains 208 defects from
general software development tasks. Observations on the data are reported in the next section.
Unfortunately, due to the subjective variance incorporated in taxonomies, there is no standard for a
correct taxonomy that can be used as a benchmark. CVE provides its own taxonomy comprising of 41
classes of which 30 relate to source code defects, but the focus of CVE on the impact of the defect, and
not the defect itself - making it improper for exact one-to-one comparison of defects or classes. However, a
case-by-case comparison can be done if the defect features can be inferred from CVEs categories. From the
defects classified by FlexTax, a random sample of 5% was chosen and the defect class attributes were listed.
For each defect, the attributes of the corresponding CVE category, where they can be inferred, were listed.
The two sets of attributes were cross matched. It was found that for all except 14 defects, the essential
defect class attributes for FlexTax’s generated taxonomy were supersets of the corresponding CVE attributes
- establishing the point that should this classification scheme were used for CVE instead of the handpicked
classification applied at present, the defects would have belonged to the same class as they do now.
The 14 defects that showed discrepancy between the generated taxonomy and the corresponding category
in CVE were analyzed more closely. Their classification by FlexTax was found to be more accurate than the
CVE classifications. The reason of the discrepancy was that, FlexTax considered all properties the defects
exhibited while CVE considered only the most severe properties. As FlexTax considered all properties, their
highest affiliation to a class became the class they are associated in. And as CVE considered only the most
severe properties, the most severe outcome they cause became their class of affiliation. Our analysis revealed
that, often a defect can cause a single most severe problem to be classified into one category, but the collective
influence of a lot of other not-so-severe impacts can outweigh the severity of the single incident.
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of Defects in the Generated Taxonomy
Figure 3.5: Unmapped and Multiple Mapped Defects with Differing Values of Tp
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Estimating the value of Tp
The threshold Tp poses a two sided problem. Evidently, it can be deducted that with a sufficiently large
Tp, only one defect class is required. This generalizes into the statement that, the higher the value of Tp,
the lower is the number of defect classes. On the other hand, having a higher Tp will also give rise to the
chances of mapping the same defect to multiple classes. That is, the lower is the Tp, the higher is the chance
of orthogonality.
To test a suitable value, instead of repeating the experiment over such a large dataset, we have evaluated
different Tp against the generated taxonomy. The results are presented in Figure 3.5. In the figure, three
trends show (a) the defects having no class with distance less than Tp, (b) the defects having exactly one
class within the bounds of Tp, and (c) the defects having multiple classes within the bounds of Tp.
As apparent from Figure 3.5, the value of Tp as 12-15% of the average distance between any two consecutive
defect classes is the best balance between the two. However, as orthogonality issues are not sure to occur
in case of multiple match, but incompleteness is a certain phenomenon in case any defect is left un-mapped,
we would recommend to use a value of Tp that minimizes the number of non-matched defects. In case of the
developed taxonomy a value of 50% was used.
A point to mention is that, having multiple distances to classes less than the threshold does not definitely
identify orthogonality problems. Some of the cases will result into orthogonality issues if the minimum
distance is the same to more than one classes. In our taxonomy, no orthogonality issues arose.
3.8.3 Observations and Justifications
(1) In Figure 3.4 (Set 1) the classes C, M, L, D, S encompass a full range of defects (i.e., 100%) and
the calculation was made compared to total defects. This states the fact that no defect was left out in the
classification, proving the completeness of the generated taxonomy. Same observation is made with Set 2.
(2) In Figure 3.4 (Set 1), some categories have very low distributions, but none effectively reaches 0, the
lowest defect density translates to 1 defect in the total set. A question may arise about the requirement of such
categories. In reality, this is a strength of FlexTax to recognize categories like these. FlexTax incorporated
the category only if the feature set of the first defect mapped to this category was distinct enough to demand
a new category. Had it not been mapped with the low density category, the defect would have mapped to a
wrong category in consideration of its features. Set 2 further strengthens the requirement of these categories,
often showing considerable population in categories that have low population over Set 1. Set 2 has a few
categories with 0 distribution - attributed to the fact that the taxonomy was not developed using Set 2.
(3) In Figure 3.4 (Set 1), most distribution is in the data related defects, as opposed to the memory
defects as described by CVE [119] in its own classification. The reason behind it is that, CVE, being focused
on vulnerabilities, considers the defect’s impacts where FlexTax considered the underlying causes. Most of
the vulnerabilities classified by CVE in the memory defects were originated by using unauthorized access or
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using wrong parameters, both of which fall under data related defects in FlexTax’s classification.
(4) In Figure 3.4 (Set 1), most defect concentration for any group is in the first class of the group. This can
be explained by a peculiarity of FlexTax. As the classes are created from human identified features, naturally
most of the significant features are associated with the first class, and unless they are later reassigned to
other classes, they remain associated with the first class, drawing most defects into the area of distribution.
Set 2 does not seem to correspond to this observation. As Set 2’s features were not used in developing the
taxonomy, it did not bias the features to be concentrated in the first category.
(5) In Figure 3.5, the Trends (a) and (c) exhibit a reciprocal relation, as is expected from the role of Tp
in the generation process. However, Trend (b) should decrease uniformly as Tp increases, which it does in
general, with an unexpected rise at Tp = 10% to 25%. A closer look discovered that some defect classes had
too many optional attributes that, by cumulative weight, became almost equal to the essential attributes to
other classes that had less weight for essential attributes. Defects containing one class’s essential attributes
and many of another’s optionals tend to get a high affinity to both. This problem can be solved by making
classes further apart so that the optional attributes do not gain enough weight to be equal to the essential
ones of any class (i.e., it can be resolved by using a larger α).
(6) In Figure 3.5, when Tp = 0%, Trend (b) should be 100% and Trend (a) should be 0%. It did not
happen in this case because Tp was varied against a fixed set of classes and defects, instead of an open set
with as many classes as there can be. But the 80% for Trend (a) at Tp = 0 indicates that in case Tp = 0%,
there would have been 20% more classes than there already are (not equal to total defect count because same
defect is reported in different instances). Therefore, for a handpicked classification, one can expect around
27 classes considering the 20% increment. CVE’s own handpicked classification system lists 41 defect classes,
of which 11 do not belong to source code defects (and defects belonging to those classes were excluded from
all analyses), bringing the classes close to the number we predicted.
(7) As apparent from Figure 3.5, the value of Tp as 10%-15% of α is the best balance between the multiple
and zero mapping situations. However, as orthogonality issues are not sure to occur in case of multiple match,
but incompleteness is a certain phenomenon in case any defect is left un-mapped, we would recommend to
use a value of Tp that minimizes the number of non-matched defects, which, in this case, is around 30% of α.
(8) Based on the previous observations, if we compare the generated taxonomy with Table 3.1, for all of
the last three columns under ‘Properties’, FlexTax will score a strong compliance, as it is strongly orthogonal,
complete and non-redundant. Same observation will be repeated for ‘Scope’s. Also, in the ‘Extensibility’
column, FlexTax will be a strong candidate. Hence, In comparison to taxonomies presented in Table 3.1,
FlexTax will provide the maximum benefit to all taxonomies considered, close to the ODC, but outperforming
ODC in both completeness and flexibility.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Effort Requirements for FlexTax with Handpicked and Automated Tax-
onomies
Non-Effort-Intensive Tasks Effort-Intensive Tasks
Responsible Responsible
# Task FlexTax Handpicked Automated # Task FlexTax Handpicked Automated
1. Fixing Guidelines User User User 5. Deciding New Class Addition System User System
2. Creating Classes System User System 6. Defect Mapping System User System
3. Determining Class Attributes User User System 7. Reconfiguration System User User
4. Determining Defect Attributes User User User
3.8.4 Improvement on Human Effort
For a taxonomy generated manually, a human supervisor has to design the classes, map the defects, and
carry on any reconfiguration activity on the entire taxonomy should the need arise in any case.
FlexTax removes the burden from the human supervisor to calculate and cross-match the affinity of defects
to the already existing classes, and to determine the point for new class addition. FlexTax also provides a set
of base attributes as obtained from the specific defect that created the need for the new class - thus relieving
the supervisor from the work of figuring them out.
Comparison of FlexTax’s working procedures with handpicked and automated taxonomies are presented
in Table 3.3 with columns ‘Handpicked’ and ‘Automated’ denoting the two cases. Comparing with hand-
picked taxonomies, three of the most effort-worthy tasks, decision on new class addition, defect mapping and
reconfiguration is left to the system in FlexTax, relieving the user of the burden of a large workload.
Automated taxonomies achieve almost the same improvement in terms of effort, with two major differ-
ences. The determination of class attributes requires subjective supervision over objective choices, which
is ignored by the automated taxonomies. Additionally, reconfiguration in an automated taxonomy often
requires the regeneration of the entire generation process, as is the case in DeMillo and Mathud’s taxonomy
[44] - in which FlexTax has a clear advantage of ‘reconfiguring without regeneration’.
3.9 Defect Similarity
According to the best of the knowledge of the author, no research has so far defined defect similarity from
defect class descriptions. As most of the taxonomies are handpicked and depend entirely on subjective
discretion of the developer, it is not often feasible to define the similarities on their structures.
As FlexTax, despite incorporating subjectivity in its generation process, defines defects under strict
mathematical constructs, it is possible to establish multiple measures of similarity among the defect classes.
In this section, an attempt was made to compare the classes of the generated taxonomy with each other
under different similarity metrics.
In describing a defect similarity, two notions have been used. A Strong Similarity between two defect
classes ci and cj indicates that the classes ci and cj share similar features in a way that any defect belonging
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to ci would certainly have belonged to cj should ci be non-existent, although the opposite might not be true.
A Weak Similarity between the classes indicates that ci and cj contain common features or properties, but
are not so strongly coupled that in the absence of one, the defects belonging to it would get mapped to the
other.
This statement of similarity defines the underlying principle of defect similarities, but leaves the exact
similarity measures open for a variety of adaptations. Considering the vast expanse of the feature comparison
field, it can be assumed that there can be at least as many comparison metrics as there are techniques to
represent the features, which makes the count very large (for example, a recent paper [30] lists 76 comparison
techniques on binary feature vector only). If the customized techniques (like the one adopted for FlexTax)
are added with it, the options become even larger.
In the generated taxonomy, the classes in Perspective 1 (C, L, M, D, S) are generalizations of their
underlying classes (C1-3, L1-8, M1-4, D1-5, S1-2). They are designed to encompass the features of the
Perspective 2 classes that fall under them. Therefore, in designating similarity, the Perspective 1 classes
do not provide any value as they are meant and designed similar to the Perspective 2 classes. To make it
relevant, only Perspective 2 classes were included in the similarity measurement study.
3.9.1 Similarity Coefficients
A similarity coefficient, or similarity score, expresses a quantitative characterization of the similarity between
two artifacts of interest. In the context of FlexTax, the similarity measure is a numerical score that identifies
a defect class’s similarity with another.
To describe this study, the similarity scores were normalized in the range [0, 1]. The normalization
procedure was adopted for easier representation of the outcome from different similarity coefficients under
the same framework (a graph, in this case). The particular range of [0, 1] was chosen for its direct association
to representing percentage values (which was used as the coefficient for one case).
A point to mention is, a defect class’s similarity score to another is the maximum (1.0) does not imply the
two classes are the same, or that they can replace one another. It only specifies that the degree of similarity
in the two class’ design and perception is the maximum as it can be under the current context.
It is expected that defect class similarity expressions shall be able to describe a few properties for the defect
classes. First, as FlexTax explicitly incorporates both subjectivity and objectivity, defect class similarity
measures should be able to cover both dimensions. Second, the similarity measures should be able to predict
how the defects will be redistributed in case of a change in the taxonomy. Finally, the similarity measures
are required to express the semantic associations between the defects, instead of just their mathematical
relations.
Although an overwhelming number of similarity coefficients exist, and customized coefficients can be
designed for FlexTax, using one coefficient to express all the properties is not practical. To account for the
properties expressed above, six different similarity coefficients were used for FlexTax. Of the six, two (Trivial
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and Distribution) were devised explicitly for FlexTax, one (Modified Hamming) was modified from a popular
coefficient to suit FlexTax and the other three (Hamming, Jaccard-Needham and Tarantula) were adopted
from popular coefficients used in previous research [30, 21].
Trivial Similarity
This similarity is relevant to FlexTax and was developed considering the specific nature of FlexTax. FlexTax
recognizes subjectivity by incorporating the supervisor’s discretion in the feature (attribute) generation and
perspective selection. This method results in a similarity imposed on the different perspectives.
In the most trivial form, defect similarity can be expressed as a defect class’s sharing of description to
other defect classes. For a hierarchical taxonomy, by principle, classes in every level generalizes the classes
immediately below it. Thus, any level can be considered as a group of similar classes under a perspective.
In this approach, the lower a level is in the hierarchy, the stronger similarity it expresses for classes below
it, and for classes under the same level. A problem with this approach is that it often does not apply to
matrices or flat taxonomies.
As FlexTax assigns weight in an incremental way, any two classes sharing similar features are expected
to be neighbours. Considering these facts, the trivial similarity coefficient ST between classes ci and cj is
defined as the compliance to two different situations. (a) if ci and cj are under the same perspective 1 class,
and (b) if ci and cj are neighbours (i.e., they occur in order with one another in consideration of the weights).
To avoid an undefined value problem, every class is considered as a neighbour to itself.
A way to implement such a similarity coefficient is to consider 1 point for compliance to each of the two
cases described above, dividing by the maximum number of points to normalize the result within the range
[0, 1]. For a taxonomy with n levels, there can be at most n-1 ancestral points for a class on the lowest layer.
Additionally, there can be one more point for the neighbourhood of the classes. Considering the present
scenario, the trivial similarity coefficient can be devised as,
ST (ci, cj) =
sn(ci, cj) +
∑n−1
x=1 sa(ci, cj)
n
(3.5)
Where,
ST = Trivial Similarity Score
sn = Similarity by neighbourhood
sa = Similarity by ancestry.
sn(ci, cj) =
1 if ci and cj are neighbours0 otherwise (3.6)
and,
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sa(ci, cj) =
1 if ci and cj have the same ancestor,or if their ancestors belong to the same ancestor0 otherwise
(3.7)
Table 3.4: Values for the Trivial Similarity Coefficient
ST (Row,Column)
# Class C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. C1 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. C2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. C3 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4. L1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. L2 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. L3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7. L4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8. L5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9. L6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10. L7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11. L8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12. M1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13. M2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14. M3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15. M4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16. D1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
17. D2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
18. D3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00
19. D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
20. D5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
21. S1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
22. S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Similarities are ordered by rows.
Table 3.4 shows the values obtained by using the trivial similarity equations over the feature set of the
taxonomy generated using FlexTax.
Similarity by Defect Distribution
As the classes are defined through the same feature space, their relative spatial positioning in the same
prioritized plane is under similar measures. By the definition of strong similarity provided above, a defect
would only be mapped to another class should its present one be absent if the other class is a neighbour
of the present one. Considering these two properties, in addition to the previous trivial coefficient, another
trivial and subjective similarity measure is used for the taxonomy.
This approach for defect similarity was examined by considering the second closest defect class for every
defect. As defects are assigned to the class closest to them by weight, the classes the defects were most likely
to belong to in absence of their present classes make similar classes to the present one.
To assess the similarity in this way, the second closest class for every defect was considered. The similarity
score by distribution, SD, between ci and cj is defined as the percentage of defects under ci that would assign
to cj in absence of ci under the same value of Tp. For any ci, ci combination, the score is at 1.0. Table 3.5
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presents the data on the similarity by distribution, SD, study.
Table 3.5: Values for the Distribution Similarity Coefficient
SD(Row,Column)
# Class C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. C1 1.00 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. C2 0.27 1.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. C3 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4. L1 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. L2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. L3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7. L4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8. L5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 1.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9. L6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10. L7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11. L8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12. M1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13. M2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14. M3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15. M4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16. D1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17. D2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18. D3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
19. D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.00 0.30 0.00 0.00
20. D5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 1.00 0.00 0.00
21. S1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.30
22. S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00
Note: Similarities are ordered by rows.
Similarity by Shared Features (Hamming Similarity)
Previous two similarities were carried out on the subjective arrangement of the defect classes. As subjectivity
differs for different projects and as FlexTax uses a unique way to incorporate subjectivity, the similarity
measures had to be custom designed.
To provide an objective assessment for different defect class similarities, an established method of compar-
ison is required. As FlexTax represents the defect classes by their features (as expressed through attributes),
and classifies all defect classes under the same feature space, it is possible to apply a number of feature vector
comparison techniques.
Among the many comparison techniques presented in [30], Hamming Similarity (1950) [67] is perhaps
the most preferred method for binary feature vector similarity assessment [30]. Although more than half
a century old, Hamming Similarity was used by a number of research until recent times [164, 21, 30, 42].
However, the range for the Hamming Similarity is [0, ∞]. To scale it down to the preferred range of [0,1],
the Normalized Hamming Similarity based on the Normalized Hamming Distance developed by Sokal and
Michener (1958) [145] for biological studies was used. Hamming Similarity is noted for its straightforward
feature count based comparison and applicability to binary vectors.
Hamming Similarity can be expressed using a variety of mathematical notations. In the context of
FlexTax, considering the notations specified earlier, the Hamming Similarity Coefficient would be,
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SH(ci, cj) =
m∑
x=1
|{(bx ∈ Bci ) = 1} AND {(bx ∈ Bcj ) = 1}|
m
(3.8)
Where,
SH(ci, cj) = Hamming Similarity between classes ci and cj .
Bci = Compliance Vector for ci.
m = Number of Attributes.
Table 3.6: Values for the Hamming Similarity Coefficient
SH(Row,Column)
# Class C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. C1 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. C2 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. C3 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4. L1 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. L2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. L3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7. L4 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.59 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.34 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.03
8. L5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
9. L6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10. L7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11. L8 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.03
12. M1 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13. M2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14. M3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15. M4 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16. D1 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
17. D2 0.10 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18. D3 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
19. D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
20. D5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00
21. S1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03
22. S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03
Note: Similarities are ordered by rows.
Table 3.6 shows the values for the similarity coefficients obtained from the feature set of the taxonomy
generated by FlexTax.
Similarity by Common Features (Modified Hamming Similarity)
For every defect class, only a few features from the entire set are complied with. Comparing the similarity
with the entire compliance vector thus would result in very low similarity scores and would fail to capture
the actual relationship, as it is apparent from the SH coefficient in the previous section.
To avoid this problem, a modified definition by feature count is used. In this definition, the score is
normalized not by the entire feature vector size, but with the specific defect’s feature vector compliance.
This score, SMH would be,
SMH(ci, cj) =
∑m
x=1 |{(bx ∈ Bci ) = 1} AND {(bx ∈ Bcj ) = 1}|∑m
x=1 |{(bx ∈ Bci ) = 1}|
(3.9)
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Where,
SMH(ci, cj) = Modified Hamming similarity coefficient between ci and cj
Bci = Compliance Vector for ci
m = Number of Attributes.
Table 3.7: Values for the Modified Hamming Similarity Coefficient
SMH(Row,Column)
# Class C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. C1 1.00 0.22 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.67 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. C2 0.50 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. C3 0.40 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4. L1 0.17 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. L2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. L3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7. L4 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.06 1.00 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.57 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.06
8. L5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
9. L6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10. L7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11. L8 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.87 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.26 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.09
12. M1 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13. M2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14. M3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15. M4 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16. D1 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
17. D2 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18. D3 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.60 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00
19. D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20. D5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
21. S1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
22. S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Similarities are ordered by rows.
Table 3.7 shows the result of the comparison under the Modified Hamming Similarity Coefficient.
Similarity by Jaccard-Needham Coefficient
The Jaccard-Needham Similarity Coefficient is another measure that was used in different fields of science
for a long time [30, 21]. Jaccard-Needham measure was used in this study for similarity due to its treatment
of the defect vectors as sets, ignoring repetitive patterns. As FlexTax’s attribute set is not a repeated
collection, rather a set containing only unique elements, the Jaccard-Needham coefficient is able to predict
the similarities. The general form of the Jaccard-Needham similarity coefficient is,
SJ(ci, cj) =
|Bci ∩Bcj |
|Bci ∪Bcj |
(3.10)
Where,
SJ(ci, cj) = Jaccard-Needham Similarity Coefficient for classes ci and cj
Bci = Compliance vector for class ci
Table 3.8 shows the similarity score under the Jaccard-Needham Similarity Coefficient.
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Table 3.8: Values for the Jaccard-Needham Similarity Coefficient
SJ (Row,Column)
# Class C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. C1 1.00 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.40 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. C2 0.18 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. C3 0.17 0.13 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4. L1 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. L2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 1.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. L3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7. L4 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.14 0.06 0.06 1.00 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.53 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.06
8. L5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00
9. L6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10. L7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11. L8 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.04 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.22 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.09
12. M1 0.17 0.13 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13. M2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14. M3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15. M4 0.00 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16. D1 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00
17. D2 0.40 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18. D3 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.29 1.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.00
19. D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20. D5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
21. S1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50
22. S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 1.00
Note: Similarities are ordered by rows.
Similarity by the Tarantula Coefficient
Among the established coefficients considered, Tarantula is a recent addition. Tarantula is a defect localization
technique that uses the customized similarity coefficient to differentiate between passed and failed execution
profiles. Although not developed for a binary feature vector comparison tool Tarantula’s workflow requires
comparison the passed and failed profiles as binary feature vectors to determine the failure pattern.
The Tarantula Coefficient was developed to establish a semantic relationship among the passed and failed
execution profiles. The technique was chosen for the current assessment due to this affiliation with semantic
aspects. Tarantula Coefficient is possibly the technique to consider all forms of binary feature vector matches
and mismatches most extensively. The formation of the coefficient is,
STT =
p1
p1 + p2
(3.11)
p1 =
m∑
x=1
|(bx ∈ Bci ) = 1 AND (bx ∈ Bcj ) = 1|
|(bx ∈ Bci ) = 1 AND (bx ∈ Bcj ) 6= 1|
(3.12)
p2 =
m∑
x=1
|(bx ∈ Bci ) = 1 AND (bx ∈ Bcj ) 6= 1|
|(bx ∈ Bci ) 6= 1 AND (bx ∈ Bcj ) 6= 1|
(3.13)
Where,
m = Number of Attributes
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bx = One specific dimension in the compliance vector B.
Bci = Compliance vector for class ci.
Table 3.9: Values for the Tarantula Similarity Coefficient
STT (Row,Column)
# Class C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. C1 1.00 0.80 0.76 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.89 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. C2 0.85 1.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.93 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. C3 0.79 0.77 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.69 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4. L1 0.53 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.79 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.68 0.24 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5. L2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 1.00 0.90 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. L3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 1.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7. L4 0.25 0.29 0.40 0.60 0.53 0.53 1.00 0.35 0.64 0.00 0.68 0.50 0.00 0.63 0.45 0.60 0.39 0.55 0.63 0.64 0.64 0.63
8. L5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00
9. L6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10. L7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
11. L8 0.35 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.46 0.74 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.45 0.63 0.73 0.69 0.74 0.73
12. M1 0.79 0.77 0.88 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.49 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13. M2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14. M3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15. M4 0.00 0.93 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16. D1 0.53 0.87 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.77 0.79 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 1.00 0.00 0.49 0.00 0.84 0.00 0.00
17. D2 0.85 0.00 0.68 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18. D3 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.70 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.80 1.00 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00
19. D4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20. D5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.55 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
21. S1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.97
22. S2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Similarities are ordered by rows.
Table 3.9 shows the similarity score under the Tarantula Similarity Coefficient.
3.9.2 Similarity in Defect Classes
Figures 3.6 - 3.10 show the defect class similarity over the coefficients presented in earlier sections. The
indicators ST (ST ), SD (SD), SH (SH), SMH (SMH), SJ (SJ) and STT (STT ) denote the Trivial, Distribution,
Hamming, Modified Hamming, Jaccard-Needham and Tarantula similarity coefficients.
Subjective indices like ST and SD do not rely on the feature space, rather incorporates the subjective
notion used by the taxonomy developer, while SMH , SJ and STT use the objective feature space and / or
semantic association. As can be seen from the graph, the SMH , SJ and STT are more predictive (display
more variance) than the ST and SD. SH ’s performance should be with those of SMH , SJ and STT , but it is
not noticeable due to the low coefficient values typical for Hamming Coefficients (which is the reason SMH
was developed for this study).
The defect class C1 is predicted to have strong association with M1 and D2, with a weak association
with L4, L8, D1 and D3, in addition to being associated with C2 and C3. C2 is associated with C3 by most
coefficients, and with M1, M4 and D1 by some with a weak association with L4. C3’s association is almost
the same as C2.
L1 is connected with a number of classes spanning C, L, M and D groups, as it is the underlying reason
66
Figure 3.6: Defect Class Similarity Over Different Coefficients
for most defects. L2 and L3 are reported to be rather localized over the other logical classes. L4, on the
other hand, can be the underlying cause for most of the defects and is associated with virtually every other
class. Same observation holds for L8, with the exception of M2 and M3. L5 can result in D1 and D5, and
thus is strongly associated with them. For L6, the reports vary as the “Improper Exception Handling” can
be resulted from a variety of other causes. L7 is mostly associated with L8, and L1, as it is a somewhat
special case of L1.
For the memory defects, M1 is associated with a variety of other classes, as an invalid memory reference
can be from a number of issues. M2 is not associated with any defect but itself, while M3 can be a direct
result if L4, and thus is associated with it. M4, again, is possibly one of the most populous defect class in
existence and can be associated with a number of other classes.
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Figure 3.7: Defect Class Similarity Over Different Coefficients (Continued)
Data related defects are usually associated with C, L and M groups, as they can be the outcome of defects
belonging to the C, L and M groups, as it is reflected by the similarity coefficients.
S1 and S2 are related to each other, with weak relation to the L4 and L8 defects.
One interesting observation can be made from the graphs. The ST and SD coefficients are modelled after
the same subjective interests that were used to develop the two perspectives of the taxonomy. It is expected
for ST and SD to correspond to the classification (that is, grouping C1-3, L1-8, M1-4 and D1-5 and S1-S2
in four separate similarity groups). The other four classifiers rely on the underlying feature set and do not
contain any relation to the subjective discretions. Interestingly, all four of the coefficients, SH , SMH , SJ and
STT showed similarity in the same groups, supporting the incorporation of proper similarity by subjective
means in the development phase.
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Figure 3.8: Defect Class Similarity Over Different Coefficients (Continued)
3.10 Answering the Research Question
This section answers one of the five research questions presented in Chapter 1.
3.10.1 RQ5: Defect Similarity Criteria and Procedures
The last among the five research question presented in Chapter 1 was stated as, “What are the criteria and
procedure to determine similarity in defect classes?”. To answer this question, the terms ‘defect class’ and
‘similarity’ need to be defined. This chapter described the definition of defect classes, and then detailed a
framework, FlexTax, used for generating defect taxonomies. FlexTax’s representation of defect classes was
based on defect features and feature similarities - facilitating the similarity comparison.
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Figure 3.9: Defect Class Similarity Over Different Coefficients (Continued)
Although the similarity study conducted in this research was a primary step to the the task, it nevertheless
was able to point out the similarity and dissimilarity in different classes of defects. The similarity study showed
than it is possible to utilize different feature representation and comparison metrics to obtain a measure of
similarity among defect classes, and that this similarity can be expressed quantitatively indicating various
degrees.
In summary, the information presented in this chapter outlined one possible way of finding out defect
similarity. According to the studies reported in this chapter, defect class similarity can be expressed by
representing defect classes by their feature set then by applying established feature comparison metrics to
compute the similarity.
This particular topic is recognized by this research as a open research question that requires further
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Figure 3.10: Defect Class Similarity Over Different Coefficients (Continued)
investigation. Although a procedure was set up by this research that answers the research question, it still
requires further analysis.
3.11 Summary
This chapter described the state-of-the-art in defect taxonomies, a proposal of a novel taxonomy generation
and defect mapping techniques, experience of using the technique to develop a taxonomy over large scale
real world dataset, evaluation of the taxonomy over multiple strategies, and a study to describe defect
similarity. The chapter started by analyzing notable existing defect taxonomies, selected under defined
criteria and presents a qualitative comparison of the taxonomies - from which the major weaknesses in
existing taxonomies were deducted. The chapter then proceeded on describing a semi-automatic framework
named FlexTax that was developed to address the specific weaknesses of taxonomies and which generates
taxonomies while mapping defects in them. Next, the chapter described a case study conducted to validate
FlexTax, and described the taxonomy generated from the case study. Finally, the chapter described defect
similarity measures and evaluated the taxonomy against the defect similarity measures. The taxonomy
and defect similarity measures described in this chapter are later used in Chapter 4 to compare and assess
existing techniques, in Chapter 5 to design the new technique of defect detection, and in Chapter 6 to provide
a common and consistent framework for comparison and evaluation.
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Chapter 4
Existing Tools and Techniques
This chapter provides an overview of the state-of-the-art in defect detection through code analysis using
the defect taxonomy established in Chapter 3. The chapter begins by describing different solution strategies
used in defect detection (Section 4.1). Later sections describe the strategies, and techniques under the
strategies. As the focus of the current research is on Symbolic Analysis, this chapter describes Static and
Symbolic Analysis techniques in greater depth. Other techniques, and tools belonging to such techniques, are
mentioned with brief descriptions. The description is ordered with techniques, mentioning a tool under all
relevant techniques. In case a tool employs a number of techniques, its description is split over the sections
covering different techniques, without repeating the same information. General information like the tool’s
structure or capabilities are specified in the first mention of the tool in usual reading order. SRTA, the
technique developed in the current research, is described later in Chapter 5. But considering its relevance,
and to compare it with existing tools, elements of SRTA’s description have been incorporated in this chapter.
4.1 Solution Strategies
Solution Strategies for defect detection fall into three broad categories - Manual Inspection, Static Analysis
and Dynamic Analysis [96]. Static and Dynamic Analyses have been adopted and combined into a number
of other strategies like Symbolic Analysis, Statistical Debugging or Verification.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the broad categorization of techniques that are discussed in this chapter. In the
Figure, solid arrows denote a ‘uses’ relation from the user to the used. Dotted arrows denote a ‘is-a’ relation
from the derived to the source. Subsequent sections describe the techniques (and include the tools) for the
strategies of interest.
4.1.1 Manual Inspection
Manual inspection, or code review, is the process where the software source code is inspected by human
inspectors, with or without the help of automated tools, to check their compliance to preset standards or
common practices. The actual process often involves checking the code against a defined checklist [1]. Despite
its strictly human-centric nature and high requirement for human labour [1], manual inspection is still a major
activity in software quality assurance, especially in modern agile development methodologies.
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Figure 4.1: Strategies Used in Detecting Defects
Research concerning manual inspection covers three main directions. The first direction concerns assessing
the effectiveness of the inspection process and measuring the impacts of different factors on the inspection
process. A research by Albaryak et al. [1] measured the impact of code styles over the functional defects found
by review, and concluded that the indentation and style have a significant negative impact on the detection
process, although identifier naming, contrary to popular belief, was not reported to have any impact. Prause
et al. measured social impacts of continuous review processes [131, 130], and concluded that collaborating
development aids development quality.
Second of the three directions involves developing different automated tools to aid in the development.
Efforts include a social development platform by Prause et al. [131], a lightweight visualization technique
called NOSEPRINTS by Parnin et al. [125] to inspect code smells1, and another code inspector named
ICICLE, developed by Brothers et al. [18] as one of the first attempts to groupware based code inspection.
Last of the three directions directs towards developing practical code review techniques to improve its
effectiveness. A series of recommendations for effective code reviews have been made by Kelly and Shepard
[78], as determined by three “controlled experiments”. The recommendations outlined the best practices
and effective methodologies for Manual Inspection processes. A recent publication by Bacchelli and Bird [9]
investigated the practice using modern collaborative tools.
This research does not assume a direct position in the debate on the effectiveness of manual inspections,
rather focuses on improving the state-of-the-art of automated defect detection which may or may not be used
by manual inspection processes as supportive aids.
1A symptom in the source code that does not create a problem by itself, but can indicate the presence of a problem. An
example is repeated code that inidicates maintenance problems.
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4.1.2 Static Analysis
Static analysis analyzes the source code only, without any runtime information. This particular approach
provides a number of advantages over other techniques. First, static analysis can probe any execution path
in the source code, including the ones not reachable at runtime. This particular advantage enables Static
Analysis to detect defects that are not yet encountered, but might surface in future once the execution path
is taken. Second, as it only requires the source code, static analysis can examine software before release, or
even before the software is complete enough to result in a successful build - providing defect detection in the
early stages of development. In specific problems, like Buffer Overflow Detection from large legacy codebase
written in unsafe languages like C and C++, researchers often consider static analysis as the only feasible
approach for proper detection [168].
The most compelling advantage for static analysis is the capability of enumerating and exploring all
execution paths, regardless of their invocation at a particular execution and irrespective of their possibility of
being exploited ever after deployment. This property enables static analysis to be able to detect defects that
might never be exposed at runtime and therefore shall be beyond the scope for Dynamic Analysis. Ironically,
the capability of exploring all paths often poses itself to be the biggest drawback for static analysis in the form
of so-called “path explosion”, that is, the extremely large number of paths the execution has a possibility to
proceed on [91, 23]. Path explosion creates a challenge for static analysis tools to perform their analyses in
reasonable time and often lowers their accuracy - usually exhibited through a high false positive rate. It was
reported that code complexity has a reciprocal relation with the accuracy of the static analysis result [160]
and the same hypothesis was supported by an earlier experiment [168]. Often the false alarm rates for static
detection tools are either difficult to assess, or are simply ignored, “possibly due to the irritation resulted
from seeing too many false alarms” [168]. Sometimes program slicing is used as a countermeasure to the path
explosion problem [91], despite the fact that it does not always provide a good result. Some specialized and
tricky defects that depend on execution order, like concurrency bugs, cannot be detected with satisfactory
accuracy by the application of pure static analysis [79].
The ability of explore all execution paths also provides the way for finding paths relevant to a specific
input set - an idea exploited by the middle phase of the three phase DSD Crasher [39]. Exploiting this idea
reduced the number of execution paths, although is not applicable without the aid of dynamic analysis.
A number of tools have been developed to utilize different flavours of static analysis, having utilized
techniques as diverse as symbolic analysis [163, 158], abstract interpretation [129] and inter-procedural anal-
ysis [129, 163, 158]. Often the conversion of the actual codes into a separate problem domain is applied to
counterbalance various problems with static analysis [163].
Static analysis was exploited in the ARray CHEckeR (ARCHER) by Xie et al. [163]. The tool is reported
to evaluate array access, pointer dereference and function calls against a derived set of constraints to find
violations that might result into an error or an exploitable vulnerability [163]. ARCHER does not require
code annotations, works on C and C++ and is reported to handle multi-million lines of code [163], although
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the accuracy was in question in large scale experiments [168] and in detecting buffer overflow defects.
SAFE [57] is a tool developed for Java codes that uses both structural checks and inter-procedural flow
sensitive dataflow solving techniques to find defects. In its first phase, the tool tries to detect defect signatures
by constructing an XML model [57] and then proceeds on by using a type-state checking to detect trivial
defects. The tool is distributed as an eclipse plug-in and is also able to function as an ANT-task or a stand
alone command line tool [57]. The tool is reported to have limitations in handling large programs [57].
Lexical Analysis
Lexical analysis, as a static analysis, analyzes software properties through the set of tokens generated from
the source files. This form of analysis can find defects that do not require any inference, or require very
limited inference.
Evans et al. [49] developed LCLint, a tool that uses purely static analysis to detect a number of defects
including violation of abstraction boundaries, data hiding, memory leaks, reference to unallocated memories
and null dereferences [49, 48, 50]. The tool works on C and C++ and relies heavily on code annotation that
puts its applicability to existing codebases in question [163].
Evans et al. [50], in a later work, used what they term as “lightweight static analysis” to find buffer
overrun vulnerabilities from source code with SPLINT, an updated version of LCLint [49]. This tool, like
its predecessor, requires code annotations and detects problems by matching code with annotations [50],
although it is able to work to a degree where no annotation is provided [168]. SPLINT works on C code
only and is known to detect stack and heap based buffer overflow defects - using some trivial heuristics as
well as complex program value analysis to detect the likely candidates to the problem. In the words of the
developers of the tool, the effort requirement for code annotation is significant [50].
Holzmann [68] developed UNO, the tool to detect Undefined outcome, Null pointer dereference and
Overflows. The tool is actually a model verifier that works on C code only. The tool provides intra- and
limited inter-procedural analysis under the names of “Local” and “Global” analyses. Although lightweight (by
requirement) and easily deployable, UNO’s accuracy was put to question by multiple experiments [29, 168].
Due to the limitation on static analysis to ensure accuracy and efficiency at the same time, approaches
were proposed to balance between the two. Viega et al. [154] employed static analysis in detecting race
conditions, buffer violations and other security vulnerabilities through a tool named ITS4. ITS4 works by
breaking the non-preprocessed source code into a set of tokens and then analyzing them against hand-coded
token sequences [154]. The tool rely entirely on code annotation to be able to process likely vulnerabilities.
4.1.3 Problem Domain Transformation
Due to the nature of the large number of program paths to analyze, often static analysis is adapted into
transforming the problem involving source code to another representation specific for the type of defect the
analysis intends to detect.
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In 2000, Wagner et al. [158] reported a prototype that used static analysis to formulate an integer
constraint problem from the source code. The prototype was intended to detect buffer overflow problems,
and modelled the test subjects as a pair of integers to verify against each other [158]. A violation on the
constraints would result into a potential buffer overflow identification. The prototype is scalable to systems
of varying sizes, but due to the scalability-precision trade-off, the precision is sacrificed [158]. It is able to
detect a subset of off-by-one errors but does not cover the entire set. A disadvantage of the prototype is its
incapability of handing multiple redirection of pointers, array of pointers, function pointers and unions [158],
along with its inaccurate flow-insensitive analysis [158]. The authors also proposed an algorithm to solve the
integer constraint system in an efficient way using a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). However, the approach
is reported to have suffered from very high false positive rates [168], an issue that was prevalent on a later
work by Xie et al. that relied on it [163].
Ganapathy et al. [56] presented a tool generated with the combination of several other tools that uses
a linear constraint generation and taint analysis for the detection of buffer overflow defects in flow and
context insensitive manners [56]. Their approach uses CodeSurfer to find points-to information for the code
and associates a four variable set to determine the minimum and maximum size of the allocated and used
memory for a buffer [56]. The approach uses a “taint analysis” to refine the constraint set by removing the
invalid variables from it. The tool used two solver modules in solving the constraints using linear programming
to find the best estimates for their values. The tool is reported to be able to handle an arbitrary level of
dereferencing but suffers considerably from both high false positives and high false negatives [56].
Using a finite state machine (FSM) to analyze dereferencing has been proposed by Chen et al. [24] that
detects the memory dereferencing and double deallocation, and provides assumptions on the undecidable
points-to analysis in representing the pointer states through an FSM. The technique detects null pointer and
wild pointer errors along with a partial coverage with the double deallocation detection [24]. The technique
suffers from context insensitivity and the lack of support for function pointers [24].
4.1.4 Hybrid Analysis
Hybrid analysis tries to address the problems of static and dynamic analyses by combining them into inte-
grated techniques to use on code. Typically the application involves selecting the paths that the program is
more likely to trace for static analysis, based on the data collected by dynamic analysis. A point to note is
that, pure dynamic analysis do not have a way of probing into source code, unless proper instrumentation is
inserted in code to generate a precise enough report. As this study focuses on source code defects, we did
not provide detailed description of the pure dynamic analysis tools, although we have mentioned a few.
Often Static and Dynamic Analyses are used to refine, restrict or verify one another’s outcome. This
technique was utilized in Check and Crash [38], DSD Crasher [36], and HeapMD [26]. In the first two,
static analysis was used to refine the results of a dynamic analysis for better performance, and on the latter,
dynamic analysis results were applied on static analysis to pinpoint the problem.
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Invariant Analysis
DSD Crasher [39] is a hybrid tool that combines static and dynamic analysis techniques to detect a variety
of defects in source code. On its first phase, the tool detects dynamic invariants from an existing test suite
using Daikon [47], thus being a subject to Daikon’s requirement of a large set of test data to detect the
invariants [17]. Attempts were made to overcome this by using a verification through ESC/Java [51], a tool
developed earlier by two of the authors of DSD Crasher [38]. The tool uses the Daikon generated invariants
in two ways, as an assumption of a method’s formal parameters inside its body, and as a requirement for the
actual parameters that the method is called with at its calling point [36].
Dimitrov and Zhou [45] proposed a framework that is claimed to be applicable on both error protection
and defects detection, based on dynamic detection and enforcement of instruction level invariants. The
approach uses a table structure named LVDV (Limited Variance of Data Values) that keeps the invariant
information as collected from a successful execution of the system under test. The tool then checks the test
run against the invariants to find a potential defect location.
4.1.5 Statistical Debugging
Statistical debugging is a form of dynamic analysis for identification of the cause of failures, i.e., a defect,
by application of statistical models on program profiles. Almost always dependent on instrumentation, a
program is required to generate a profile that can be monitored and analyzed statistically to locate the point
of failure. However, the technique requires multiple program runs, refining the profile incrementally but never
being able to provide complete information in any single run. Choosing proper instrumentation predicates
(i.e. (often) boolean value generators) remain as a key problem in statistical debugging as the effectiveness
of the technique depends largely on it [74]. Often established techniques like machine learning [74] are used
for the selection of the predicates that accurately model the defect. The predicates are usually boolean value
generators, but it was argued [4] that complex value predicates serve a better purpose. However, the approach
is often criticized for introducing large execution overheads [27], and being a poor indicator of the actual
defect predictors [5, 105]. Recent studies claim that it is impossible to identify complex defects automatically
[132] and that, experts are likely to increase their efficiency using the techniques, when the defect is simple
in nature [126].
Statistical debugging has made its way into a number of defect detection efforts. Liblit et al. [105]
proposed a statistical debugging method by instrumenting predicates at particular program execution points
and using a bit vector to summarize the results from all predicates after each program run. The study focuses
on removing logically redundant predicates. The remaining predicates are then used in localizing defects in
source code blocks. The study claims to be extended to all kinds of source code defects, provided proper
predicates are chosen. The approach was more elaborated in a follow up work on adaptive bug isolation [5]
that searches on the control dependence graph of the program to locate defects in the system. The latter
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approach is reported to significantly reduce the average performance overhead to an order of 1% as compared
to the 87% of the realistic sampling based instrumentation [5].
Jiang and Su [74] proposed a path-sensitive and context-aware statistical debugging methodology with
the use of Random Forests and Support Vector Machines (SVM). Their approach is to assign a classification
score or weight to each predicate to measure its likeliness in predicting a defect [74]. A linear SVM classifier
is employed to perform the task, later random forests are used to permute data values to each classifier.
A k-means clustering algorithm is used to discover the correlation among predicates and then the relevant
predicates are used to execute a branch prediction mechanism that constructs the faulty control flow direc-
tions. The control flow path prediction is a greedy algorithm traversing every possible control flow path and
isolating those relating to the most weighted predicates.
Machine learning approaches were also employed through feature selection techniques by Roychowdhury
and Khurshid [138]. Their approach uses well-known feature selection algorithms like RELIEF and its
derivatives.
Although predicates are the most used candidates for statistical debugging, a tool named HOLMES was
developed by Chilimbi et al. [27] to use path profiles instead of predicate profiles as the instrument for
statistical debugging. The tool relies on the assumption that “only a small portion of the code is related
to a given bug” [27] and reduces the space and execution overheads by inclining towards a defect-centered
approach. The tool allows a program to run without any profiling until it encounters a failure, thus ruling
defect-free programs as “free to run” without any interruption or overhead. The tool combines failure profiles
and static analysis to construct a set of “likely defect containing portions” that are later profiled heavily to
test against the defect. After a sufficient number of profiles are collected, statistical models are used to isolate
the paths that strongly predicts a defect. The tool uses an importance score to paths for the assessment
of their being predictors of the defect y a combination of three statistical metrics, sensitivity, context and
increase. Among these, sensitivity was described as the logarithmic ratio of the failed executions that invoke
a given path to the total failed executions, context is the ratio of the failed executions to total executions
and increase is the increment of the ratio of the failed executions that invoke a given path with the total
executions involving that given path over the context.
SOBER, a statistical defect isolator by Liu et al. [109], used profiles not only from the failure runs, but
also from successful runs to predict a defect’s location. The tool reports a defect probability only if the failure
profiles differ significantly from the successful execution profiles.
One major direction in statistical debugging is improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the process
itself. Zheng et al. [165] proposed an iterative collective voting scheme, influenced by the bi-clustering
algorithms, to judge the suitability of the predicates as being bug predictors. Jiang and Su [75] apart from
their original work on the path-sensitive and context aware methodology exploiting random forests and SVM
[74], used the profiles as a program simplification tool to reduce the complexity of analysis. In a separate
research, Liu and Han [108] proposed a new proximity metric named R-proximity to effectively group multiple
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related profile information that lead to the same defect.
Due to their completely non-deterministic nature, concurrency bugs remain one of the prime targets for
statistical debugging. In a recent work, Lucia et al. [113] proposed Recon, a graph-based partially context-
aware representation of inter-thread communications to reconstruct executions of concurrent programs for
detecting defects that might have resulted into a failure or abnormal behaviour. According to the claim of the
paper, the tool does not only detect defects, but also attempts to provide insight on why the defect occurred
[113]. The tool is reported to detect single and multi-variable concurrency defects [113]. In an earlier but
recent study, Jin et al. [77] presented the Cooperative Crug Isolation framework (CCI), that isolates “crugs”
(concurrency bugs) using a low overhead framework. The issue of parallel programs was also addressed by
Zhou, Kulkarni and Bagchi [166] through their tool Vrisha that detects defects in large scale software by
using a combination of small-scale models of defect free behaviour.
4.1.6 Symbolic Analysis
Traditionally considered as a static analysis technique, symbolic analysis augments the capabilities of pure
static analysis techniques by providing symbolic execution data. As the exact dataflow cannot be determined
without the aid of dynamic analysis, symbolic analysis attempts to provide a similar data by approximating
information that often involves constraint solving or linear programming. Symbolic analysis converts the
problem into a set of symbolic values or constraints that can be resolved, or at least, guessed to find the
possible outcome. Often the failure to resolve a constraint or to find an anomaly in terms of the symbolic
values and a predefined rule lead to the conclusion of finding an error. Symbolic Analysis can be thought of
as a special case of the Problem Domain Transformation technique mentioned in Section 4.1.3.
In the art of defect detection, probably the use of exclusive Symbolic Analysis for detecting defects started
with the technique by Wagner et al. [158]. Their symbolic domain was composed of integer values derived
from memory bounds, which employed a simplified constraint solver to approximate the values used in the
symbolic arithmetic. Later, in ARCHER, Xie et al. [163] used a symbolic analysis technique to bind the
values to variables and memory sizes. The values are represented in symbolic constraints that determine
whether or not the statement qualifies for a defect [163]. The constraints are then resolved to find the actual
threats. They developed a specialized solver that approximates the values from different conditions.
Li et al. [103] presented an algorithm on effective symbolic analysis using simple rules to detect buffer
overflow vulnerabilities in code. The algorithm focused on data and control dependencies and instead of
checking every execution path, it worked on linearly related control dependencies [103].
Symbolic analysis is exploited in the generalized technique of Structural Abstraction and Refinement
(SAR) that has been employed by a number of defect detection tools [20, 144, 149]. Among them, Sinha
[144] proposed a generalized Structural Abstraction Technique that analyzes program ”regions” corresponding
to modular constructs.
FindBugs, [69, 71, 70] a project that started with an experiment and incrementally developed into a
79
complete product, is cited for being one of the most comprehensive defect detectors [8, 7]. The tool works
for Java only, and uses symbolic analysis with the notion of extending a simple analysis technique and / or
model in detecting multiple defects. Findbugs is cited to detect concurrency bugs, but actually the detection
is limited in ‘suspecting’ a few language specific constructs provided in Java [79].
In the most recent approach, Le and Soffa [97] devised a tool called Marple that relies heavily on Symbolic
Analysis. Marple is effective on four types of defects and is path-sensitive, context-sensitive and inter-
procedural.
Grammatech’s CodeSonar [63] is one of the most cited industry-developed tool that detects a wide variety
of code defects through a symbolic execution engine. Coverity’s SAVE [35] and Klocwork’s Insight[81] are
the two other similar tools. Although details of these tools are not public, they are claimed to have detected
“hundreds of types” of defects through symbolic models.
SRTA, the tool developed in this thesis, employs purely Symbolic Analysis as its working procedure.
Similar to Wagner et al. [158], ARCHER [163], and Li et al.[103], SRTA uses constraint formation and
solving techniques, but differs with all three in its novel application of a 3-tuple of constraints formed as
ranges providing greater flexibility, and in its capability to detect dissimilar classes of defects. Marple [96]
and Findbugs [71] make the propositions SRTA builds on, and SRTA has similarity with them in detecting
multiple defects and in using symbolic analysis, but differs with both in its incorporation of multiple-phases
of an entity’s life cycle and complete path envelopment that, collectively, increase SRTA’s capabilities.
4.1.7 Context Sensitive Analysis
In detecting defects, context sensitivity usually means the analysis relative to a block of code’s calling context.
In extended definitions, it might include the set of all active methods in the stack [16]. It is argued that
context sensitivity helps in reducing false positive by refining the results [163, 96]
ARCHER [163] uses a context sensitive analysis by using a call graph of the functions to keep track of
the calling contexts. The approach utilizes a Depth First Search in transforming the control flow graph into
a set of solver states, checking block by block while selecting a block’s successors in random order. However,
the traversal has a time constraint associated, default to five seconds [163] that breaks the analysis once
exceeded.
Although their approach was not strictly context-sensitive, Ganapathy et al. [56] relied on constraint-
inlining and inter-procedural dataflow analysis to incorporate a degree of context sensitivity.
The approach by Jiang and Su [74] provided an algorithm that used a context-aware statistical model for
debugging using machine learning algorithms. Depending on a number of heuristics, they combined several
machine learning algorithms to construct context aware processing models.
Apart from the tools and techniques that are context sensitive themselves, frameworks are proposed to
add context sensitivity to those that do not already have them. Breadcrumbs [16] is a framework proposed
by Bond et al. that extends dynamic defect detection tools by adding context sensitivity.
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4.1.8 Path Sensitive Analysis
Path sensitive analyses, in addition to the other methodologies, consider the exact execution path that was
used to reach a statement in assessing the statement’s being a defect. It is argued that path sensitive analysis
cannot be substituted for a scalable and accurate technique [95, 96, 97]
Marple by Le and Soffa [97] provides specific treatment for a path sensitive analysis in its detection
process. The tool is reported to eliminate a number of false positives by path-sensitive analysis [97].
ARCHER [163] uses what the authors call a “traversal module” to check for infeasible paths in a program’s
execution space. The module checks the feasibility of paths using binary constraints and avoids the infeasible
paths to improve efficiency. However, the authors claimed the accuracy to be “considerable” for their test
systems, although not completely sound [163].
Often static analysis adopts one of the two approaches in handling paths. The first approach, detecting
and excluding infeasible paths (e.g., [121, 167, 97]) provides scalable results, but increases the risk of false
negatives in case a faulty path is excluded from the analysis. The second approach, creating summaries at
specific program points instead of excluding paths (e.g., [143] ), is theoretically able to provide better false
negative performance, but risks the loss of information in creating summaries. Moreover, it is argued by Wei
Le that summaries are not able to provide a complete analysis [97] which is in disagreement to a degree to
the findings of other researchers [15, 14].
SRTA is not path-sensitive in the traditional way, rather SRTA incorporates path-sensitivity through a
Hybrid Data and Control Flow Graph which is used in the processing, but unlike most other tools described
in this section, do not rely on paths for the entire duration of the analysis, providing less restrictions on
the interpretation of symbolic relations. In handling paths SRTA uses the approach to summarize the path
information, to a degree where sufficient information is retained in summary to find the exact path taken.
4.1.9 Model Checking and Enforcement
Model Checking, or formal verification, involves the checking of the subject system against a defined set of
“properties” under strict formal constraints. Although accurate and efficient, model checking requires a deep
understanding of the system to be able to provide effective analysis results.
Trainin et al. [150] argued that injecting small models of conditions on concurrent program can expose
concurrency defects. A model of conditions is defined as a function that takes a program as an input
and generates a set of suspected conditions on program interleaving as output [150]. The approach was
tested for the improper serialization defect by using two models of conditions in relatively small programs.
Experimenting on their custom designed small programs with intentional concurrency bugs, the authors
reported an accuracy improvement of a factor by 7 and 73, respectively [150]. An implication of this study
is the proposition that having a low false positive rate is not an absolute prerequisite for a combination of
tools.
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Frama-C [41] is a static analysis framework that provides model checking capabilities. The framework
relies on user supplied specifications to evaluate the test system (written in the C Language) against the
specifications.
4.1.10 Other Techniques
A number of combination of techniques have been developed for the detection of defects that do not fall in
earlier categories, or deserve separate mention for their unusual nature.
ISA is a static code analyzer that focuses on known code defects leading to vulnerabilities based on data
fusion techniques to validate the results [84]. The tool combines the results from a number of known tools
and applies simple reasoning on the data to validate them against each other. Although reported to increase
the accuracy by cross validation, ISA’s achievements are not widely cited and are not free from arguable
contradictions. In case many tools have the same false positive, it will be identified by ISA as a true positive
and a true positive might be identified as a false positive if it is cited by few detection tools. Due to the
flexibility on the choice of detection tools, however, ISA can be applied to detect any type of code defect.
The 2008 dissertation by Csallner [36] presented the idea of the combination of over and under approxi-
mation analyses for testing. In the dissertation, over-approximated processes are reported as the processes
having complete recall, and under approximated processes are the ones having complete precision.
Csallner and Smaragdakis [38] used test generation to refine the results of static analysis (abstract rea-
soning) to develop a tool named Check ’n’ Crash (CnC). The approach used ESC/Java [51] to statically
detect defects from source code and then validated the results using test cases generated via JCrasher [37], a
tool developed earlier by the same authors. The two tools are combined together using a constraint solving
technique that solves the constraints inferred from the ESC/Java output and provides input to the JCrasher.
CnC is developed explicitly for Java code and is reported to detect a number of low level errors in arbi-
trary codes. The paper claims that the combination of the techniques outperform the same techniques used
separately.
Almost at the same time, the idea of Csallner and Smaragdakis [38] had been used in reverse to establish a
path pruning mechanism by Vipindeep and Jalote [157]. Instead of refining the outcome of static analysis by
test cases, their technique used the data from testing to exclude the paths used in static analysis that might
have relatively low possibility of errors [157]. The tool is effective in finding invalid references, initialization
problems and null dereferencing.
The same idea of the combination of static analysis and test generation has been extended into aiding C
program debugging by Cebaro et al. [22] through a framework named SANTE (Static ANalysis and TEsting).
Their approach used the static analyzer Frama-C [52] and the structural test generation tool, PathCrawler
[127].
Jiang et al. [76] explored the completely different approach on defects by analyzing clone related inconsis-
tencies to find defects that might be introduced by cloning (i.e., duplicating code). The approach detects code
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clones and then extracts inconsistencies-of-interest to generate potential defect reports based on parse trees.
However, in the same paper, the authors reported a false positive rate as high as 90%, attributed to some
fundamental clone detection issues (e.g., same control constructs may not be clones, different drivers may
introduce some clones). The assumption of “clone inconsistencies predicting bugs”, which is one of the same
that was used by CP-Miner [104] (another clone detection tool that directly influenced Jiang’s approach),
is also not beyond considerable doubt. The tool mentions context to describe the control construct of a
particular code artifact [74].
4.1.11 Frameworks
Besides individual tools, a number of frameworks were developed to create tools for defects detection. SUDS
[92] is a multi-stage defect detection framework that provides the testing engineers a mean to create code
defect detection tools based on predetermined or custom built correctness models. SUDS work by four phases,
namely, parsing, simplification, static analysis and instrumentation [92]. Although SUDS uses static analysis
to generate its tools, it generates tools that are dynamically verifiable. SUDS itself does not detect any
defects, rather creates mechanisms that do the detection.
The main notable technique used for SUDS is the source transformation technique [92]. It uses the parser
from CTools [92, 40] and generates statements that are further simplified for analysis through the application
of program slicing techniques. A “tainted propagation algorithm” is used to segregate the variables of interest
and to observe their values, and thus providing an instrumented version of the source code that can then be
run to find the values of interest.
Of the results reported in the paper that describe SUDS [92], it is applied on eight systems and found
sixteen bugs with a few false alarms. An infrastructure like SUDS is a very powerful ally to testers, with
the possible downside of code instrumentation that poses both a security risk and may not be effective in
catching Heisenbugs. The effectiveness of SUDS was not found to be tested with large datasets.
A different approach was exhibited by Lu et al. [112] through PathExpander, an architectural support
for improving the path coverage of the dynamic defect detection tools. The framework increases the coverage
by executing the non visited execution paths in what the authors called a “sandbox”, and thus is able to
predict some of the defects that might exist there. However, the architecture can only resolve defects that
are left undetected for the path coverage problem, and has no way of detecting those that are undetected for
the value coverage problem [112].
Among the few works that address the scalability-accuracy trade-off, Parfait [33] is a multilayer framework
to work on defect detection that utilizes multiple lists to explicitly improve the precision and recall of the
outcome. The framework ensures both precision and scalability by combining a step-by-step approach in
detecting “certainly defective”, “possibly defective” and “safe statements” on C code.
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Table 4.1: Properties of the Analyzed Tools
Strategy Path Sensitivity Requirements Generality Acc.
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Comment
1. ARCHER [163]   #  G# G#     G# # # #  # G# # # G# G# [163, 168, 96]
2. Check n Crush [38]  #  G#  # # # #    # #  # G# G# #  G# [36]
3. Chen [24]  # #   G# # # G# G# # # # #  # G# # #  
4. CCI [77] # #    # # # #   # # # G#  # #   
5. DSD Crasher [39] G# #    # # # G#    # #  # G# G# #  G#
6. ESC/Java [51]  # # G# G# G# G#      G# G#  #  # # G# G# [36, 38]
7. Findbugs [71]  # # G# G#    #  G# # # #  G#  G# # G# G#
8. Ganapathy [56]   # G# G# G#  # G#  # G# # #  # G# # #  G#
9. HOLMES [27] # #  G# G#  # # #    #   # G# #  G# 
10. ITS4 [154]  # # G# G# # G# # G#    # # G# # G# # # G# G#
11. Jiang [74] # #  G#    # #    # #    #   G#
12. LCLint [49]  # # G# G# G# G# G# #   G#  #  # G# # #  
13. Liblit [106] # #    # # # #   # #     #   
14. Parfait [103]   # G# G# G# G# G# #  #  # #  #  # #  G#
15. Recon [113] # #    #  # #    #    #    G#
16. Roychowdhury [138] # #    # # # #    # # G# # # G#   
17. SAFE [57]  # # G# G#   G#   #  # #  #  # # G# G#
18. SOBER [109] # #    # # # #    # G#  # # G#  G# G#
19. SPLINT [48]  # # G# G# G# G# #    G# # #  #  # # G# G#
20. Trainin [150]  #    # # # #  # # # #    # #  
21. UNO [68]   # G# G# G# G# # G#  # # # #  #  # #   [168, 29]
22. Vrisha [166] # #    # # # #   # # #   # #  G# 
23. Wagner [158]  # #  G#  G# G#   # # # #  #  # #  
24. SRTA   #   G#    G# # # # #  #  # #   Chapter 5
Strategy:  = Used as the main technique, G#= Used as auxiliary means, #= Not used
Path:  = All paths, G#= Most paths,  = Minimum paths
Sensitivity:  = Exclusively addresses, G#= Implies, #= Does not address
Requirements:  = Requires, G#= Does not require, but can use and derive benefits from, #= No use
Code/Build:  = Requires complete implementation, G#= Able to use partial code , #= No mention
Generality:  = Considers all, G#= Considers partly, #= Does not Consider
Language:  = General specification based, G#= Multiple Language,  = Single Language
Accuracy:  = ≥ 75%, G#= ≥ 50%,  = ≥ 25%, #= < 25%,  = Not enough data / undecidable
4.2 Defect Detectors Evaluation and Comparison
In the literature we analyzed, evaluation and comparison of defect detectors were done using one of the two
ways. Most of the comparative studies developed benchmarks to evaluate the tools. In the second approach,
either the benchmarks or other experimental methodology was used to compare a set of tools.
4.2.1 Benchmarks
Not many benchmarks exist in the field of defect detection. In their attempt to evaluate static analysis tools,
Zitser et al. [168] used open source code as a benchmark for evaluation. Although their target was not to
establish a benchmark, their approach constructed one. Lu et al. [112] constructed another benchmark for
memory related vulnerabilities under the name BugBench.
Cifuentes et al. [32] proposed a benchmark suite to evaluate defect detection tools for systems developed
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in C. The benchmark, named BegBench, contains two sets of open source software to measure the accuracy
and scalability of the defect detection software [32]. It was evaluated with the tools Parfait, Splint, Clang
and UNO [32].
iBUGS, an automated benchmark extractor from development history, was constructed by Dallmeier and
Zimmermann [43]. Instead of being a benchmark itself, the tool constructs benchmarks by extracting codes
from existing codebases before and after fixing a defect (as identified by log messages) and uses them to
construct the benchmark itself [43].
4.2.2 Evaluative and Comparative Studies
Shahriar and Zulkernine [141] classified static buffer overflow detectors over six characteristics, inference
technique, analysis sensitivity, analysis granularity, soundness, completeness and supported language. Their
assessment was on twelve tools that represented the state-of-the-art at present.
In a separate work, Zitser et al. [168] evaluated five static analysis buffer overflow detectors using open-
source code as benchmarks. This study pointed out a number of issues in present systems, as was described
in earlier sections in this Chapter. One particular contribution of this study was the representation of results
using an ROC-type plot which was adopted in this dissertation for the presentation of results.
4.3 A Scenario Based Comparison of Defect Detection Tools
Table 4.1 summarizes the properties of the tools and techniques presented in this chapter, with a row dedicated
to the later described SRTA (Symbolic Range Tuple Analyzer), the tool developed as a part of this thesis.
The table presents the information in six different groups. ‘Strategy’ identifies the solution’s strategy in a
combination of three major techniques, static, dynamic and symbolic analysis. The ‘Path’ group expresses
the tool’s consideration and treatment to the set of execution paths. ‘Sensitivity’ identifies the tool’s analysis
from the perspectives of path sensitivity, context sensitivity, inter-procedural analysis and intra-procedural
analysis. The ‘Requirements’ group, in order, specifies the requirement of build-able or complete systems,
requirement of annotation, and the requirement of specification, specific type or structure in the subject
system. ‘Generality’ expresses the tool’s adaptability across different granularities. Finally, the ‘Acc.’ column
specifies the Precision and Recall of the tools, as can be found in literature. A point to mention is, this table
does not describe every tool mentioned in this chapter. It only described the ones directly comparable to
SRTA, the technique developed in this research.
Table 4.1 can be used in four different ways. First, it provides a snapshot of a particular tool if read in a
row-wise order. Second, it can provide the overview across particular perspectives, if read in a column-wise
order. Third, it can provide a qualitative comparison of different tools under different perspectives. Fourth,
it can identify the major issues and challenges present in the trade by analyzing the specific column values.
This section provides three scenarios that describe the use of the information summarized in Table 4.1
85
and Table 4.2. Instead of relying on hypothetical scenarios, the author’s specific experience while doing the
literature survey for this dissertation was expressed. The three scenarios describe the first three of the uses
described in the previous paragraph. As the fourth use, identification of major issues and challenges, is
specifically important for such a study, it is reported under a different section.
For the evaluation of the technique proposed in this thesis, different tools were required to compare the
technique. Three different tools were planned for evaluation. The information presented in Table 4.1 and
Table 4.2 was used to make the decision.
4.3.1 Scenario 1: Finding Tools Matching Perspectives
This thesis focuses on static analysis, and specifically, symbolic analysis. dynamic or hybrid analysis tools
therefore do not make relevant candidates for comparison as the set of strengths and weaknesses for Static
and Dynamic Analyses are often complementary to each other.
A look at the tools specified in Table 4.1 under the column group ‘Strategy’ specified the tools ARCHER,
Chen’s Tool, ESC/Java, Ganapathy’s Tool, FindBugs, ITS4, LCLint, Parfait, SAFE, SPLINT, UNO, and
Wagner’s Tool as the potential candidates. Other tools could safely be excluded from the candidacy list for
their strong reliance to dynamic analysis, which would make the comparison improper.
4.3.2 Scenario 2: Finding Information About a Tool
Scanning the Table 4.1 row-wise, it was found that ARCHER, Chen’s Tool and Wagner’s Tool considers all
paths, same as SRTA. But only Chen’s Tool processes all paths. On the other hand, Chen’s Tool lacks the
sensitivities required for SRTA, while ARCHER, ESC/Java, Ganapathy’s Tool, FindBugs, LCLint, Parfait,
SAFE, SPLINT, UNO and Wagner’s tool provide more comprehensive treatments. Considering these facts,
other tools were preferred over Chen’s Tool for comparison.
All of the tools considered in this list required complete code, as expressed in Table 4.1. Therefore no
advantage could be gained by selecting one over the other. But for the requirements of style and specific
structure, ESC/Java and LCLint provide less compelling information. Other tools, however, do not have the
extra burden of style and structure as ESC/Java and LCLint do. In consideration of these factors, ESC/Java
and LCLint were not preferred over the rest of the tools for comparison.
Although SPLINT, FindBugs and Ganapathy’s Tool require annotation that ARCHER, SAFE, UNO and
Wagner’s Tool did not, it was not considered a determining factor due to the existence of this requirement
for many of the tools.
4.3.3 Scenario 3: Qualitative Tool Comparison
Considering the Table 4.1, it can be seen that, according to the literature, Ganapathy’s Tool performs
poorly in precision in comparison with other tools, although the recall performance is considerable. A
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further examination by Table 4.2 shows that Ganapathy’s tool’s defect coverage, in comparison with the
others considered, is minimal. Same issue extends to Parfait. Considering these two facts, other tools were
preferred over Ganapathy’s Tool and Parfait.
The same factor of low precision and recall exists for Wagner’s Tool and UNO, but UNO provides more
defect coverage that Wagner’s Tool. Table 4.2 also demonstrates SPLINT’s strong association to multiple
defect types, while ARCHER, and Wagner’s Tool usually have weak association. Although SAFE’s defect
coverage is more numerous than the rest, the association to no defect class is strong. Considering these facts,
FindBugs, SPLINT and UNO were considered as the final set of tools for comparison. The comparison was
presented in Chapter 6, along with the details of experiments and evaluation.
4.4 Issues and Challenges
Despite the fact that a lot of efforts were indulged into the detection of defects, an equally large barrier of
issues and challenges still remain. The generalized track for defect detection still has a lot of open problems
to explore, as well as having scopes for improvement of present techniques to provide better results.
4.4.1 Defect Type Coverage
Table 4.2 shows the defect class coverage of the analyzed tools. For any defect type, a strong indicator is
used if the tool explicitly aimed at that defect class, and does not exclude any defect type that has been
found to be belonging to the class. A weak indicator is used if either the tool does not provide an explicit
coverage to the class, or if it considers defect types to only part of the class.
As shown in Table 4.2, there are a number of defect classes that are focused heavily by the detection tools
and thereare classes that are almost untouched. One of the heavily focused groups is the group for memory
related defect classes that was covered by a number of tools (e.g., [163, 49, 50, 154, 57, 158, 56, 51, 36, 38]).
Although most of the tools are vulnerability detectors, they often treat memory issues as vulnerabilities.
Apart from the concurrency problems that require special techniques to be employed, types requiring
generalized techniques or extensions of present tools are still not covered much. For example, computation
defects are investigated by only a few tools [154, 51, 36, 38], as well as those of data related ones [51, 36, 38],
while Logical Defects stay mostly untouched.
Computation and data related defects largely fall into the categories where constraint checking can detect
or infer the presence of errors. Thus a number of existing tools [163, 49, 50] that do not address these defects
can be adjusted to work with them. Also, specific broad symbolic techniques [103] can be brought to work
with these using their standard rule-set by defining rules for the types of errors.
The data from SRTA are presented in a shaded row at the bottom for comparison with other tools. As
it is apparent from the table, SRTA provides a more comprehensive defect coverage than most of the tools
analyzed in this chapter.
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Table 4.2: Defect Coverage of Different Tools (with respect to the Taxonomy Developed in Chapter
3)
Comp Logic Memory Data Sync.
# Tool/Author C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2
1. ARCHER [163] G# # G# # # # # # # # # G# # #  # # # # # # # [163, 168, 96]
2. Check ’n’ Crash [38] G# G# # # # # # # # # # G# # # G# G# G# G# # # # # [36]
3. Chen [24] # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # #
4. CCI [77] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G#  
5. DSD Crasher [39] G# G# # # # # # # # # # G# # # G# G# G# G# # # # #
6. ESC/Java [51] G# G# # # # # # # # # # G# # # G# G# G# G# # # # # [36, 38]
7. FindBugs [71] G# G# G# G# # G# # G# # G# # G# # # # G# G# G# # # # # [8, 8, 69, 71]
8. Ganapathy [56] G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # # #
9. HOLMES [27] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # #
10. ITS4 [154] G# # G# # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# G# # # # # #
11. Jiang [74] # # # G# # # # # # G# # G# # # G# # # # # # # #
12. LCLint [49] # # # # # # # # # # #  G# G#  # # # # # # # [163, 49, 48]
13. Liblit [106] # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# G# G# G# G# # G# # # #
14. Parfait [103] # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # #
15. Recon [113] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #   
16. Roychowdhury [138] # # # # # # # # # G# # G# # # G# # # # # # # #
17. SAFE [57] G# G# G# # # # # # # # # G# # G# G# G# G# G# # # # #
18. SOBER [109] # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# # G# # G# # # #  
19. SPLINT [48] # # # # # # # # # # #   G#  # # # # # # #
20. Trainin [150] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #  G#
21. UNO [68] # #  # # # # # # # # G# # #  # # # # # # # [168, 29]
22. Vrisha [166] # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# G#
23. Wagner [158] # # # # # # # # # # # G# # #  # # # # # # #
24. SRTA      G# # G#   #     G# G#   G# # # Chapter 5, Chapter 6
 = Strong Support, G#= Weak Support, #= No Support
4.4.2 Complete System Requirement
Although one of the strongest points in favour of static analysis is its ability to process incomplete code, this
is often not utilized by the techniques. Prominent tools that utilize only static analysis [163, 51, 49, 48, 154]
require complete systems to process, as apparent in the “Code/Build” column in Table 4.1. For any system
to undergo a defect detection activity by these tools, the developer has to wait till a build-able complete
system is at hand, forcing the detection to the later phase of development. Among the tools analyzed in this
chapter, only SRTA and Chen’s Tool skip the requirement of complete system.
4.4.3 Annotation
Tools to exploit dynamic analysis require source code instrumentation as a prerequisite for the application
of the technique. Static analysis does not have the limitation of enforcing instrumentation, still a lot of
static analysis tools rely on instrumentation or annotation. These instrumentations or annotations are often
done by hand, involving significant human effort on the part of the developers. Often the developers of the
tools report the significant overhead associated with the tool [38], which is supported by other researchers
[163, 168].
Table 4.1 show the tool’s annotation requirement under Column “Annotation”. As it can be seen from
the table, most tools require annotation as a requirement, while others consider it as supporting mechanisms.
Only a handful of tools (Chen’s Tool, Ganapathy’s Tool, Parfait, SAFE, Wagner’s Tool) exclude the require-
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ment altogether. SRTA, the tool developed in this thesis, avoids the annotation requirement to provide for
a more practical solution, as it can be observed in the shaded row of the table.
4.4.4 Accuracy
As presented under the columns Precision and Recall in Table 4.1, the precision and recall for most of the
tools, especially those employing static analysis, are often in the order of 50%, with some performing in as
low as in the order of 25%. In balancing the trade-off between scalability and accuracy, most tools often
ensure scalability at the expense of accuracy [163, 158, 36], resulting in large number of false positives, and
often having a large false negative rate.
4.5 Summary
This chapter provides an overview of the state-of-the-art with their comparisons with each other and with
the technique developed in this research. The descriptions provided in this chapter is used to shape the
development of SRTA, as described in Chapter 5. The chapter started by providing information on the tools
and techniques categorized by their strategies, and then provided a qualitative comparison of the relevant
ones. The tools and techniques were evaluated using the taxonomy developed in Chapter 3. The chapter then
proceeded on describing a case study to demonstrate the use of the information contained in this chapter.
Finally, the chapter described the prominent issues as were apparent from the information presented.
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Chapter 5
Using Symbolic Range Tuples in Defect Detection
This chapter provides details on SRTA (Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis), the technique developed under
this research to detect dissimilar classes of source code defects. SRTA builds on the concepts of defect
similarity as outlined in Chapter 3 and uses the analyses provided in Chapter 4. This chapter begins by
providing chapter-specific background information (Section 5.1) followed by a description of the propositions
made by other researchers that drove SRTA’s development (Section 5.3) and a description of the conceptual
architecture of SRTA (Section 5.4). Next, the solution provided by SRTA, that utilized the propositions,
was described (Section 5.5) along with the rationale behind specific design decisions. The Symbolic Domain,
notations, rules and Symbolic Algebra associated with the solution are described next (Section 5.6). The
chapter then continues with the details of application of SRTA for defect detection (Section 5.7). Finally, a
prototype implementation of SRTA is described in brief (Section 5.13). This chapter answers the Research
Questions RQ1 (“Can a specific abstraction provide sufficient means for detecting multiple dissimilar classes
of defects?”) and RQ2 (“To what length can such a technique go in terms of dissimilar classes of defects?”).
5.1 Chapter-specific Background
This section provides the background for this chapter.
SRTA: Abbreviation for Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis. It is a dissimilar defect detection technique that
was developed as the outcome of this research and is described in this chapter.
Path Envelopment: This term is used throughout this chapter to mean the actual expanse of the technique
in probing the execution paths. A partial path envelopment is used to denote the situation where a technique
does not process all possible execution paths across a program execution point, rather selects a subset of it.
A Complete Path Envelopment is the situation where a technique considers each and every execution path
that might have resulted in reaching a particular program point.
Path Summarization: The process of creating path summaries. Path summaries, in the context of this
research, is the technique of creating a summarized representation of an entity’s states in a program execution
point, across all execution paths that have passed through that particular program execution point.
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5.2 The Need for Detecting Dissimilar Defects
A single software project usually contains multiple classes of defects, some of which may belong to similar
classes (e.g., different memory problems), and some in completely different classes (e.g., memory problems
and computation errors). Regardless of their affiliations, even trivial defects are known to create complicate
problems. One such case was the Mars Polar Orbiter Accident [100], the crash of a spacecraft that is
attributed to a very simple error involving only units of measurement (NASA ground control team used the
Metric Newton-Second as the unit of impulse, while the spacecraft’s control software interpreted it as the
Imperial Pound-Second unit, causing a discrepancy in its impulse estimation at a factor of 4.45) [146, 110].
Apart from the specialized Mars Orbiter Project, one other trivial defect caused human casualties in Canada
and the U.S.A. by overdosing radiation patients with 100 times the intended value due to a unchecked
keystroke sequence [101].
Considering an everyday software, this research found the popular browser Mozilla Firefox alone to be a
container of twelve different classes of defects (Table 6.7 in Chapter 6). The classes belong to at least four
different dissimilar groups, even under the most liberal estimation of similarity.
To provide a complete detection coverage on software projects, a software management team has two
alternative solutions. First, a set of different tools providing specialized coverage to different defect types
can be applied. This technique often fails to guarantee high quality software, as specialized tools focus more
on scalability than accuracy (e.g., [163]). If only high accuracy tools are chosen, being originated in different
sources, the tools still differ in their input specifications and reporting. Using the strategy effectively thus
requires specialized and dedicated manpower, increasing project overhead.
The second approach is to use one of the available industry tools that provide coverage over different
defect types (e.g., Coverity SAVE [35], Grammatech CodeSonar [63], Polyspace [129]), that, in addition to
being expensive [86, 85, 64], require high configuration of the experimental environment to be able to conduct
their massive analyses (as reported in [29]).
If multiple dissimilar defects can be detected by a tool with reasonable accuracy, it can provide a substitute
to the multi-tool strategy of the first approach described above, as it is already provided by the tools
mentioned for the second approach. If such a tool can retain its accuracy and scalability using a single
simplified model, it should be able to reduce its internal structural complexity, thus relieving the requirement
of high-resource experimental environments. Using such a tool shall be able to provide the benefits of the
second approach, without the associated drawback of resource intensive requirements, and probably without
the high acquisition cost. This particular motivation was the driving force behind SRTA.
5.2.1 Defect Classes Revisited
To make this chapter self-contained, a summary of the Taxonomy described in Chapter 3 is provided in this
section in Table 5.1. The table does not contain examples or details of the defect classes. A summary of the
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identifying property is mentioned along with defect class identifier and the defect class’s descriptive name.
Table 5.1: Summary of Defect Classes Described in Chapter 3
# Class Name Description
1. C1 Value Representation Defect An entity is assigned a value it is unable to represent.
2. C2 Value Offset Defect An entity’s value is off by a specific constant.
3. C3 Undefined Outcome An operation’s outcome becomes non-determinable.
4. L1 Improper Checks Absent, or wrong, check at any point in code.
5. L2 Improper Terminal Condition Absent, or wrong, condition for loop or recursive function termination.
6. L3 Wrong Operation Using one operation / operator in place of another.
7. L4 Flaws in Algorithm Any error in algorithm.
8. L5 Performance Issues Presence of any code structure that could be replaced with a better performing one.
9. L6 Improper Exception Handling Not handling proper exception.
10. L7 Improper Control Flow Creating a control flow improper for the context.
11. L8 Design Non-conformance Deviation from design / algorithm.
12. M1 Invalid Memory Reference Accessing a memory location that should not be accessed.
13. M2 Improper Deallocation Deallocating wrong entity, or deallocating in the wrong way.
14. M3 Memory Leaks Not releasing allocated memory.
15. M4 Over / Underflow Accessing a memory out of the defined boundary.
16. D1 Interface Mismatch Using mismatching data types / other specifications in interfaces
17. D2 Data Mismatch Using mismatching data values in interfaces.
18. D3 Improper Input Validation Missing, or making error in, input validation.
19. D4 Missing / Extra Inputs Self-explanatory.
20. D5 Improper Abstraction Improper representation of an entity (not the value).
21. S1 Prohibitive States Multi-process situation that halts execution and cannot be resolved.
22. S2 Improper Sequencing Multi-process situation with wrong sequencing of events.
5.2.2 Single Model Representation of Dissimilar Defect Classes
Defect features simplify over abstractions. The higher one goes in the abstraction levels, the more simplified
the feature set becomes. However, more abstraction also specifies less details - which limits the detection
capabilities. If a specific abstraction can be provided over the source code to represent the entities in a form
that can express multiple defects under the same structure, while preserving sufficient information for their
detection and distinction, dissimilar defect detection from a single model becomes a reality.
Four illustrative cases, taken from simple examples, are shown in Figure 5.1. Of the four cases, the first
three belong to one class of defect, the value representation problem, and the fourth belongs to a completely
different class, buffer overflow. The four levels of abstraction show how the features converge over higher
abstractions, facilitating the employment of single model.
The source code, including its entire token sequence can be represented using a Parse Tree (PT), as it is
done for all software building processes. However, the source code contains defect instances, not defect types
or classes. Therefore, detecting every single instance from a Parse Tree would require specialized treatment
for different defect instances. In Figure 5.1, Case 2 and Case 3 are two instance of the same defect, although
their parse trees differ. Any pattern matching algorithm that works on parse trees, unless it incorporates
customized inference modules for such cases, will treat the two instances as two different defects. Although
the trees have common subtrees, it cannot be used for the inference due to the fact that there are different
non-terminals involved in the mismatching part of the trees.
The Abstract Syntax Tree, or AST, provides an abstract mechanism over the Parse Trees (which, in
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Figure 5.1: Representation of Four Defects over Four Levels of Abstraction
contrast, are often called the Concrete Syntax Trees), although it is not much different than a parse tree.
ASTs can generalize the defect instances to defect types, although cannot extend to different defect types
represented under the same defect class. In the figure, Cases 2 and 3 are represented by different tree
structures, but the information can be obtained from either one as the differing parts of the sub-trees do not
contain any non-terminal values, making the non-matching part deterministic and thus inferable.
Moving up one more step on the abstraction, if a dataflow module is used on top of the AST to comprehend
the context of the information represented by the AST, different defect types corresponding to the same
context can be generalized into one unit, effectively summarizing a defect class. If an analyzer performs at
this level, it is able to detect a single, or a few related, defect classes using a single model or technique,
although cannot generalize to dissimilar classes. In the figure, Cases 1, 2 and 3 result in identical dataflow
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anomalies each involving , although the Case 2 defect cannot be detected by dataflow analysis because the
change in data occurred before the assignment to the receiver.
If the representation can be abstracted even further, then the defect classes can be represented by a set of
features. At this point, the representation problem reduces to an abstract feature set, instead of the instance,
type or class-specific representations of less abstract methodologies. If the source code’s representation can
be converged into the same abstract feature set, this set can be used as the model for the detection. The
figure shows the situation on Level 4, where all five situations of the four example cases are represented using
the same structure. SRTA utilizes this concept.
5.3 Existing Propositions
SRTA is built on five major propositions that were published over a period from 1995 [44] to 2011 [60].
Proposition 1: Source Code Contains Most of the Defects
Studies show that source code alone contains the origination and exhibition of 75% of the defects existing in
software systems [99]. For the defects that are not originated in source code, often the footprint is contained
in the source [44].
Proposition 2: Dissimilar Defects Show Similar Characteristics over Arbitrary Abstraction
Virtually all defect taxonomies are built on this concept that different defects can be expressed through
common properties. The work by DeMillo and Mathur [44] used this fact to use the grammar as an abstraction
to categorize defects. Although their work is not directly related to this research, differing from objectives,
processes and experiments, it established the grammar based defect generalization principles that are directly
utilized by this research in defect detection.
A 2010 study by Le and Soffa [96] has utilized the same principles, although through different realizations
and procedures, into detecting multiple similar classes of defects using a simplified representation.
Proposition 3: Summarization Techniques can Alleviate Path Explosion Problems
As proven by Godefroid et al. [59, 60], compositional symbolic analysis effectively alleviates path explosion
problems associated with static and symbolic analyses. In a later work, Li et. al. [103] used the summarized
ranges in detecting buffer overflows through a tool named Parfait. Their argument proved the general
technique of summarization to be practical and effective when analyzing large systems.
Proposition 4: Path Summarizations Preserve Defective Path Information
As demonstrated by Blume and Eigenmann [15, 14] and later applied by Wagner et al. [158] and Xie et al.
[163], it is possible to convert code features into numerical ranges that can be analyzed to infer defects. In a
recent study, Le and Soffa [93] has proven that, if a given program point contains a defect, any path traversing
through that point contains properties relevant to that defect. The general argument of Le and Soffa [93] was
against the use of summaries due to the fact that summaries do not retain enough information for effective
detection. Recognizing this argument, this research used multiple summaries to resolve this issue.
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Proposition 5: State-Space Holds Information for Defects
Le and Soffa [94, 95] have demonstrated that “faults exhibit locality”. A generalization of this statement can
be used to infer that defects exhibit features that are distinguishable in their local context.
5.4 An Overview of Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis
SRTA, or Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis, was aimed to be general, scalable, practical and accurate. To
achieve generality, SRTA was designed with provisions for as much soft-coded specifications as possible. Figure
5.2 shows the conceptual structure of SRTA. In the figure, the external data (i.e., Source Code, Specifications
and Grammar) are shown using a document symbol. The dotted rectangle denotes the boundary of SRTA
and the solid rectangles denote the three functional phases, with their specific tasks listed inside.
Figure 5.2: Conceptual Architecture of SRTA
For the analysis of a software system, the input to SRTA is the collection of source files that make up the
software system. No extra information on the system or annotation is required. SRTA is composed of three
sequential phases, shown in Figure 5.2.
5.4.1 The Preprocessing Phase
The first phase, ‘Preprocessing’, prepares the input data stream for processing by SRTA. This phase is not
to be confused with the C/C++ Preprocessing, although the C/C++ Preprocessing is a part of SRTA’s
preprocessing phase. The functional tasks for the preprocessing phase is to tokenize the input according
to the Language-Specific Lexical Specifications and to match the sequence of tokens into grammar patterns
of interest, which is recognized from the Grammar supplied as external data. Both the Lexical Specifica-
tions and Grammar were incorporated as external components to ensure SRTA’s applicability over different
programming languages.
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5.4.2 The Model Building Phase
The next phase is named ‘Model Building’. In this phase, SRTA analyzes the token sequence resulting from
specific grammar patterns, and creates a Hybrid Data and Control Flow Graph (HFG). The HFG is used
to approximate the symbolic ranges SRTA uses. The Range Tuples, which are the main model components
for SRTA, are inferred in this phase. This phase outputs the internal model for SRTA which is described in
details in later sections of this chapter.
5.4.3 The Analysis and Reporting Phase
The third, and final, phase, named ‘Analysis and Reporting’, analyzes the information obtained from the
model with respect to user supplied specifications on defects, and reports the outcome.
Later sections of this chapter details the model, the ranges, inference procedures, tuple description and
the defect specifications, along with the description of a prototype to implement the concepts of SRTA.
5.4.4 Example Workflow
To demonstrate how SRTA works, the fourth case as represented in Figure 5.1 is used. This example is
included in this section with the intention to provide an overview of SRTA’s working procedures only, exact
technical details and model specifications are provided later in this chapter.
Figure 5.3 shows the summarized workflow. In the preprocessing phase, SRTA breaks down the source
code into tokens, determines the types of identifiers, and determines values for the literals.
Figure 5.3: Example Workflow of SRTA Over a Simple Example
On the next phase, model building, SRTA builds a hybrid data and control flow graph (HFG) that
represents the flow in the code. Using this graph, and the external specifications provided, SRTA assumes
the range of values associated in each execution point, which is represented by one or more nodes in the graph.
In this particular example, integers were assumed to be 2-byte entities. In every node, all possible values for
an entity is considered. When x was declared (before initialization) at Node 1, its value was encompassing
the entire range possible. At node 2, when the allocation was done, the range was restricted to [0, 9].
96
Using the HFG’s flow information, SRTA constructs a 3-tuple of ranges, signifying the absolute possible
range of values, the imposed (through external checks) range of values, and the applied range of values for
an entity. In this example, there was no imposed range (they require conditional branches). The other two
ranges were specified.
In the analysis phase, an anomaly is detected when a disagreement between ranges is found. In this case,
at Node 3, x was accessed with a range of values [10, 10], where its permitted range was [0, 9], thus indicating
an anomaly. On the other hand, the single element of x, being an uninitialized integer, has the permitted
range [-32768, 32767] and was accessed using the range of values [0, 0], which fall within the permitted range.
Therefore it was marked as safe.
Later sections provide the technical details of mathematical approximations, tuple description, tuple
formation, range estimation and the detection procedure.
5.5 Solution Description
SRTA detects dissimilar defects by analyzing a single model. The model is built using symbolic values
obtained using static analysis, through the application of path summarization and complete path envelopment
techniques in the form of a 3-tuple containing symbolic ranges.
5.5.1 Rationale
In detecting dissimilar defects, the first problem arises in defining what defect similarity is, and which defects
are similar or dissimilar under what conditions. Chapter 3, through the established framework, attempts
to define defect similarity. The proposition that different defects can be similar with respect to arbitrary
abstraction (Proposition 2), provides a possibility to model dissimilar defects into a simplified construct that
can be analyzed for the detection.
Source code is selected for the processing because of the fact that it is the container of most defects
(Proposition 1). As source code exhibits strict formal constructs, it is possible to apply automated techniques
in analyzing source code and to find the defects. Moreover, the defects that are uncovered in earlier phase of
development often require lower fixing overhead. Also, as dynamic analysis, being the other possible choice,
cannot analyze paths that are not taken during the execution of the software, it often has high false negative
rates for the defects that exist in the non-taken paths. Static analysis can uncover defects in all paths, thus
resulting into lower false negative rates. Considering the advantages, and the objectives of the research, static
analysis was chosen as the proper technique to be adopted.
Defects often exhibit themselves through the interactions of different code artifacts. Detection of defects
often requires information on the inter-relation of different artifacts, as well as on the order and probability of
invoking particular statements. It is difficult for a pure static analysis to analyze these information. Symbolic
analysis aids in such situations by simulating execution or by inferring constructs that provide the information
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or approximations of runtime behaviour. To attain the objectives of this research, symbolic analysis was thus
chosen as the technique of selection.
Usually the path explosion problem is attacked using two methodologies, exclusion of infeasible paths
[121, 147, 167] and path summarization [31]. Exclusions are able to reduce the search domain for the analyzer
to a great deal and are employed in different flavours, but they suffer from very prominent drawbacks. First,
the general solution to the problem of finding infeasible paths is undecidable [121, 94] - thus the best outcome
is bounded by a good approximation only. Second, often the required information is localized in statements
under particular context [147], and are not decidable through pure static analysis. Third, the number of
included paths, regardless of the soundness of the exclusion approximations, increases with the increase of
total available program paths and puts a practical limit on the scalability.
Summaries do not exclude paths, but the specific summary technique may drop information required to
detect the defects. Despite their lossy representation, summarizations are effective techniques to counteract
path explosions (Proposition 3), because, as the set of paths is summarized, the size of the summary set
does not increase with the increment of paths. Additionally, path summarizations can be devised to contain
required information if the objective of summarization is defined (Proposition 4). For SRTA, the objective
was predefined, and the summaries were constructed of multiple parts.
5.5.2 Statement Ordering
In SRTA, symbolic range tuples are used to model the state-space. The components (i.e., ranges) of the tuples
are derived from the source code. Statement orders were used to model the relations among the components
of the tuple, and among different tuples. The statement ordering was determined with the following principles
(i) Statement orders have arbitrary start points.
(ii) From the start point, statements have an ascending integer number associated with them to denote
their location in the code.
(iii) In case of a procedure call, the statements continue inside the procedure code from the calling point,
and return to the called point after completing the procedure.
5.5.3 State-space Modelling
A software’s states are the different instantaneous situations of the software along its execution. A state-space
is the collection of all states the software may encounter in its course of execution. The concepts related
to state-space, and different modelling of the state-space, are frequently used in type systems and model
checking. The same concepts for software state-space can be applied to individual entities like variables or
constants.
For a primitive entity (e.g., an integer variable), the states are different values the entity may assume. For
example, for a one byte signed integer value, the state space consists of all values from -128 to +127. States
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Figure 5.4: Generic State-space for an Atomic Entity
change with execution phases, where an execution phase is defined as a set of instructions that perform any
change in the software or accesses any entity in any way. The exact machine level details of an execution
phase may vary with different levels of abstraction but for the current analysis, considering only the change
inducing instruction(s) as a single execution phase is sufficient (that is, more than one variable declaration
statements may comprise to a single execution phase). At any execution phase, an entity has exactly one
state out of a set of possible states.
Figure 5.4 shows a generic state-space for an entity. Execution phases are defined as e0, e1, e2..., with e0
being the initial state and e1, e2, e3, ... being subsequent execution phases. The states for the identifier are
denoted as si±n, n ≥ 0, with si as the initial state. At the initial phase of execution, e0, the state of the
identifier is at si. As execution progresses, at the first phase, e1, depending on the situation in the software,
the identifier may have any one of the states si+1, si−1. If the identifier was at state si+1 in e1, it may assume
any one of the states si, si+1, si+4 in e2, and in case it was at state si−1, it may have any one of the states
si−3, si−2, si, si+2 at e2. The execution thus proceeds on, if the identifier is at any specific state s at an
execution phase, in the next execution phase it either remains there, or has a transition to any of the states
connected by lines with s. The range [si−3, si+4] thus encompasses all values the identifier may assume over
the course of the execution. The ‘Phase of Initiation’ is the execution phase where the entity comes into
being - through declaration or allocation. The ‘Phase of Termination’ is the execution phase where the entity
ceases to exist.
A few properties of the state-space becomes apparent from the diagram. First, when increasing values of
i denote subsequent execution phases, there can only be a transition from phase ei to phase ei+1 and not the
opposite. The reason for this phenomenon is, if a defect occurs in a particular statement, there may not be
a decidable relation of the defect with an earlier version of the same statement. To account for this fact, the
execution is modelled as linear and not repetitive. For a recurrent structure that runs n-times and induces
some change in an entity, there are n execution phases arranged in a linear construct where the transition to
99
Figure 5.5: State-space for Entities in Listing 5.1
a new state depends only on the present state of the entity without any dependency on the previous states.
As execution does not roll backwards, it is not possible for a state to go to another state in a previous phase
although it might assume one of the previously assumed states in a later execution phase.
The second property is that, a transition from execution phase ei occurs only to execution phase ei+1,
and not to any later state. This phenomenon realizes that if an entity is not changed by an execution phase,
unless it is destroyed, it retains the same state it was in before proceeding into that execution phase and it
does not become stateless or undefined. For the same reason, if an entity is created in eI and destroyed in
eT , for every intermediate execution phase ei, I ≤ i ≤ T it has at least one transition. For any transition,
the destination state may be the same as the state of origin (although under a different execution phase), or
it may be a different state.
A more specific example is shown in Figure 5.5, following the Code Listing 5.1. The figure shows the
state-space for entities n, r, i, f, s and cards in the function Shuffle() under the specified calling context. In
the subfigures under Figure 5.5, execution phases are marked downward on the vertical axis and states, i.e.,
the values of the identifiers, are on the horizontal. The initial execution phase, e0, is the invocation of the
function. The next execution phase, e1 includes the variable declaration statement as it does not change any
other value in the statement. e2 to e6 includes the loop iterations, with e7 marking the return statement.
The states are formed using different possible values of the identifiers - that is, in state sb entity a assumes
the value b.
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The constants n and r were created at e0, when the function was entered and their values did not change
over any execution phase. Both entities retained the same state throughout all execution phases, as shown
in Figure 5.4(n) and Figure 5.4(r). The entities i, f and s were declared at e1, but were not initialized. Their
initial state can be any of the possible ones. For simplicity, the figure does not include states beyond s6 but
in reality, the initial states for i, f and s span the range of all possible states for the int-type (i.e., a total
of 65536 states for 2-byte integers). In e2, the value i, regardless of its state at e2 moves to state s0 due to
the initialization inside the loop and steadily moves to the next states over the next execution phases. The
values f and s, in execution phases e2 to e6, may assume any state from the set {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4} in any of
the phases.
Listing 5.1: Example Code to Demonstrate the State-space
1 void S h u f f l e ( int cards [ ] , const int n , const int r )
2 {
3 int i , f , s ;
4 for ( i = 0 ; i < r ; i++)
5 {
6 f = rand ( ) % n ;
7 s = rand ( ) % n ;
8 //Swap cards [ f ] and cards [ s ]
9 }
10 return ;
11 }
12
13 int main (void )
14 {
15 int cards [ 5 ] ;
16 . . .
17 S h u f f l e ( cards , 5 , 5) ;
18 . . .
19 }
For SRTA, the state-space is modelled as three ranges signifying the three situations that can occur in the
state-space. Usually, a state-space is conceptually modelled over a two dimensional plane with one direction
denoting the states and the other denoting the execution phases that result into that state, as shown in
Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5. In SRTA, however, only summaries over execution paths are used, therefore a
single range can signify the states over all execution paths. The three ranges are used to characterize the
absolute allowed value of the state-space (the Constraint), any implied boundary within the state-space (the
Resolution) and the actual state space-covered by an entity (the Application) in the course of the software
being analyzed. Details on the tuple are provided later.
Considering the example code Listing of 5.1, the array cards, the absolute boundary for the state-space
for the symbolic array indices is [0, 4]. When this array is passed into the function, the applied values for the
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state-space become the values bounded by rand()%n, which is [0, n− 1], or, in this context, the range [0, 4]
that coincides with the absolute range. If, in the declaration of cards, its size was set to less than 5, or if n
was set as greater than 5 in calling the function, reachable states for the array would have contained states
that are invalid in its declaration - indicating a problem in the code.
The three-tuple representation of the state-space is applicable to atomic entities. For collective entities,
each member of the collective entity contains its own state-space, with an additional state-space dedicated
to the collective entity itself. The state-space for composite entities is a collection of state-spaces for the
different collective and atomic entities it may contain.
5.6 The Symbolic Domain
This section describes the symbolic domain that SRTA operates on. The descriptions of the range tuple,
ranges, their properties and interaction are provided.
5.6.1 Notations and Specific Values
To clearly convey the ideas, a set of specific notations were adopted from programming languages and
mathematics. Although most of them were used in congruence with their conventional meanings, some of
the symbols have been customized according to the need of this dissertation. The notations were adopted
for specific values and operations. Table 5.3 provides a summary of the notations and specific values.
Absolute Limits
Two symbolic absolute limits have been used in the expressions. The limits, −∞type and +∞type denotes the
theoretical minimum and maximum range of values accommodated by an entity that belongs to type. The
+ and − in front of the notation are not used strictly to denote values greater or less than zero, rather they
are used to denote the position of one with respect to another (i.e., they denote the maximum and minimum
of the range, both may have the same sign in their absolute values).
For any kind of literal (i.e., constant value), both absolutes are equal to the value of the literal. Table 5.2
shows the absolute limits for a few atomic and collective data types.
Symbolic Value and Set of Values
A Symbolic Value is a value assigned to an entity through a symbolic analysis or inference procedure. The
value may or may not be the actual value that occurs in the entity during execution. It may or may not be
the value assigned to the entity in its static context.
A Set of Values for an entity is the set of all possible symbolic values that could have been assigned to
that entity in any point of execution.
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Table 5.2: Examples of Absolute Limits for Different Entities
# Type Entity Size −∞ +∞ Comment
1. char Atomic 1 byte -128 +127
2. unsigned char Atomic 1 byte 0 +255
3. int Atomic 2 bytes -32768 +32767
4. unsigned int Atomic 2 bytes 0 +65536
5. int[n] Collective N/A 0 n-1
6. const int n = 5; atomic 2 bytes 5 5
Table 5.3: Notations, Values and Symbols
# Symbol Example Explanation
Sets, Values and Generic Symbols
1.1. ±∞type +∞int Absolute limits for values under the type. Unconventional.
1.2. , E Symbolic expression and set of all symbolic expressions. Unconventional.
1.3. v, V Generic single symbolic value and set of symbolic values.
1.4. R,Ri Generic range of values.
Operations
2.1. ← R1 ← R2 Assignment. Conventional.
2.2. +,−, ∗, /,% R1 + R2 Arithmetic operations. Conventional.
2.3. <<,>> R1 << V Bit shift. Conventional
2.4. ∪ R1 ∪ R2 Union. Conventional.
2.5. ∩ R1 ∩ R2 Intersection. Conventional.
Relations
3.1. ∈ R1 ∈ R2 Set inclusion. True if every elements of R1 is also an element of R2.
3.2. > R1>R2 Containment. True if R1 is contained-over-maximum in R2.
3.3. ⊥ R1⊥R2 Containment. True if R1 is contained-over-minimum in R2.
3.4. >⊥ R1 >⊥ R2 Containment. True if R1 is completely contained in R2.
3.5. | | |R| Cardinality. Conventional.
3.5. || || ||R|| Cardinality of subrange. Unconventional.
Symbolic Expression and Set of Expressions
A Symbolic Expression,  is an expression that uses symbolic values instead of the actual values. The set of
expressions, E is the set of all symbolic expressions in the context of the entire software.
5.6.2 The Range Tuple
The range tuple is defined to reflect the model of the state-space and contains three parts - namely, the
Constraint, the Resolution and the Application. That is, for any entity x, at statement i, there is a range
tuple,
Tx(i) =
{Cx(j), Rx(k), Ax(i)} if x is an atomic or collective entity⋃
∀y{Ty(i)|y is a member of x} if x is a composite entity
(5.1)
Where,
Cx(j) = the Constraint, or absolute boundary of x’s state-space as defined on statement j.
Rx(k) = the Resolution, or the implied restriction on x’s state-space as defined on statement k.
Ax(i) = the Application, or the actually applied value on x on statement i.
Of the statement numbers, following relations can be obtained,
j ≤ i, because the Constraint is fixed at the time of declaration / reallocation.
103
k ≤ i, because checks and bounding constructs always work before the entity is accessed.
To elaborate the ranges further, the Constraint can be expressed as a continuous range of a minimum
and maximum. The elaboration of Constraint thus is,
Cx(j) = [min(Cx(j)),max(Cx(j))] (5.2)
where, max() and min() denote the maximum and minimum value for the range, respectively.
For the Resolution, the range may not be continuous, rather may contain disjoint subranges. The Reso-
lution can be expressed as,
Rx(k) = {Rx1(k), Rx2(k)...Rxn(k)} (5.3)
where every single Rxi(k) is a disjoint subrange of the values. And for every Rxi(k)
Rxi(k) = [min(Rxi(k)),max(Rxi(k))] (5.4)
If Rx contains more than one subrange, the extremes of Rx is defined as the extremes of all the subranges.
For the lowest extreme,
min(Rx(k)) = min(∀(Rxi(k)⊂Rx(k))(min(Rxi(k))) (5.5)
and the highest extreme becomes the highest of the highest extremes of all subranges, i.e,
max(Rx(k)) = max(∀(Rxi(k)⊂Rx(k))(max(Rxi(k))) (5.6)
For the Application, the same issues of the Resolution applies, thus
Ax(i) = {Ax1(i), Ax2(i)...Axn(i)} (5.7)
Where, every Axi(i) is a subrange of the values,
Axi(i) = [min(Axi(i)),max(Axi(i))] (5.8)
The lowest and highest extremes of Ax also follow the same definitions as those of Rx, that is,
min(Ax(i)) = min(∀(Axi(i)⊂Ax(i))(min(Axi(i))) (5.9)
max(Ax(i)) = max(∀(Axi(i)⊂Ax(i))(max(Axi(i))) (5.10)
By definition, the Resolution is simply a restriction imposed on the Constraint. If an entity is not used
inside the bounding block of a recurrent structure or a decision making construct, it does not have a defined
range to signify Resolution. Most analyses performed by SRTA can proceed in the absence of the Resolution.
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Considering this, the Resolution could be merged with the Constraint, or could replace the Constraint when
present. It is kept as a separate range because in cases where a Resolution is present, it may disagree with
the Constraint due to a defect in the validation constructs, and without a separate range for Resolution, such
defects cannot be detected.
5.6.3 The Constraint
The Constraint is the range that denotes the absolute state-space for any identifier, i.e., it denotes the set of
permitted values for any identifier. For example, for the most basic numeric type, it is the exact minimum
and maximum values an identifier of that type can assume over a specific build system. Such ranges tend to
vary across compilers and different builds of the compilers, making it necessary to incorporate build system
data in the analysis. Table 5.2 details the values of the Constraint for primitive types of a C++ software
under different representations.
Properties of the Constraint
The Constraint has a few significant properties.
Finite: The state-space for any entity is finite for all types in all platforms. As the Constraint signifies the
absolute boundary of the state-space, it is finite too.
Continuous: The state-space is not discrete. Some states may never be achieved during a software’s
execution but it indeed is possible to reach these states.
Constant: For a given entity, the Constraint does not change unless the object is reallocated or redefined.
Must Exist: For the programming languages we have considered, strict type systems are enforced. No
entity is possible without a type, and thus an absolute range is associated with every entity.
5.6.4 The Resolution
The Resolution signifies further restrictions put on the state-space through any validation statement. Any
branching statement, loop or similar construct will contribute into shaping the state-space into a different
and more restrictive one one, and will be summarized with the Resolution. In congruence to the definitions
outlined in Chapter 3, the Resolution signifies the set of expected values for any entity.
Properties of the Resolution
May not be Finite: Resolution comes from the code, and is not defined by the environment. Thus it can
contain defects in itself, coming from the problems in validation and loops. Wrong conditions in any loop or
branching statement can cause Resolution to become an infinite range.
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May not be Continuous: Resolution may not have a continuous range of values for its existence. In case
of a multiple branching statement (e.g., C++ switch statement) it can have discrete values.
Variable: Resolution changes with every level of conditional statement a software’s execution has to en-
counter, and thus can be variable.
May Not Exist: In case no conditional construct enforces any boundary on the state-space, the Resolution
shall not exist.
5.6.5 The Application
The Application is the set of actual values applied on or extracted from an entity. For any entity, Application
changes at every execution phase that modifies the entity.
Properties of the Application
May not be Finite: As Application signifies the values applied to the entity, it may not be finite. An
infinite value is almost always an indication of a problem.
May not be Continuous: Like the Resolution, Application may consist of discrete values.
Variable: Application changes for any statement concerning a read or write of the entity.
May not Exist: Declaration of an entity does not guarantee its usage. Thus, Application may not exist
for an entity. However, in case Application does not exist, it proves a problem in code.
5.6.6 Formation of the Constraint
The Constraint is formed only with the creation and destruction of entities, and remains unchanged as long
as the existence of the entity is not changed.
For any single entity, the Constraint is the two extreme values the entity may assume under its build
environment. For example, for a system with 2-byte integer values, a signed integer may assume values from
-32768 to +32767, and an unsigned integer may assume values from 0 to 65535. The two extremes are marked
by symbolic values −∞type and +∞type. The exact values for the extremes are dependent on the system.
Entries 1-4 in Table 5.4 show the situation. For pointers however, as they represent memory locations instead
of variables, 0 is used as a symbolic value as the Constraint.
For entities acting as collections of other entities, like arrays (both statically and dynamically allocated),
every single item in the collection has the extremes noted by its type, as described for the single entities.
Additionally, the collection has an additional Constraint for its access - that is, the minimum and maximum
values for indexing or access operations that specifies a valid item. For example, for an array of n elements
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Table 5.4: Example Range Formations for Different Statements in C++
Ranges
# Statement Cx Rx Ax Comment
1. int x; [−∞int,+∞int]
2. unsigned int x; [0,+∞unsigned int]
3. int x = 0; [−∞int,+∞int] [0, 0]
4. const int x = value; [−∞int,+∞int] Avalue
5. int *x; [−∞int,+∞int]
6. x = new int [0, 0]
7. x = new int[SIZE] [0, SIZE − 1]
8. for(int i = 0; i < SIZE;
i++)
[+∞int,−∞int] [0, SIZE − 1] [0, SIZE − 1]
9. if(x <VAL) [−∞int,max(AVAL)− 1] int x;
10. if(x <= VAL) [−∞int,max(AVAL)] int x;
11. if(x != VAL) [[−∞int,min(AVAL − 1)],
[max(AVAL + 1),+∞int]]
int x;
12. if(x < VAL1 || x >
VAL2)
[[−∞int,min(AVAL1 − 1)],
[max(AVAL2 + 1),+∞int]]
int x;
13. x = y; Ay
14. x = y+z; [[min(Ay) +min(Az),
max(Ay) +max(Az)]]
15. x++; [min(Ax),max(Ax) + 1] Context Dependent
16. x; [min(Ax)− 1,max(Ax)] Context Dependent
17. x = y; Cy Ay x, y pointers to collections.
in C++ or Java, the Constraint on the array entity is [0, n− 1], while for some versions of Microsoft’s Visual
Basic, it is [1, n].
5.6.7 Formation of the Resolution
The Resolution is formed through any imposed condition on any entity that restricts the entity’s state-space
into a subset of the possible state-space. The restriction is enforced by checks or loop’s terminal conditions.
For any conditional construct, the Resolution is formed by considering the bound(s) specified by the
condition. In case a condition specifies one end, the other end is kept to the maximum reach as specified
by the Constraint. If a condition, or a set of nested or sequential conditions specify both bounds, then the
Resolution is formed using both bounds.
For a loop, the Resolution is inferred from the loop’s initialization and condition. If the loop condition
involves a complex parameter, the range, until it can be inferred correctly, is considered as the extremes.
All Resolutions must fit within the Constraint. If a situation exists where the Resolution violates the
Constraint, it is a certain indication that the conditions that formed the Resolution have at least one defect.
5.6.8 Formation of the Application
The Application signifies the actual range of values an entity assumes over its course of execution. An entity
assumes a value under any assignment or operation.
There are some cases, especially those that involve user-supplied values, that cannot be determined
correctly without the actual program execution. In such cases the Application is approximated to the
maximum possible values (i.e., worst case approximation is used).
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5.6.9 The Symbolic Algebra
This section describes the symbolic algebra as it is used for the analysis. The description is organized in
sections that describe particular operation and their effect on the ranges and range tuples.
Assignment
For any range to be assigned to another, regardless of the entity type they correspond to, the values in one
range is copied into another. That is,
(R1 ← R2) =
R1 ← [min(R2),max(R2)], if ||R2|| = 1R1 ← ⋃∀(Rx2⊂R2) [min(Rx2),max(Rx2)], otherwise (5.11)
For a statically typed programming language, when an atomic entity is assigned to another, the type
or context of the receiver entity does not change, only the value is copied between entities. However, for
languages like C, C++ that allows the assignment of pointers, which can be collective entities, the absolute
range represented by the entities are transferred. This phenomenon is the reason to result into memory leaks.
To account for this fact, for SRTA, assignments are modelled in different ways for atomic and collective
entities. Therefore, for any entity y to be assigned to x, we have,
(Tx ← Ty) =

Ax ← Ay, if x is an atomic entity
Cx ← Cy, Ax ← Ay if x is a collective entity
Tx ←
⋃
∀z{Tz|z is a member of y} if x is a composite entity
(5.12)
Union
As ranges are effectively descriptions of sets, the range union operation works much the same way as set
union.
(R1 ∪R2) =
{R1, R2}, if ||R2|| = 1{R1,⋃∀(R2x⊂R2) R2x}, otherwise (5.13)
Intersection
Intersection expresses the overlapping between ranges. The intersection of two ranges consist of the range
that is common between them, and an empty range if no common range exists. The ranges are overlapped
if the intersection does not produce an empty range.
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(R1 ∩R2) =

[min(R2),max(R1)], if R1⊥R2 and ||R2|| = 1
[min(R1),max(R2)], if R1>R1 and ||R2|| = 1⋃
∀(R2x⊂R2)R2x, if ||R2|| > 1
(5.14)
Arithmetic Operations
Arithmetic operations on any range applies on both extremes of the range, and only on the extremes of the
range. If the range contains subranges, arithmetic operation does not have any effect on any but the terminal
range.
Arithmetic operations are carried out on the Application range only. This is because, for any statically
typed programming language, an arithmetic operation does not change the type of the resultant entity,
although it may create a temporary entity based on the type of its operands.
(R1 +R2) =
[min(R1) +min(R2),max(R1) +max(R2)], if ||R1|| = 1∀(R1x⊂R1)[min(R1x) +min(R2),max(R1x) +max(R2)], otherwise (5.15)
(R1 −R2) =
[min(R1)−min(R2),max(R1)−max(R2)], if ||R1|| = 1∀(R1x⊂R1)[min(R1x)−min(R2),max(R1x)−max(R2)], otherwise (5.16)
(R1 ∗R2) =
[min(R1) ∗min(R2),max(R1) ∗max(R2)], if ||R1|| = 1∀(R1x⊂R1)[min(R1x) ∗min(R2),max(R1x) ∗max(R2)], otherwise (5.17)
(R1/R2) =
[min(R1)/min(R2),max(R1)/max(R2)], if ||R1|| = 1∀(R1x⊂R1)[min(R1x)/min(R2),max(R1x)/max(R2)], otherwise (5.18)
The rules are the same for values instead of ranges.
The remainder, or modulus, operator works in a different way. As this operator returns the remainder
of an entity, it does not go beyond 0 in its minimum value. The maximum value differs in relation of the
two entities. If the divisor is bigger than the dividend, the maximum becomes the maximum of the divided,
otherwise, it is one less than the divisor. Formally,
(R1%R2) =
[0,max(R1)], if max(R1) < min(R2)[0,max(R2)− 1], otherwise (5.19)
5.6.10 Range Inter-relation
This section describes the part of the symbolic algebra that governs the relation between ranges.
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Range Containment
The term range containment, in context of SRTA, is used to denote the associativity of one range within
another. A range is considered contained in another with respect to a particular extreme if that particular
extreme of the contained range falls within the extremes of the container.
For any two ranges R1 and R2,
• R1 is contained-over-minimum in R2 if min(R2i) ≤ min(R1) ≤ max(R2i) is satisfied for any subrange
R2i ⊂ R2. This relation is expressed using R2⊥R1 and its negation is expressed using R2 6⊥ R1.
• R1 is contained-over-maximum in R2 if min(R2i) ≤ max(R1) ≤ max(R2i) is satisfied for any subrange
R2i ⊂ R2.This relation is expressed using R2>R1 and its negation is expressed using R2 6> R1.
• R1 is completely contained in R2 if R2>R1 and R2⊥R1. This relation is expressed using B >⊥ A and
its negation is expressed using B 6>⊥ A.
• R1>R2 implies R2⊥R1 and R1⊥R2 implies R2>R1.
Value Containment
The containment of a value with a range is used to express whether the value is included in the range of not.
A value is contained in a range if the value falls within the bounds of any subrange the range is made of, and
it is considered not-contained in a range if it does not fall into any subrange the range is made of.
That is, for any value v and a range R,
• v is contained in R if (v ≥ min(Ri) and v ≤ max(Ri)) for any Ri ⊆ R. Such containment is expressed
using the usual set notation, v ∈ R.
• v is not contained in R if (v ≤ min(Ri) or v ≥ max(Ri)) for all Ri ⊆ R. Such containment is expressed
using the usual set notation, v 6∈ R.
Equality
Two ranges are equal if they have exactly the same expanse. That is, if both of the extremes coincide with
each other for each subrange they may contain.
(R1 = R2) =
max(R1) = max(R2),min(R1) = min(R2), if ||R2|| = 1∀(R1x⊂R1)∃(R2x⊂R2)(R1x = R2x), otherwise (5.20)
Adjacency
Two ranges are adjacent to each other if their opposite extremes coincide and they do not have an overlap.
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Figure 5.6: Example State-space Models with Different Violations
(R1 on R2) =
max(R1) = min(R2), if min(R1) ≤ min(R2)min(R1) = max(R2), if min(R2) ≤ min(R1) (5.21)
5.7 Defect Detection from the Ranges
The model constructed with the three ranges contain the information that can be used to infer anomalies.
The model is a hard-coded element, while the rules to infer defects are soft-coded, allowing the users to
specify their own defect definitions. One key advantage of SRTA is to put the complexity into the hard-
coded model building portion, making the specifications simple and manageable, adding to the practicality
of the approach.
5.7.1 Defect Indication
At any point, any mismatch among the three ranges denotes the presence of a defect. In case no mismatch
is among the ranges of a tuple, sometimes the evolution of the tuple is an indicator of a defect.
In case an Application does not agree with a Resolution, it indicates that there is a problem in either the
formation of Resolution (i.e., any validation or loop construct) or in the application of the entity. The actual
defect can be an integer overflow, a buffer overflow, a data mismatch or a wrong logic. In case a any other
range does not agree with the Constraint, the problem is always in the range that does not agree with the
Constraint.
Figure 5.6 shows examples of the defect indicators. Instead of showing the different states, the expanse of
the states are shown using its boundary (triangular, as the expanse of the state-space tend to increase with
execution, unless the entity is uninitialized, the Constraint is rectangular for its being a constant). Figure
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Table 5.5: Defect Coverage of SRTA (with respect to the Taxonomy Developed in Chapter 3)
# Defect Description Detection Comment
1. C1 Value Representation Defect Full
2. C2 Value Offset Full
3. C3 Undefined Outcome Full
4. L1 Improper Checks Full
5. L2 Improper Terminal Condition Full
6. L3 Wrong Operation Partial Most cases can be detected, but some require design information.
7. L4 Flaws in Algorithm None All cases require design information.
8. L5 Performance Issues Partial
9. L6 Improper Exception Handling Full
10. L7 Control Flow Error Full
11. L8 Design Non-conformance None All cases requires design information.
12. M1 Invalid Memory Reference Full
13. M2 Improper Deallocation Full
14. M3 Memory Leak Full
15. M4 Overflow / Underflow Full
16. D1 Interface Mismatch Partial Some cases require architectural/design information.
17. D2 Data Mismatch Partial Some cases require architectural/design information.
18. D3 Improper Input Validation Full
19. D4 Missing or Extra Input Full
20. D5 Improper Abstraction Partial Some cases require architectural/design information.
21. S1 Prohibitive States None All cases require runtime information.
22. S2 Improper Synchronization None All cases require runtime information.
5.6(a) shows an ideal situation without any anomaly, as the Resolution is contained in the Constraint, and the
Application is contained in the Resolution. In Figure 5.6(b), both the Resolution and the Application stay
within limits, but their occupation of the entire limit of Constraint is a potential (not certain) problem. In
Figure 5.6(c), the Resolution and Application do not encompass the same range, denoting a certain problem,
with another instance of the same problem being displayed in Figure 5.6(g). In Figure 5.6(d), The Resolution
surpasses the Constraint, indicating a certain problem, with the same occurring in a different way in 5.6(f).
Figure 5.6(e) shows a situation where the Application surpasses the Resolution, denoting a certain problem.
5.7.2 Coverage
Although most defects leave traces in code, not all of them can be detected from source code alone. In the
taxonomy generated in Chapter 3, all listed defects are ones that place their footprint in the source code, but
some require other information like design data or architectural information to be detected. In this analysis
technique, the focus is made only on defects that are contained in source code in their entirety and do not
require any information from outside of source code for their detection. Table 5.5 lists SRTA’s coverage of
the developed taxonomy.
Among the defect classes, SRTA can detect all defects that are contained entirely within the source
code (C1-3; L1, 2, 6, 7; M1-4; D3, 4). The defect L8 (Design Non-conformance) is the deviation from
the design of the software and requires design information for its detection, making it out of the scope of
SRTA. The two synchronization defects S1 and S2 require runtime information as the synchronization is a
dynamic phenomenon. Synchronization defects are often out-of-reach for static analysis tools due to the lack
of interleaving information [79] and SRTA, being a static analyzer, does not cover them.
Some defect classes include defects that do not have external information as a requirement, but often
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involve such information. SRTA can address the detection of these defects as long as they do not involve
external information. From Table 5.5, the defect L3 (Wrong Operation) can be detected when the operation
is incorrect based on the context (e.g., a loop’s counter update involves an increment operation but the
terminal condition requires the counter to be less than the initial value). In cases where the value requires an
understanding of the underlying principles (e.g., wrong precedence), SRTA cannot detect the values correctly.
However, as the L3 defects are mostly context-dependent, SRTA applies to most of them.
The defects under class L4 (Flaws in Algorithm) rely heavily on the design specifications and are mostly
out of scope for SRTA. Only the very trivial defects of this type may be detected by SRTA (e.g., not updating
a loop controller variable inside the loop, or updating through a branch that will never be reached). However,
there is no way to conclusively state that a code fault is initiated from a flaw in the algorithm without knowing
what the algorithm is. SRTA detects the defects introduced by L4 under other classes, but cannot report
them as being under L4.
The defects under class L5 (Performance Issues), like the L4, mostly require program comprehension and
algorithm revision to be detected, thus are out of scope for SRTA. Still, SRTA can detect the portion of such
defects that stay entirely in code (e.g., checking for values that will never be used).
The defect D1 (Interface Mismatch) often involves using interfaces with wrong values but the right data
types, thus are detected by SRTA. But some of the Interface Mismatch involve architectural or design
specifications, and are out of scope for SRTA. For defect D2 (Data Mismatch), the same situation occurs. In
case a mismatching data value is supplied by the calling context, it can be detected by SRTA, but it cannot
be detected if the supplied data is wrong with respect to the algorithm, or design. The defect D5 (Improper
Abstraction) is almost always a defect with explicit relation to design. SRTA can catch it only in cases where
the abstraction problem is evident from code construction (e.g., a public interface returning a reference to a
private property).
5.7.3 Detection Accuracy
SRTA detects all defects present in the form of anomalies by analyzing the range tuples. However, due to the
nature of symbolic analysis, the range tuples may not be accurate, rather approximated. For example, if a
range tuple depends on a user supplied value, there is no technique to determine the range tuple accurately
without running the program. But if, after the input, a value is tested and allowed to proceed only in case
it falls within the allowed range, the range can be determined accurately.
SRTA is able to detect certain and probable defects by using worst case approximations. If an user is
expected to enter any value, the value is approximated to the extremes of its type - making the cases of
problematic values inclusive to the range. Although this approach might increase the false positive rate,
unless it is adopted, probable defects will remain undetected.
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5.8 Detecting Computation Defects
SRTA can detect defects belonging to all three of the computation defect classes. The detection is performed
with full coverage (i.e., any defect in any of the three classes fall within the scope of SRTA’s detection
capabilities).
5.8.1 C1: Value Representation Defect
A value representation defect occurs when an attempt is made to fit a value into an entity incapable of
holding the value. The situation may arise from multiple causes. The value of an entity, or the outcome
of an expression, can be assigned into another entity where the destination is not large enough to hold the
value, or an entity’s value can be modified in a way that the entity’s capacity is rendered insufficient for
holding it. The resultant phenomenon can be detected by checking an entity’s change of Application range
over subsequent statements and by checking the assignment operations for the violation of the ranges.
To detect the presence of such defects, it is required to check if the Application range of a an atomic
entity is being fit into another entity for which the Constraint is not capable of accommodating the value.
To check for the anomaly, tuples formed in the following construct are checked, in statement i,
Tx(i)← Ty(i) (5.22)
For the violation of the inter-tuple relation,
Cx(i) >⊥ Ay(i) (5.23)
If a violation is detected, that is, if any bound of the Ay(i) crosses those of Cx(i), or if Ay(i) contains a
value that does not fit inside Cx(i), the statement is marked as a defect.
A second indication of the defect is when an entity itself is changed beyond the range it can accommodate.
In this case, the identifying anomaly is detected in any constructs in statement i, if it is detected that,
Cx(i) 6>⊥ Ax(i) (5.24)
where, for any previous statement, the opposite to the relation holds.
∃(j<i), Cx(j) >⊥ Ax(j) (5.25)
In case of a value truncation or cast-down, a temporary entity shall receive the value from the symbolic
expression, creating an instance of the first anomaly.
Most of the modern C, C++ and Java compilers report any type casting to lower storage types as a
warning. However, SRTA differs with such detection in that, compilers do not provide any discrimination for
a case being an actual problem, a potential problem, or not a problem. SRTA is able to differentiate among
all three.
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5.8.2 C2: Value Offset Defect
The value offset defect occurs when either or both of the limits of a range is a certain offset away from where
it should be. These defects are mostly associated with conditional statements, either as normal conditional
branches or inside a loop statement’s header.
As these defects are defined through the conditional statements, they involve the Resolution for all
instances. One simple way to infer the presence of such defects is if the disagreement between the Constraint
and Resolution, or Resolution and Application is found only in one or both of the extremes.
One point to note with value offset defects is their nature to occur adjacent to the expected range of
values. Hence, these defects can be characterized by the following anomalies that hold for any atomic or
collective entity x,
Ax(i) 6>⊥ Rx(i) and Ax(i) ∩Rx(i) 6= ∅ (5.26)
or,
where it holds that,
Cx(i) 6>⊥ Rx(i) and Cx(i) ∩Rx(i) 6= ∅ (5.27)
If either of the conditions hold, it will identify that one of the two ranges (Constraint, Resolution or
Resolution, Application) is encompassing an invalid region close to the valid regions, identifying the problem.
5.8.3 C3: Undefined Outcome
This defect occurs when the outcome of an operation cannot be predicted. Two situations may give rise
to the situation, (a) if a participating entity for an operation contains an unexplained value and (b) if the
entities all contain defined and determined values but their interaction is undefined.
To model scenario (a), it is difficult to model all problematic values as they change with the specific
application of the entity in the software (for example, a 0 (zero) causes a problem as the denominator of an
arithmetic operation, but not as a multiplier). However, the situations that correspond to such scenarios
is not diverse as their outcome. Over the cases investigated for this research, the problem almost always
was created by using an uninitialized value or a value that has experienced a C1 defect before its use in a
statement.
Two phenomena indicate an entity’s being used without initialization. The first, is having no Application
range (as it occurs for collective entities) and the second is having the Application range spanning the
maximum of the Constraint (as it happens for atomic entities). Therefore, a C3 defect is found for an entity
if one of the following holds,
Ax(i) = Cx(i) (5.28)
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or,
Ax(i) = ∅ (5.29)
In case of the first anomaly, the Application range is either not set, or it is used to the entire range as
the Constraint, indicating that an unchecked value is used for the Application.
Scenario (b) mainly occurs from the division-by-zero error in programming, but generalizes to other values.
To detect it, the following construct needs to be addressed for atomic entities,
Tx(i) OP Ty(i) (5.30)
Where the entity y can be an atomic entity or the result of an expression, OP is an operation. To indicate
a defect, the following needs to hold,
yi ∈ Ay(i) (5.31)
where yi is an invalid value for the identifier y. This same definition can be extended by the user for any
specific value for any identifier. In case of checking for the division-by-zero, the expressions need to be tuned
as, yi = 0 and OP = /.
5.9 Detecting Logical Defects
Of the eight defect classes under logical defects, SRTA can detect any defect belonging to four of the classes
(L1, L2, L6, and L7), and most of the defects belonging to two classes (L3 and L5). Due to the necessity of
using architectural or design data, the other two classes (L4 and L8) do not fall within the scope of detection.
5.9.1 L1: Improper Validation
The Improper Validation defect occur for the absence of, or the mistake in, the validating constructs for any
identifier before its use. The absence of validation can be detected by assessing the Resolution alone. If an
entity misses a Resolution range before the first Application range is introduced, it is without a validation.
A mistake in validation is characterized by one of the two scenarios - first, if a validation does not provide
a Resolution agreeable to the Constraint it is a flaw in the validation, and second, if a validation does not
provide a Resolution agreeable to the Application, it may indicate a flaw in the validation.
The first scenario, or absence of validation, can be detected as, for any identifier x in statement i,
Rx(i) = ∅ and Ax(i) 6= ∅ (5.32)
The second scenario, comparisons between Constraint, Resolution and Application is,
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Cx(i) 6>⊥ Rx(i) (5.33)
or,
Rx(i) 6>⊥ Ax(i) (5.34)
The absence of validation anomaly is self-descriptive. The other two denote the cases where the Resolution,
that is, the range formation coming from the validation is not in congruence of the other two ranges.
5.9.2 L2: Improper Terminal Conditions
The improper terminal condition, for any recurrent structure, occurs when the validation used as the terminal
condition is wrong. Most of such cases will be caught as parts of C2 and L1 defects. As a generic form, this
validation is indicated by the presence of any defect in the control variable for any recurrent structure. To
detect it, the same procedure of C2 and L1 are applied for entities in the role of recurrence controllers.
5.9.3 L3: Wrong Operation
Wrong operations happen when the result of an operation becomes completely out-of-scope of what it should
be. It is characterized by either of the two scenarios, for any entity x at statement i,
Ax(i) on Rx(i) (5.35)
or,
Rx(i) ∩Ax(i) = ∅ (5.36)
The first anomaly signifies where the two ranges are adjacent, with at most one common element, while
the second identifies where the two do not share any common elements.
5.9.4 L5: Performance Issues
SRTA cannot detect all performance issues as they often require design and architectural knowledge. The
specific defects that SRTA can detect are,
(a) A variable was declared but never used: Detecting this defect is straightforward. For any entity that
has no Resolution or Application range associated with it between its point of origination and termination is
an extra and unused entity. (b) An entity was declared with wrong type. (c) Part of a collective entity was
never used.
An extra variable can be detected by checking the construct,
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∀(j>i), Ax(j) = ∅ (5.37)
where i is the statement of initiation of the entity.
For Atomic entities, it can be characterized by checking the situation where, for any atomic entity x
Cx(i) >⊥ Ax(i) (5.38)
but, there exists another data type d for which,
Cx(i) >⊥ Cd (5.39)
and,
Cd >⊥ Ax(i) (5.40)
For collective entities, any disagreement between the ranges indicates an unused portion. That is, for any
collective entity x, if the following holds,
∀(j>i), Cx(i) 6= Ax(i) (5.41)
it denotes a performance issue.
5.9.5 L6: Improper Exception Handling
Exception data are not straightforward entities that can be represented by the state-space. To check for the
exception handling capabilities in language that support them, an intermediate representation is required to
transfer the information into the symbolic domain.
A convenient workaround is to represent all exceptions thrown in a piece of code as a collective entity
with indices denoting different member exceptions. Any processing of the exceptions is then modelled as an
access to that collective entity with the same index translations. If a wrong exception is processed, or an
exception is not processed, it is indicated by an invalid reference to that exception. That is, to formulate, if
entity e holds the translated exception data, any anomaly in the formulation,
∀(j>i), Ce(i) 6>⊥ Ae(j), (5.42)
and,
∀(j>i), Ce(i) 6= Ae(j), (5.43)
will denote a problem in exception handling. First of the two anomalies identifies a situation where
at least one exception handled wrong. The second anomaly identifies that there is at least one unhandled
exception in code.
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5.9.6 L7: Control Flow Error
The control flow defects are characterized by situations for which the control flow is always directed towards
a branch statement, or never directed to one. Detecting this defect is straightforward in the scope of any
entity. For any entity x, the defect is indicated by the following constructs,
∀(j>i),∪Rx(j) 6= ∪Ax(j) (5.44)
If this anomaly is present in code, it means that either the control flow is localized for a portion of the
total space (in case Rx(j) has more expanse that Ax(j)) or that a portion of code is never executed (if Ax(j)
has more expanse than Rx(j))
5.10 Detecting Memory Defects
SRTA can provide full coverage to each of the four defect classes for memory defects.
5.10.1 M1: Invalid Memory Reference
An Invalid Memory Reference occurs if a memory access attempt is made for a piece of memory that does
not exist. The access can be marked by a null-referrer, by an uninitialized referrer or by a referrer that holds
the address to a memory already deallocated or out-of-scope.
By nature, initiation and features, this defect is similar to the C3 defect. Detecting this defect, therefore,
requires similar constructs. For the detection of null pointer dereference, for any entity x representing memory,
the following conditions are analyzed,
Tx (5.45)
for the presence of the anomaly,
Cx = ∅ (5.46)
or,
Cx = [0, 0] (5.47)
A major difference with the C3 defect is that, C3 defect applies to atomic entities, but memory entities
are almost always collective. To check the entity x for an uninitialized value, it has to be checked,
Cx = [−∞max,+∞max] (5.48)
which, if satisfied, indicates a defect.
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5.10.2 M2: Improper Deallocation
An improper deallocation occurs when a piece of memory is deallocated that is not meant for deallocation.
The same situations that give rise to an Invalid Memory Reference, may create an improper deallocation if
used in a deallocation statement instead of memory access.
To check for the defect, following anomalies are checked for any memory entity, for any memory entity x
deallocated at statement i
Cx(i) = ∅ (5.49)
or,
Cx(i) = [0, 0] (5.50)
or,
Cx(i) >⊥ [−∞max,+∞max] (5.51)
All first three of the anomalies, identical to the anomalies for M1 defects, show the situation where an
invalid memory reference is tried to be deallocated. Last of the anomalies
5.10.3 M3: Memory Leaks
Memory leaks occur when an allocated memory is not deallocated at the end of its usage. Thus, for any entity
representing a reference to a memory, if the following condition exists, for any memory entity x subjected to
a deallocation at statement i, or if i is the point of termination for the program,
∃(j>i), Cx(j) 6= ∅ (5.52)
it denotes a memory leak.
5.10.4 M4: Overflows / Underflows
Memory overflows and underflows occur when a memory access is attempted beyond the permitted range of
the memory. Technically, it is an invalid memory reference, done adjacent to a range of valid memory. This
defect can be originated both in the validating constructs and the access statements, and hence involves the
Resolution and the Application. To detect this defect, for an entity x representing a memory region, the
following has to hold,
Cx 6>⊥ Rx (5.53)
where, either,
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Cx>Rx (5.54)
or,
Cx⊥Rx (5.55)
or,
Cx on Rx (5.56)
The same applies for the Application range with the Constraint. That is, if the Ax holds the same relation
with the Cx, it also indicates the same defect.
5.11 Detecting Data, Interface and I/O Defects
Among the five defect classes of this group, SRTA can provide full detection coverage to two (D3 and D4)
and partial coverage to the other three (D1, D2 and D5). The partial coverage to each of the classes is able
to detect most of the defects belonging to the classes.
5.11.1 D1: Interface Mismatch
In an interface mismatch, an interface is used with wrong values for data. For most cases, this defect is an
instance of C1 or C3 applied to formal parameters. To detect this defect, the following constructs need to be
checked. For any actual parameter y and a formal parameter x,
Cx(i) 6>⊥ Cy(i) (5.57)
This particular anomaly denotes that the type of the parameters did not match, and actual parameter is
not able to hold all the values supplied to it, although it may not run into a defect at present. Other types
of this defect requires the knowledge of the design for detection.
5.11.2 D2: Data Mismatch
The data mismatch defect occurs when the interface is used with proper data types, but not with proper
data values. Any value supplied beyond the capability of the formal parameter is a certain indication of such
defect. If the value is not beyond the capability of the formal parameter, but is never used throughout the
interface, it also denotes the same defect.
Detection of this defect requires checking of the following condition, for any formal parameter x and
actual parameter y
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Cx(i) 6>⊥ Ay(i) (5.58)
if this does not hold, then, for all subsequent use for the entity x in the code that follows, an anomaly of
∃(j>i), Rx(j) 6>⊥ Ax(i) (5.59)
indicates this problem.
5.11.3 D3: Improper Input Validation
The improper input validation defect contains the same characteristics as the L1 defect, only applied to the
inputs of a module or the program. If the entity x is used as an input for any module or the full software
itself, and it lacks validation, the situation is characterized by,
Ty(i)>Tx(i) (5.60)
where,
∀j>i, Rx(j) = ∅ (5.61)
5.11.4 D4: Missing or Extra Inputs
The missing or extra inputs defect occurs when an interface is used with insufficient or over-sufficient data.
To detect the defect, following situations are analyzed,
∀f :formal parameterCf 6= ∀a:actual parameterCa (5.62)
where f is the set of all formal parameters and a is the set of all actual parameters.
For a missing input defect, in addition to the indication presented above, the following anomaly shall be
in force,
|Cf | > |Ca| (5.63)
or,
||Cf || > ||Ca|| (5.64)
The opposite will hold for an extra input defect
|Cf | < |Ca| (5.65)
or,
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||Cf || < ||Ca|| (5.66)
5.11.5 D5: Improper Abstraction
SRTA can detect improper abstractions when they are directly apparent from code. The most severe case
that occurs in code is providing a reference to a private member of a class through a public function.
Under the scope of SRTA, this defect cannot be checked directly as the other ones. However, a workaround
exists. If any member entity to any piece of code is reset to have the range [∅] (empty) once out of scope.
This situation then shall give rise to the other errors once accessed. Thus, the identifying signature for such
defects becomes,
For any statement
Ty(i)← Tx(i) (5.67)
if,
Cx(i) = ∅ (5.68)
but,
∃(j<i), Cx(j) 6= ∅ (5.69)
then the defect denotes an improper abstraction.
5.12 Answering the Research Questions
This section attempts to answer the research questions mentioned in Chapter 1. In particular, two research
questions (RQ1 and RQ2) are answered in this chapter, with both answers reinforced with experimental
evidence in the next chapter.
5.12.1 RQ1: Detecting Multiple Dissimilar Classes of Defects
The first research question for this research was stated as, “Can a specific abstraction provide sufficient
means for detecting multiple dissimilar classes of defects?” The answer to this question is presented using
the materials provided in this chapter. As it was presented in earlier sections, SRTA represents the entities
from source code using the range-tuples. The three ranges in the tuple corresponds to three phases of an
entity’s life-cycle. For different classes, the rules of detection were presented in the previous section.
To illustrate the objective of the research, that is, to detect multiple dissimilar classes of defects using a
single model, the rules are applied together. Each program statement passes through SRTA’s detector that
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Figure 5.7: Detection Mechanism for Dissimilar Classes of Defects
checks if the statement conforms to any of the specifications. One common point that has been established
in this chapter so far is that, all detection mechanisms performed on the three ranges that form the range
tuple only - thus creating a single model.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the detection of dissimilar classes of defects. In Figure 5.7(a) three dissimilar defect
classes are shown. Defects belonging to these three classes, once they are passed through SRTA’s model
builder, are expressed by using the range tuples. The range tuples have exactly the same structure for
all defects - enforcing the single model methodology. The similar-in-construct range tuples coming from
dissimilar defects are then checked by SRTA against specific conditions and a defect is reported once a
violation is detected.
If this three-defect-case is extrapolated further, as is shown in Figure 5.7(b), we have n dissimilar defect
classes, all of which are represented by SRTA using the same model (i.e., the range-tuples). The model is then
checked for specifications concerning one of the four aspects, Range Formation, Range Evolution, Inter-Tuple
Relation and Intra-Tuple Relation (Not all aspects are applicable to all defect classes). If an anomaly is
detected in the checking, it is reported as a defect.
In summary, this process proves the ability of presenting a specific abstraction, that is, the use of range-
tuples to represent and detect multiple dissimilar classes of defects.
5.12.2 RQ2: Scope of Detection
The second research question was stated as, provided a specific abstraction is possible and existent to represent
multiple dissimilar classes of defects, “To what length can such a technique go in terms of dissimilar classes
of defects?”.
The information presented in Figure 5.7, provides the answer to this question. As it can be seen from the
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figure, and as it was established in the arguments presented in earlier sections, SRTA can detect dissimilar
defects by representing them in its own model of range tuples, and then by applying analyses belonging to
one of the four aspects to find the anomalies. The detection process is based on the model construction.
This statement can be generalized into stating that SRTA can detect the dissimilar defects as long as they
are represented using SRTA’s model. SRTA’s model uses
In summary, this chapter hypothesizes that as long as the defects are contained in source code, they
can be represented using SRTA’s model and can be detected. If the defects require external data like the
architecture or design, it is not possible for SRTA to represent them in a model suitable for detection.
5.13 The SRTA Prototype
To test SRTA over real-world systems, a fully functional prototype was implemented. This section describes
the prototype’s architecture and implementation-specific information. Due to the large volume of information
related to the design and construction of the prototype, it is not described in full. Full description, along
with the details on specification languages, are provided as a supplement to this dissertation [11].
5.13.1 Prototype Architecture
Figure 5.8 shows the structural view of the prototype. In the figure, the corner-folded document symbols
represent external data and the standard flowchart document symbols represent internal data. Rectangles
denote the structural components. Circles inside rectangles represent configurable components that depend
on external specifications, and bounded rectangles represent pluggable modules as developed by users’ spec-
ifications. To keep the diagram less cluttered, internal data is shown at its origination / modification point.
It is to be assumed that the same internal data flows through all components that come after its origination.
5.13.2 Components
Components of the SRTA prototype are shown in Figure 5.8. The components Lexical Analyzer (LA), Token
Recognizer (TR), and Token Sequence Mapper (TSM) correspond to the Preprocessing Phase. Graph Builder
(GB), Range Approximator (RA), and Tuple Builder (TB) correspond to the Model Building Phase. Finally,
Analyzer (AZ) and Report Generator (RG) constitute to the Analysis and Reporting Phase.
Preprocessing Phase
This phase of the prototype, corresponding to the preprocessing phase of the technique, prepares the input
for processing. It includes the components for lexical analysis and token sequence mapping.
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Figure 5.8: Structural Model of the SRTA Prototype
The Lexical Analyzer (LA)
Once the system reads the Source Code, the first processing unit is the Lexical Analyzer (LA) which breaks
the code down into a set of tokens, based on the Language-Specific Lexical Specifications provided as external
data. The token stream is then passed through a Recognizer that segregates the identifiers, using the same
set of specifications.
The reason for implementing the LA, instead of using a Lexer developed by a Generator like Flex [58, 102]
is that, SRTA’s aim of being generally applicable is realized through its capability of processing test systems
developed in different programming languages. The scanner generators develop scanners that are specific
to one set of specifications only. It indeed was possible to use such scanner generators for SRTA, but it
would have required source regeneration and recompiling every time a specification was changed, creating
dependency on the scanner generator and on an external compiler. In the current approach, SRTA uses
its own reconfigurable lexical analyzer, which does not extend beyond programming languages (unlike the
scanner generators). The advantage of such a reconfigurable analyzer is that, it does not require any source
modification or recompiling if the specifications are changed.
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The LA passes a set of tokens, as derived from the source code, to the Token Recognizer (TR). The
set contains the tokens and their location information in code. The specifications to the LA are passed as
external input, which are detailed later in this chapter.
The Token Recognizer (TR)
The Token Recognizer (TR) was introduced because SRTA does not use conventional parsing, requiring a
forward recognition mechanism before the tokens can be used in further processing. The application of a
conventional parser could eliminate the need, but would have introduced problems of generality.
The TR accepts the set of tokens from the LA, and adds token specific information to the set, including
the type of token and its location in code (File, Line, Statement). The TR passes the token sequence to the
Token Sequence Mapper (TSM). The TR uses the same specifications as the Lexical Analyzer.
The Token Sequence Mapper (TSM)
After the TR processes the token set, the Token Sequence Mapper (TSM) maps the token sequences of
interest. The TSM is a collection of n Finite State Machines (FSM), that identify specific patterns in the
token stream as specified by the Grammar. This specific matching is similar to the LALR Parsing mechanism,
but is not identical to it. Unlike conventional parsers, SRTA does not require a complete grammar. Rather,
it requires only specific patterns of interest (e.g., variable declaration, initialization, assignment, increment).
A conventional parser could be used for SRTA, replacing the TR and TSM components, but it would have
required a complete, or at least, parsing-error-free program for analysis. In its current form, SRTA can
process code that cannot be compiled due to the presence of compile-time errors, up to a point where the
error does not affect the actual defective code. This specific strategy made SRTA capable of analyzing code
as they are being developed, providing a strong advantage over most other static analysis tools.
The TSM builds a Symbol Table and a Composition Table. The Symbol Table, as it is used in the field
of compiler design, is the table with the data of all identifiers present in the test system, along with their
scope and type information. The Composition Table is unique to SRTA, it holds the detailed breakdown of
composite entities with reference to the Symbol Table.
The prototype implemented the TSM as a set of seven Finite State Machines (FSM). Each FSM recognizes
one token sequence from the set - declaration and initialization, composite entity creation, array/memory
access, expression, assignment, allocation/deallocation and all other statements. The same token set is passed
along the seven FSMs that are connected as a chain. The Symbol and Composition Tables are implemented
as relations in a mysql database.
5.13.3 Model Building Phase
In the Model Building Phase, the components of the model are built using the data provided by the Prepro-
cessing Phase.
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The Graph Builder(GB)
In the Model Building Phase, the Symbol Table and Composition Table, along with the Recognized Token
Sequences, are used by a Graph Builder to create a Hybrid Data and Control Flow Graph (HFG). This graph
expresses the dataflow and control transfer among the entities.
Each node of the graph is the representation of an entity’s state in code. In case a statement changes mul-
tiple entities, the graph contains multiple nodes for the same statement. Conditional branches are represented
as forking structures in the graph, while recurrent structures are represented with loopbacks.
The Range Approximator(RA)
A Range Approximator (RA) takes over after the HFG is created, and uses the HFG, along with the Sym-
bol Table, Composition Table and the Token Sequences to determine or approximate the range of values
associated with each entity at its particular location in code. The RA uses simple mathematical relations
(as described in Chapter 5) to find the values. As the values for an unbound variable are not decidable in
static analysis, the RA uses a Solver Module (SV) to approximate the worst case values in such cases. The
Solver Module approximates values by evaluating a series of arithmetic operations that the value had to pass
through. The RA outputs a set of ranges for each identifier.
In this phase, the HFG is ‘Flattened’ to contain only the summarized representations. In case of forks
present in the graph, all possible values of the entities involved are summarized into a single node. Recurrent
structures are flattened in the same way.
The Solver (SV)
The solver accepts an expression for an entity from the RA and, consulting the HFG, Symbol Table and
Composition Table, provides the range of values the entity may assume at the point of interest. In case
the values cannot be determined, the solver approximates the worst possible scenario for the entities. For
example, if, at any point of the program, an entity is expected to read a string from the user, its length will
be approximated as infinite.
The Tuple Builder (TB)
The Tuple Builder (TB) uses this set of ranges, along with the HFG, the Symbol and Composition Tables and
the token set, to infer range tuples for different entities in different points in code. TB decides the placement
of ranges (operations concerning Constraint, Resolution, and Application) and processes them accordingly.
At this point, SRTA’s internal model building completes, and the HFG, Symbol Table, Composition Table
and Tokenset are not used anymore.
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5.13.4 Analysis and Reporting Phase
This phase uses multiple analyzer modules, built under users’ specifications, and a reporting module that
formats the output of the analyzers.
The Analyzer (AZ)
In the Analysis and Reporting Phase, the Analyzer Module (AZ) accepts the input from the Tuple Builder
and checks the Range Tuples for specific patterns as specified by the Defect Specifications supplied to it. The
Specifications are created to represent the defect mapping procedures described earlier in this chapter. As
the specifications can be different in number and type, they can be thought of as pluggable modules for the
AZ. Each of these Modules conducts exactly one specification check, although one might depend on others
for its checking. The result from the AZ is a set of defects identified from the source code.
Analyzers use a certain specification for defect detection. The format of the specification, as used by
SRTA, is described in brief later in this chapter.
The Report Generator (RG)
The defects are accepted in a Report Generator that formats and outputs them in one of the three supported
formats (at present). The reports can be generated as Plain Text, as formatted HTML or as XML files.
5.14 User-Defined Artifacts
SRTA requires three user-defined specifications. However, none of the specifications are restricted in format
by this research, as particular implementers of the tool may prefer a different representation. This section
describes the contents of the specifications, not the format of the specification file.
5.14.1 Lexical Specification
The language specific lexical specifications specify the token types of the language used for the development
of the test system. The objective for the specifications is to provide language specific information to the
Lexical Analyzer and the Token Recognizer.
The prototype implemented the specification in three parts. First part is a set of keywords, along with
a numeric type identifier for each, second part is a set of operators with associated numeric type identifiers
and the third part is a set of delimiters (spaces, tabs, newlines etc.).
This specification is not a part of SRTA and may change depending on the particular implementation of
the Lexical Analyzer. For example, if one decides to use a Lexer generated from Flex, it will correspond to
the Flex specification.
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5.14.2 Grammar Specification
The prototype uses a partial sequence mapper based on Finite State Machines, instead of a conventional
parser. Grammar implementations may differ for different implementations, for this prototype, a seven-
phase partial token sequence recognition mechanism was used.
5.14.3 Defect Specification
SRTA requires two information from the defect specifications. The first is the symbolic pattern to look for,
and the second is the description of anomaly expected in the pattern
The patterns use a form of high-level specification language similar to the Tool Command Language
(TCL). One of the main objectives of SRTA is to provide the user with the option to write simple specifica-
tions, relieving the user from complex decision making processes. The specification constructs are designed to
reflect this objective. The specification has two parts. The first part contains a set of patterns represented in
the symbolic analysis form, and the second part is the description of the anomalies that should be identified
as defects should they occur. As an example, the C1 Defect as described earlier is specified as,
Pattern: assign identifier1 identifier2
Anomaly: not {contained {application identifier2} {constraint identifier1}}
The pattern indicates to look for the assignment of identifier2 to identifier1 (in the usual postfix notation
typical to Tcl), and to check for the specific anomaly that the Application of identifier2 is not contained in
the constraint of identifier1.
The specification language contains a set of keywords and specification rules which are not presented in
this chapter (due to the large volume). As the exact specifications are required to use the prototype, details
are provided as a user manual to the prototype. It is available as a supplement to this dissertation [11].
5.14.4 Implementation Notes
Through its own specialized Lexical Analyzer, Token Recognizer and Token Sequence Mapper, the prototype
can be extended to systems developed in any programming language that can be expressed in a context-free
grammar. However, as the aim for developing this prototype was to test SRTA, and not to deliver a full-scale
product, only C++ and Java Grammars were implemented for the experiments (C systems were processed
using the C++ grammar).
The prototype employed mechanisms not commonly found in other tools - like the multi-phase token
sequence recognition or not using a conventional lexical analyzer and parser. Also the specifications were
custom designed for the prototype. The implementation and specifications are not standardized, and can be
reimplemented.
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5.15 Summary
This chapter details SRTA, or the Symbolic Range Tuple Analysis, technique. The chapter started by outlin-
ing the underlying propositions of SRTA, and then described the representation used by SRTA. The chapter
then proceeded on describing the mathematical framework of SRTA, followed by the detection techniques for
multiple dissimilar classes of defects. As the final note, the chapter described a prototype implemented to
test SRTA. The next chapter Chapter 6 describes the experiments conducted to evaluate the technique.
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Chapter 6
Experiments and Discussion
This chapter provides detailed information on the experiments conducted to validate and compare the
technique, SRTA, as it was described in Chapter 5. The evaluations were carried out using a prototype
implementation of SRTA described in the same chapter. This chapter begins with chapter specific background
information (Section 6.1) and an overview of the Evaluation Activities (Section 6.2). The chapter then
proceeds on describing the experimental setup for the four experiments conducted (Section 6.3). The data
and analyses are presented next (Section 6.5). Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of outcome
from the experiments (Section 6.6).
6.1 Chapter-specific Background
This section provides the chapter-specific background to the evaluation of the research.
6.1.1 Accuracy
Accuracy expresses an analyzer’s capability to detect as many of the relevant artifacts as possible, with the
least quantity of non-relevant artifacts detected along with the relevant ones. Two popular metrics, Precision
and Recall, are used to measure accuracy.
To define precision and recall, a number of background elements need to be defined. In these definition,
the generic term ‘Tool’ is used to mean the defect analyzer being evaluated.
Let,
1. D = {d1, d2, d3, ...dn} a collection of defective artifacts existing in the test system. The collection may
contain repeated artifacts.
2. C = {c1, c2, c3, ...cm} a set of defect classes. The set contains only unique classes.
3. A = {a1, a2, a3, ...ap} a collection of artifacts detected by the tool as defects. The collection may contain
repeated artifacts.
4. c = M(d) : D → C is the actual mapping of a defective artifact d ∈ D to the defect class c ∈ C, known
through previous detection or manual inspection.
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5. c = S(a) : A → C is the mapping reported by the tool for detected defective artifact a ∈ A to defect
class c ∈ C.
6. N = Defect count. It is the total number of defects in the test system. This number is equal to the
element count of the collection D. This count does not signify the unique defects existing in the system,
rather counts the total number of defects, including repetition. The reason for treating repetitions as
different instances is that, the same defect can be present in different flavours in different code constructs
and an effective system should detect all these different flavours. If repetitions are not counted, only a
generic estimate of a system’s accuracy can be obtained.
7. TD = Detection Count. It is the total number of artifacts detected by the tool as defects. This number
is equal to the count of elements in the collection A. The more accurate a detection system is, the
closer shall TD be to N , but the opposite is not guaranteed.
8. TP = True positive. It is the number of defective artifacts that are detected by the tool and are actually
existing in the system. That is, this number is equal to the element count of the intersection of the
collections D and A.
9. FP = False positive. It is the number of artifacts detected as defects, but in reality are not defects.
This number is equal to the element count for the set difference from A to D.
10. FN = False negative. It is the number of defective artifacts actually existing in the system, but are not
detected by the tool as defective artifacts.
Precision
Precision is the probability of a detected artifact’s being relevant [61]. Traditionally, it is expressed as
the percentage of the correctly detected artifacts with respect to all detected artifacts. To assess the tool’s
(specifically, SRTA’s) capability in more details, two variations of precision are considered in this experiment.
Precision 1 (Lenient Estimation): In the liberal or lenient variation, the precision is considered to be
the correctly detected artifacts over all artifacts. That is, a detection is considered as a true positive if the
detected artifact is found to be a defect, regardless of whether the class it was reported in is the actual defect
class it belongs to. This definition was used to assess the accuracy of SRTA in finding the anomalies that
lead to defects, regardless of its capability of correctly interpreting them. Often the precisions reported by
techniques in literature fall in this category. The expression for the lenient precision PL, is,
PL =
|{x : x ∈ A and x ∈ D}|
|A| (6.1)
Alternatively,
PL = 1− |{x : x ∈ A and p 6∈ D}||A| (6.2)
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Precision 2 (Strict Estimation): In the strict variation, the precision was considered to be the correctly
detected artifacts under correct class over all artifacts. That is, a detection is considered as a true positive if
the detected artifact is found to be a defect, and is of the same class as it was reported to be. This version
of precision is used to assess SRTA’s capability to correctly interpret the anomalies once they are detected.
The expression for the strict precision PS , is,
PS =
|{p : p ∈ A and p ∈ P and M(p) = S(p)}|
|A| (6.3)
Or, alternatively,
PS = 1− |{p : p ∈ A and (p 6∈ P or M(p) 6= S(p))}||A| (6.4)
The two variants of precision signify two different aspects of the process. Precision 1 (PL) expresses
the effectiveness of the detection of anomalies, while Precision 2 (PS) signifies the correct interpretation of
anomalies. For any test system, PS ≤ PL.
Recall
Recall is the probability that a relevant item has been detected by the analyzer [61]. Traditionally, recall is
expressed as the percentage of the detected artifacts over all actually present artifacts. In congruence with
the same definitions for precision, we have considered two different recall measures in this experiment.
Recall 1 (Lenient Estimation): In its lenient or liberal variant, a recall is the proportion of the detected
defects, regardless of the class they are detected in, to the total existing defects in the test system. That is,
RL =
|{p : p ∈ A and p ∈ D}|
|D| (6.5)
Or, alternatively,
RL = 1− |{p : p ∈ D and p 6∈ A}||D| (6.6)
Recall 2 (Strict Estimation): In the strict variant, the recall is defined as the proportion of defects
detected under the correct class, to the total existing defects in the test systems.
RS =
|{p : p ∈ A and p ∈ P and M(p) = S(p)}|
|D| (6.7)
Or, alternatively,
RS = 1− |{p : p ∈ A and (p 6∈ P or M(p) 6= S(p))}||D| (6.8)
Like precision, the two versions of recall signify the recall in detecting anomalies and the recall in inter-
preting the anomalies. For any test system, RS ≤ RL.
134
A point to note is, the words ‘Strict’ and ‘Lenient’ or ‘Liberal’ are used in the precision and recall
specifications to indicate the relative difference in the two versions, and not to impose any general quality.
The precision and recall reported by literature, which were used for comparison with other tools, all belong
to the Lenient estimate.
6.1.2 Scalability
Scalability of an analyzer denotes the ability to retain its qualities against a varying range of properties of
the test systems. In the context of this research, scalability is used to denote the capability of successful
processing with codebases of various sizes, and with various degrees of information that can be inferred from
the codebases.
A scalable technique should be able to function with codebases of varying sizes and complexities, with
reasonable accuracies for each.
6.1.3 Generality
Generality is used to describe the technique’s ability to be adapted in different situations. In the context of
this research, these situations are considered as different input specifications, subject system diversity, and
extension of the capability of detection over multiple dimensions with similar efficiency.
In the context of this research, a technique is considered to be general if it is able to process test systems
of differing technologies (e.g., programming languages, frameworks, specifications) but not necessarily of
different size or complexity, which are covered under scalability.
6.1.4 Practicality
Practicality is the applicability of the technique over real-world scenarios, that is, the ability to function
within reasonable environmental bounds. In this research we consider practicality to be the generic and
attainable requirement for the technique to function.
In the context of this research, a technique is considered to be practical if it does not put any special
requirement (e.g., extra large memory, specialized hardware, special annotations) on the test system or the
experimental environment, adapts itself in varying resource constraints (e.g., memory, processing power) and
is able to complete its analysis in a reasonable time frame in comparison with other notable tools.
6.2 Evaluation Overview
SRTA was evaluated to assess the four aspects of its features as described in the previous section. The
assessment was carried out using four different experiments (although the feature-experiment relation is
not exclusive). Table 6.1 summarizes the experiment and their objectives of assessment. Details of the
experiments are provided in the next section.
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Table 6.1: Summary of Assessment Procedures for SRTA’s Evaluation
# Experiment Description A
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Relevant Sections
1. Experiment 1 (a) Application of SRTA over Six real-world test systems. X X X 6.4.1, 6.5.1
(b) Application of three state-of-the-art tools over the same test systems. X X 6.4.1, 6.5.3
2. Experiment 2 (a) Application of SRTA over a Benchmark Suite. X 6.4.2, 6.5.2
3. Experiment 3 (a) Application of SRTA a large-scale fault-injection experiment. X 6.4.3, 6.5.2
(b) Application of three state-of-the-art tools to a large-scale fault-injection experiment. X 6.4.3, 6.5.2, 6.5.3
4. Experiment 4 (a) Application of SRTA in a controlled experiment. X X 6.4.4, 6.5.4
(b) Comparison of SRTA with secondary data on seven tools. X X 6.5.3
6.3 Experimental Setup
This section describes the experimental setup used to carry out the evaluation activities for SRTA.
6.3.1 Experimental Environments
All of the experiments were carried out in two different computer systems, both used for general purpose
computing. No specialized hardware or software components have been used to test SRTA.
Among the two systems, the first system (System 1) was used only to measure the effect of scalability
and practicality of SRTA. All of the experiments to measure accuracy and generality were conducted on the
second system (System 2). The two systems’ properties are summarized in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Description of Experimental Environments
# System Property Description Comment
1.
System 1
Processor Intel Core i5 4 Cores
2. Memory 2GB
3. Operating System Fedora 17 64-bit
4. Available Secondary Memory 200GB
5.
System 2
Processor Intel Core i7 8 Cores
6. Memory 4GB
7. Operating System Fedora 17 64-bit
8. Available Secondary Memory 200GB
6.3.2 Test Systems
The test systems were chosen from real-world open source systems that correspond to varying domains, and
are implemented in three different programming languages. Table 6.3 lists their properties.
Firefox, the popular web browser, was chosen for multiple reasons. Firefox is widely used as a browser. It
is a community project that accommodates different styles, specifications and standards. Moreover, Firefox
has a structured and extensive bug repository that can be used to verify the detection outcomes. Same
reasons were behind the selection of Thunderbird, the email client from Mozilla.
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Table 6.3: Description of the Test Systems
# System Version S-LOC Language(s) Comment
1. Firefox 12.0 3.4M C, C++,Java Well known for a lot of defects
2. Thunderbird 12.0.1 3.8M C++, Java Well known for a lot of defects
3. Linux Kernel 3.1.8 9.5M C, C++ To test scalability
4. Sendmail 8.12.11 86K C To test scalability
5. Notepad++ 5.8.3 121K C++ Stable System
6. BlueJ 3.0.9 103K Java Stable System
S-LOC was reported for the portions that fall under SRTA’s processing scope.
Languages specify the languages for developing the major portions (at least 1% of total LOC).
Linux Kernel was added to the test systems to assess SRTA’s scalability over a large system. Linux
Kernel contains inter-related modules, providing a complex and massive software system ideal for scalability
verification.
Sendmail, the mailing demon from Unix, was used in a number of experiments by other researchers. It
was incorporated in the test suite to be able to compare SRTA’s outcome with other research described in
literature.
Notepad++ and BlueJ are two code editors implemented in C++ and Java respectively. Both are well
known for their stability, indirectly stating their high quality. The systems were incorporated to assess
SRTA’s capability of detecting tricky defects. A second reason for incorporating BlueJ was to provide means
for comparison with FindBugs, one of the tools used for comparison.
6.3.3 Tools for Comparison
SRTA was compared against three tools. Each of the three tools came from Academia and is available as
gratis.
UNO
UNO is a tool developed by Holzmann [68]. It is lightweight and performs local and global (i.e., intra- and
inter-procedural) analysis. The tool works on C only and does not require any source annotation, specific
formatting, specific structure or paradigm.
FindBugs
FindBugs, developed in the University of Maryland, is one of the most widely cited multiple defect detection
tool. The tool is reported to find more than 300 defect inducing patterns in code. Despite the fact not all of
these patterns are considered defective in the context of present research, and that the patterns matched by
FindBugs are all from code directly, it was included to compare with SRTA due to its closest resemblance to
a multiple-dissimilar defect detection tool. FindBugs works on Java Only.
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SPLINT
Developed by Evans et al., SPLINT [48] has been used in a number of experiments over the years. The tool
is an upgrade of the widely successful LCLint [48], and is able to detect memory defects from C code only.
6.4 Experiment Descriptions
This section provides the description of the experiments. The data are provided in the next section.
6.4.1 Experiment 1: Application on Test Systems
SRTA was applied on the six test systems as described in Table 6.3. For each of the six cases, SRTA’s reports
were verified using manually checking every single defect SRTA reported. For every reported defect, it was
categorized in one of the three cases
Reported Under Correct Class (CC): a reported defect belongs to this class if it is a indeed a defect,
and that the class reported by SRTA is the correct class the defect belongs to, according to the Taxonomy
provided in Chapter 3.
Reported Under Incorrect Class (IC): a reported defect belongs to this class if it is a indeed a defect,
but the class reported by SRTA is not the correct class the defect belongs to, according to the Taxonomy
provided in Chapter 3.
Not a Defect (ND): a reported defect is not a defect.
The three tools, UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT were applied on two of the same test systems, Sendmail
and BlueJ. UNO and SPLINT were applied on Sendmail because of their capability to process the C language
only, and because Sendmail is the only system among the test systems to implemented using only C. BlueJ
was processed using FindBugs, as FindBugs can process only Java Code and BlueJ was the only system
among the test systems that was implemented using only Java.
6.4.2 Experiment 2: Application over Benchmark
BugBench is a benchmark developed by Lu et al. [112]. The benchmark contains a collection test systems
written in C and documented defects present in them. The benchmark was used to determine the recall of
SRTA. For every defect SRTA failed to detect, the reason for the failure was investigated by manual inspection
of the source code. The benchmark supports L3, M2, M4 and S1 defects, as shown in Table 6.4.
Unfortunately, no benchmark could be found that encompasses the entire range of defects SRTA is able
to detect. To make a comprehensive assessment of recall, Experiment 3 was used. Due to the limited defect
coverage of the benchmark, it was not used to compare SRTA with the other tools.
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Table 6.4: Properties of the BugBench Benchmark version 1.1
Defect Count in BugBench Under Different Defect Classes
# System LOC C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1. bc 1.06 15k 3
2. cvs 1.11.4 110k 1
3. gzip 1.2.4 7k 1
4. httpd 2.0.48 319k 1
5. man 1.5.h1 11k 1 1
6. mysql 3.23.56 508k 1
7. mysql 4.1.1.α 739k 1
8. ncompress 4.2.4 1.4k 1
9. polymorph 0.4.0 3.7k 2
10. Squid 2.3. 73k 1
LOC = Lines of Code
Figure 6.1: Generation Phase of the Mutation-Injection Framework
6.4.3 Experiment 3: Large-scale Fault-Injection Experiment
To evaluate the recall through the fault-injection experiment, the adaptation of an established Mutation-
Injection Framework by Roy and Cordy [136, 148] for evaluating code clone detectors [137] (in particular,
for evaluating the NiCad clone detector [34, 134]) was used. The framework is composed of two phases,
Generation and Evaluation.
Generation phase of the framework generates the mutants (i.e., versions of the test system with induced
changes), following the process as depicted in Figure 6.1 which are later used for assessment in the evaluation
phase. The defect Taxonomy developed in Chapter 3 was used to develop mutation rules (i.e., Mutation
Operators) by following a similar strategy of a clone taxonomy [135] that were specified using constructs
of the TXL programming language. Three different sets of mutation operators were developed for C, C++
and Java, with minor difference to each other. The set of operators for C is summarized in Table 6.5. The
operators for C++ and Java are provided in Appendix B. The table shows the mutation operators that
apply on single statements. The operators for defects D3, D4 and D5, being interprocedural in nature,
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Figure 6.2: Evaluation Phase of the Mutation-Injection Framework
require complex structures and are shown separately in Appendix B.
A question may arise on the use of the operator mL6, as Sendmail is a system developed in C and exception
patterns are not valid in C. Among the tools evaluated, L6 pattern was supported by SRTA only. Due to
the complete containment of the C constructs as valid C++ constructs, SRTA processed the C systems using
C++ grammar, and thus this construct becomes valid in context with SRTA. For UNO and SPLINT, the
other two tools that were applied on the same set of mutants, L6 is an out-of-scope defect class.
The un-mutated test system, shown as the ‘Original System’ in Figure 6.1, is mutated by choosing a
random source file from the set of all files of the original system, and then by applying a mutation operator
at a random position of the file. The mutation operator either changes a specific construct of the programming
language to make it faulty, or introduces a new line of code to induce faults. The resultant system after the
application of the mutation operator is called the Mutant. For every mutation operator, the generation
process was repeated 1000 times.
In the Evaluation Phase, the mutants are processed using the analyzer under assessment and the reports
are checked to determine if the analyzer was able to detect the induced defects. Due to the large number
of mutants, it is often impractical to check every detection report manually. For this experiment, a specific
automated procedure was developed. Figure 6.2 shows the procedure for evaluation of SRTA.
The procedure for the evaluation can be described step-by-step as,
(i) SRTA was applied on the un-mutated Sendmail. The report was marked as the Original Report, or R0.
(ii) For every mutant i, 1 ≤ i ≤ 1000, following procedure was performed
(a) SRTA was applied on the mutant and the report was marked as Ri.
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Table 6.5: Single-mutation Operators Used in this Experiment (developed for C)
# Cls mOP Mutation Example Comment
1. C1 mC1
TP < id ><=>< num ><;> x = 10;
MP< id ><=>< num1 ><;> x = 10 + 99999999999999; num1 = a large number
2. C2 mC2
TP < id >< OP >< num > x < 100; OP = {<,>,<=, >=, ! =
,==}
MP< id >< OP >< num > + < num1 > x < 100 + 10; num1 = [1, 10]
3. C3 mC3
TP < type >< id ><=>< num ><;> int x = 0; type =
int|float|double|long
MP< type >< id ><;> int x;
4. L1 mL1
TP < if >< (>< id ><==>< expr ><) > if(id == 10)
MP< if >< (>< id ><=>< expr ><) > if(id = 10)
5. L2 mL2
TP < for >< (> ... < id >< OP1 >< num > ... <) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x+ +) {OP1,OP2} = {<,>},{>
,<},
MP< for >< (> ... < id >< OP2 >< num > ... <) > for(x = 0; x > 100; x+ +) {<=, >=},{>=, <=},{<
,<=}
6. L3 mL3
TP < for >< (> ... < id >< OP1 ><) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x+ +) {OP1,OP2} =
{++,−−},{−−,++}
MP< for >< (> ... < id >< OP2 ><) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x−−)
7. L5 mL5
TP N/A
MP< type >< id >; intx;
8. L6 mL6
TP N/A N/A Inject.
MP< try >< {>< throw >< new >< type ><} ><
catch >< (>< type1 >< id ><) >
try{throw new MyException}
catch(Exception e)
Note 1.
9. L7 mL7
TP < if >< (> ... <) > if(x < 100)
MP< if >< (1) > if(1)
10. M1mM1
TP < id ><=>< malloc >< (>< expr ><) ><;> p = malloc(100);
MP< id ><=>< 0 > p = 0;
11. M2mM2
TP < free >< (>< id ><) ><;> free(p);
MP< free >< (>< id ><) ><;>< free >< (><
id ><) ><;>
free(p); free(p);
12. M3mM3
TP < free >< (>< id ><) ><;> free(p);
MP< / >< / >< free >< (>< id ><) ><;> //free(p);
13. M4mM4
TP < id >< [>< num ><] > p[30];
MP< id >< [>< num >< + >< num1 ><] > p[30+10];
14. D1 mD1
TP < id >< (>< id1 ><,>< id2 > ... <,>< idn ><
) >
function(x, y, z);
MP< id >< (>< id1 ><,>< id1 > ... <,>< id1 ><
) >
function(x, x, x);
15. D2 mD2
TP < id >< (> ... < num > ... <) > function(10, 20, 30);
MP< id >< (> ... < num1 > ... <) > function(10, 0, 30);
16. D3 mD3 Complex Operator. Shown in Appendix B
17. D4 mD4 Complex Operator. Shown in Appendix B
18. D5 mD5 Complex Operator. Shown in Appendix B
Cls = Defect Class mOP = Mutation Operator
TP = Token Pattern MP = Mutation Pattern
<> = Token
Note 1: Although it is not recognized for C, as SRTA processed the C Systems using C++ grammar, it counts as a valid construct.
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(b) If Ri is the same as R0, SRTA is considered to have missed the defect.
(c) If Ri is the not the same as R0, but SRTA’s report does not mention the defect class in the
mismatching portion, SRTA is considered to have detected the defect in a different category than
it should be reported into.
(d) Otherwise, SRTA is considered to have detected the defect correctly.
Same set of mutants were used with SPLINT and UNO to assess their recall to compare with SRTA.
For FindBugs, another set of mutants were generated using BlueJ as the test system, and both SRTA and
FindBugs were applied on the same set of mutants for the comparison of results.
To compare the reports R0 and Ri, the plain diff utility was used for SRTA. The utility reports a
line-by-line match or mismatch on the source files compared. In case the reports are the same, it is taken
as an indication of SRTA’s failure to detect the defect. In case diff reported a mismatch, the mismatching
report fragment from Ri is checked for the mention of the defect class the mutant was developed for. If the
class is found in this portion, SRTA is considered to have detected the defect correctly, if not, then SRTA is
considered to have detected the defect in an incorrect class.
SRTA provides an added advantage over the other three tools in that, SRTA does not involve a con-
ventional compiler like gcc to build the code. This feature provides SRTA with the capability to process
incomplete code, and relieves it from another problem present in the other systems. In case of multi-file
compilation, the exact compilation order of the files are not usually decidable for gcc. This problem can
cause UNO and SPLINT, when applied on the same subject system more than once, to generate reports that
are same in content, but different in ordering. Although the problem was not observed for FindBugs, no
information was found to guarantee its absence.
As a workaround to this problem, the tools were used to generated plain text reports, which were then
converted to XML using a custom script. The XML report contents were then compared using an evaluation
version of the XML DiffDog by Altova [3].
6.4.4 Experiment 4: Controlled Experiment
SRTA was implemented to balance between available memories. SRTA uses the available primary memory
as much as possible. If it runs out of memory, it moves the data to secondary memory and loads them as
required. The data unit granularities can be as small as the set of tokens from a single file. By design, SRTA
is guaranteed to run as long as the primary and secondary memories of the computer system it is executed
on do not run out together, contrary to most other tools that only rely on the primary memory.
To test the scalability of SRTA, two different execution systems, as described earlier in this chapter, were
used. In each of the systems, five small subject systems were processed. As these systems were only used
to check scalability and practicality, and as SRTA’s processing accuracy does not depend on the size of the
subject system (as was apparent from the precision experiment), the accuracy for these systems were not
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verified. Default Linux profiling tools time and vmstat were used to log the execution information.
As the target of this exercise was only to verify SRTA’s scalability and resource usage, instead of an
independent software, five collections of SRTA’s own source code (including repetition) were used. To estimate
the least requirement for the software, the smallest possible C++ code was used (that is, the one that contains
a main function and a return statement inside). From SRTA’s Source Code, a collection was formed with 13
source files, containing a total of 3402 source lines excluding comments. Multiple copies of these files were
used to form five small collections that were used to evaluate SRTA’s processing time and memory over two
execution systems. The size for the test systems are shown in Table 6.6.
The reason to use SRTA’s own code in repetitive collections, instead of a set of established software is to
have better control over the number of tokens and the codebase sizes. Instead of the entire code of SRTA,
the 13 files that constitute to the common components utilized by SRTA were used because the code in these
files, being generic in nature, provides greater complexity than the rest of the system.
Table 6.6: System Metrics for Scalability Test
# Name Files LOC Tokens Comment
1. Base 1 3 10 Baseline. Almost no processing.
2. TS1 13 3,402 12,062
3. TS2 26 6,804 24,124 2xTS1
4. TS3 65 17,010 60,310 5xTS1
5. TS4 130 34,020 1,200,620 10xTS1
6. TS5 1300 3,40,200 1,20,06,200 100xTS1
6.5 Results and Analysis
This section provide the results and analysis obtained from the four experiment as described in the previous
section. In presenting the data, experiment-wise grouping was not used due to the same aspect being verified
in multiple experiments.
6.5.1 Precision
Table 6.7 shows the results from Experiment 1. As it is apparent from Table 6.7, SRTA performs particularly
well for memory and computation defects, but not so well for logical and data related defects. The reason for
the performance loss in Logical and Data related defects is their dependence on artifacts external to code.
Computation and Memory defects can be completely traced from code, a task SRTA is specifically designed
to do. Analysis of the false positives yielded three major reasons behind SRTA’s failure to detect them.
Worst-case Approximations: Worst-case approximations resulted in a number of false positives in the
processing. In C1 defects, SRTA produced two false positives for each of Firefox, Thunderbird and Linux
Kernel. All six of the false positives included user supplied values, and thus were approximated using the
worst-case estimation which included infeasible states. Same reason was behind one false positive in C2, all
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Table 6.7: Precision of SRTA in Processing the Test Systems
Test Systems
Firefox Thunderbird Notepad++ Sendmail Linux BlueJ
# Class PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP Comment
1. C1 0.67 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.87 0.13 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.93 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.00
2. C2 0.70 0.80 0.20 0.76 0.82 0.18 - - - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.86 0.93 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.00
3. C3 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.77 0.82 0.18 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.83 0.83 0.17 0.74 0.84 0.16 0.67 1.00 0.00
4. L1 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.40 0.60 0.40 - - - 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.64 0.79 0.21 0.56 0.67 0.33
5. L2 0.25 0.50 0.50 - - - - - - - - - 0.70 0.80 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.00
6. L3 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.67 0.83 0.17 1.00 1.00 0.00
7. L5 - - - 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.76 0.76 0.24 0.50 1.00 0.00
8. L6 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.75 0.75 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.00
9. L7 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - 0.50 0.75 0.25
10. M1 0.71 0.82 0.18 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.73 0.82 0.18 0.86 0.86 0.14
11. M2 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - 0.75 0.75 0.25 - - -
12. M3 0.67 0.83 0.17 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.74 0.78 0.22 - - -
13. M4 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 - - - 0.60 0.80 0.20 0.64 0.71 0.29 0.67 0.83 0.17
14. D1 - - - - - - - - - 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.43 0.57 0.43 0.67 1.00 0.00
15. D2 - - - - - - 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.92 0.08 0.50 0.50 0.50
16. D3 0.70 0.85 0.15 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.82 0.91 0.09 0.75 1.00 0.00
17. D4 0.50 0.50 0.50 - - - - - - - - - 0.80 0.80 0.20 - - -
18. D5 - - - - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - -
PS = Precision (Strict Estimation)
PL = Precision (Lenient Estimation)
FP = False Positive Rate
in L1, all in L2, six in M1, twenty in M3, four in M4, and most in D1-5. Incorporation of simple heuristics
in the solver and in the range tuple inference module can act against this problem.
Insufficient Library Function Models: Three of the false positives in C2 defects were due to function-
dependent conditions used in checks, for which SRTA did not have the model of the functions (as they were
standard library functions, source code was not provided), and therefore created the worst-case approxima-
tions. Same reason created one false positive in L2, eight in L5, one in L7, ten in M1, and seven in M3. This
problem can be resolved if user-defined models of library functions can be provided to SRTA. As SRTA only
deals with range tuples, it is possible to provide library function models by specifying the input and output
ranges. However, this functionality was not implemented for the prototype.
Dataflow Problems: SRTA failed to properly process the cases where one entity is reused multiple
times. In case a variable is declared as a loop index, and used in more than one loops in the same block of
code, SRTA marked it as a defect. This situation occurred for one false positive in L2, two in L3, seven in
M1, two in M2, three in M3, three in M4, two in D1, one in D2, one in D3 and one in D4. Resolution of this
problem requires remodelling of dataflow, which we leave as a future research direction.
Comparing with UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT, the precisions are reported in Table 6.8.
As it can be seen from Table 6.7 and Table 6.8, SRTA outperforms UNO in all directions. The reason
behind it is the same as it was reported by previous research [168, 141]. UNO only can process straightforward
expressions that do not require any inference. SRTA, on the other hand, can process inferred information,
and can consequently, can detect more defects than UNO.
FindBugs is a generally well performing tool that matches bug patterns and is reportedly able to find 300
“patterns” [8]. In case of L1 and L5 defects, FindBugs outperformed SRTA, although the performance was
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Table 6.8: Precision of UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT Using Direct Experimental Data
Sendmail BlueJ
# Tool Language Class PS PL FP PS PL FP Comment
1. UNO C C3 0.75 0.75 0.25
M1 0.00 0.00 1.00
M4 0.25 0.25 0.75
2. FindBugs Java C1 1.00 1.00 0.00
C2 1.00 1.00 0.00
C3 0.67 0.67 0.33
L1 0.71 0.71 0.29
L3 0.67 0.67 0.33
L5 1.00 1.00 0.00
L7 0.67 0.67 0.33
M1 0.80 0.80 0.20
D1 0.50 0.50 0.50
D2 0.33 0.33 0.67
D3 0.75 0.75 0.25
3. SPLINT C M1 0.50 0.50 0.50
M2 - - - None was present
M3 0.50 0.50 0.50
M4 0.38 0.38 0.62
PS = Precision (Strict Estimation)
PL = Precision (Lenient Estimation)
FP = False Positive Rate
close in other defects. The reason can be attributed to FindBug’s specialized treatment of Java, which SRTA
had to give up to become a general tool. Many of the patterns FindBug reported (e.g., dead parameter) are
specific to Java, for which SRTA does not provide specialized treatments.
SPLINT’s performance over Sendmail was not above SRTA. For all categories, SRTA performed well
above SPLINT. The reason for this is SRTA’s incorporation of defect information from multiple phases of
the entity’s life-cycle, which helped to reduce false positive and false negative. This reason was found by
inspecting two of the defects that SRTA detected, but SPLINT missed. For both cases, it was found that
local information did not suffice in identifying the defects, but compared to their immediate conditional block
(i.e., if statement), the defect became apparent.
6.5.2 Recall
The data from SRTA’s application on the benchmark is presented in Table 6.9. Detailed detection counts
are presented in Appendix C.
Table 6.9: SRTA’s Recall Assessment by Application on BugBench
bc cvs gzip man ncompress polymorph squid
# ClassRC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN Comment
1. L3 - - - - - - - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - - - -
2. M2 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. M4 0.75 1.00 0.00 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Avg 0.75 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
RS = Recall (Strict Estimation)
RL = Recall (Lenient Estimation)
FN = False Negative Rate
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As can be seen from the table, SRTA provided high recall in all cases except the one defect in man. The
defect was caused by having a buffer overflow in line 979 of the file man.c, where the estimate of a loop exit
condition was set 4 times higher than it should have been in the expression,
“if(end == NULL||i+ 1 == sizeof(tmp section list))”
, which, in a correct version, should have been,
“if(end == NULL||i+ 1 = sizeof(tmp section list)/sizeof(char∗))”
, as specified in BugBench’s descriptions. However, in SRTA’s symbolic execution, the first condition eval-
uated to false only, minimizing the need to evaluate the second condition. This lazy evaluation technique,
introduced to increase the prototype’s performance, was the underlying reason for missing this defect.
The data from the fault-injection experiment is presented in Table 6.10.
Table 6.10: SRTA’s Recall Assessment from the Mutation-Injection Experiment
Sendmail BlueJ
# Defect mOP Mutants RS RL FN RS RL FN Comment
1. C1 mC1 1000 0.89 0.89 0.11 0.89 0.90 0.10
2. C2 mC2 1000 0.86 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.87 0.13
3. C3 mC3 1000 0.88 0.88 0.12 0.78 0.79 0.21
4. L1 mL1 1000 0.62 0.73 0.27 0.63 0.64 0.36
5. L2 mL2 1000 0.77 0.88 0.12 0.81 0.85 0.15
6. L3 mL3 1000 0.71 0.79 0.21 0.73 0.75 0.25
7. L5 mL5 1000 0.73 0.85 0.15 0.69 0.71 0.29
8. L6 mL6 1000 0.67 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.77 0.23
9. L7 mL7 1000 0.79 0.96 0.04 0.79 0.80 0.20
10. M1 mM1 1000 0.82 0.88 0.12 0.90 0.90 0.10
11. M2 mM2 1000 0.79 0.88 0.12 - - - Not Defined for Java.
12. M3 mM3 1000 0.84 0.92 0.08 - - - Not Defined for Java.
13. M4 mM4 1000 0.82 0.90 0.10 0.89 0.93 0.07
14. D1 mD1 1000 0.71 0.81 0.19 0.73 0.74 0.26
15. D2 mD2 1000 0.75 0.85 0.15 0.67 0.68 0.32
16. D3 mD3 1000 0.62 0.78 0.22 0.60 0.70 0.30
17. D4 mD4 1000 0.70 0.82 0.18 0.75 0.91 0.09
18. D5 mD5 1000 0.69 0.83 0.17 0.59 0.70 0.30
Average 1000 0.76 0.86 0.14 0.78 0.81 0.19
mOP = Mutation Operator
RS = Recall (Strict Estimation)
RL = Recall (Lenient Estimation)
FN = False Negative Rate
On an average, SRTA detected 86% of the defects injected in Sendmail, and correctly interpreted 76%
included in those 86%. For BlueJ, the detection performance is 81%, with correct interpretation of 78%. This
recall performance is considerably high for a unified detection tool and is better than some of the specialized
tools as well (as described in later sections).
As a general trend, SRTA showed a better recall performance in the Memory Defects (M1-M4) and on
the Computation Defects (C1-C3). For both, the detection accuracies are higher, with lower misclassification
problems. The reason can be traced to the structure of these defects that make the anomaly apparent.
All of the computation defects are intra-procedural, and therefore do not require complex reasoning over
procedural boundaries. The memory defects are sometimes inter-procedural, but are always local to the
place of occurrence. Logical Defects, on the other hand, require inter-procedural analysis, often relying
heavily on the context and specific execution path. In most cases, Logical Defects require a combination of
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the context and path for their determination, giving rise to confusion in the analysis.
For the defects under the class C1, the mutation rule was a certain one to introduce a defect. For Sendmail,
SRTA did not mis-classify any of the defects from this category, but failed to capture 11% of the total injected
values. For BlueJ, SRTA mis-classified 1% of injected defects, and missed 10%. Checking ten random missed
defects confirmed all of them to be in function declarations in Sendmail, where the assignment of the value
only becomes a default value for the function parameter. If the function is not called with this value, the
context will override the defect into a safe statement, which happened for all the checked cases for these
defects. The mis-classified defects in BlueJ were all classified as Invalid Memory References (M1). Manual
verification of the 12 missed defects found all mutations to be implemented in variables that were used as
array indices, thus actually causing the Invalid Memory References.
For the defects under the class C2, SRTA was able to find 91% of the defects in Sendmail, and correctly
identified 86% of the total defects with the rest 9% as false negatives. For Bluej the detection performance
was 87%, identification 86% and false negatives 13%. However, these false negative rates are not guaranteed
as the mutation rule may introduce mutations that do not result into a defect. Ten random samples of the
missed defect instances were checked, of which three were found to be non-defects (two in BlueJ and one in
Sendmail). For the other seven, SRTA missed the defects due to the extra complex nature of the loop control
structures that contained the defects. The structures involved composite entities and / or values from inside
the loop’s body that skipped detection.
For the defects under the class C3, like those under the class C1, SRTA did not mis-classify any defect
for Sendmail, detected 88% and missed 12%. For BlueJ detection performance was 79%, with 78% identified
correctly and 21% false negatives. However, the mutation rule was not certain to introduce a defect. There-
fore, the missed 12% and 21% can not be considered as the actual false negative rate. Ten random defects
were checked from among the missed defect instances, and it was found that for all instances, although the
entities were initialized (which were changed to ‘uninitialized’ by the mutation operator), the uninitialized
entities were not used in any of the computations, rendering the defective mutations into safe ones.
For the defects under the class L1, SRTA had a relatively high false negative rate of 27% for Sendmail and
36% in BlueJ. However, this defect class is another where the mutation operator is guaranteed to produce a
defect. A random check of ten missed defects verified that the mutation operator changed the operators in
complex arithmetic expressions involving true/false values, which were set to tautologies and thus skipped
detection.
For the defects of the class L2, SRTA had a false negative rate of 12% for Sendmail and 15% for BlueJ.
However, the mutation operator was not certain to inject a fault in this case. The mutation operator for this
particular defect changes an operator with another, creating an improper validation statement. Of the ten
randomly selected defect instances from among the ones SRTA failed to detect, two were not defects despite
the change in operators. For the others, the operators were replaced in complex comparison operations that
did not register as anomalies for SRTA.
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For the defects of the class L3, SRTA’s false negative rate was 21% for Sendmail and 25% for BlueJ, but
the mutation operator was not guaranteed to insert a fault. Of the ten randomly chosen defects from the
ones SRTA failed to detect, four were not defects, for the others, SRTA failed to detect the defects due to
the ambiguity used in the precedence of the operators.
For the defects of the class L5, SRTA had a 15% false negative rate for Sendmail and 29% in BlueJ. Of
the ten randomly chosen defects checked from here, eight were found to be defined later in the program and
therefore were not defects. The other two SRTA missed because of their insertion in wrong places. Both of
these two cases were errors to stop building the system. SRTA does not involve a compiler to be able to
parse incomplete code, and thus was not able to find these cases.
For the defects of the class L6, SRTA’s false negative rate was 15% for Sendmail and 23% for BlueJ.
Verification with the 10 randomly sampled defects pointed out the cause for missing the defects to be the
possibility of automatic conversion of the exception classes which rendered them improper for classification
as defects. This particular incident was more prominent in BlueJ.
For the defects of the class L7, false negative rate was 4% only for Sendmail, but 20% for BlueJ. Of the
40 defects that SRTA failed to classify for Sendmail were due to the involvement of outer-nested conditions
that rendered the inside ones improper. In case of BlueJ, ten randomly verified defects identified three of
them to be from the same loop nesting conditions, and the rest due to the use of user-specified variables.
For the defects belonging to the M1 class, false negative rate was 12% for Sendmail and 10% for BlueJ.
An analysis of the random sampled 10 defects revealed that for four of them, there was no defect as the
values, although were initialized at the beginning which the mutant changed, was re-initialized through a
validation statement and thus nullified the defect.
For the defects belonging to the M2 class, with a false negative rate of 12% for Sendmail, SRTA failed to
detect all of the defects that were checked, primarily due to the multiple branching deallocation statements.
This particular defect class is not valid for Java, which involves automatic garbage collection, and therefore
this particular set of mutation was not performed for BlueJ.
For the defects under the class M3, with a false negative rate of 8%, all of the randomly checked ten
missed defects were actually defects. SRTA missed the trivial memory leaks due to their occurrence in very
complex code structures (one with a four-level nesting). This defect class, also, is not valid for Java, and was
omitted for BlueJ.
For the defects under the class M4, with a false negative rate of 10% for Sendmail and 7% for BlueJ, none
of the ten randomly checked defects were actually defects. The buffer size for these cases were large enough
to accommodate the increased access induced by the mutant.
For the defects under the class D1, the false negative rate was 19% for Sendmail and 26% for BlueJ. Of
the ten randomly checked defects it was found that nine of the defects were not actually defects as the data
provided to the functions were valid. The last one had an implicit type casting, which SRTA missed.
For the defects of the class D2, none of the ten random sampled missed defects were found to be defects.
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The mutant was not guaranteed to include a defect in this case.
For the defects of the class D3, with a false negative rate of 22% for Sendmail and 30% for BlueJ, the
ten randomly checked missed defects were due to three different causes. First, three of the mutations were
reverted by the later code constructs. Second, two of the mutations did not induce defects because the calling
context of the function validated the values and the rest were due to not using all the function parameters.
For the defects belonging to class D4, with an 18% false negative for Sendmail and 9% for BlueJ, the ten
randomly verified missed defects were found to be actual defects, which SRTA missed due to the composite
entities involved.
The the defects belonging to the class D5, with 17% false negative rate for Sendmail and a high 30%
for BlueJ, the ten randomly verified defects were found to be actual defects. For BlueJ, the defects avoided
detection due to the static declaration context, which made their values reset right after the mutation.
The same experiment, repeated on the three other tools, resulted in the data provided in Table 6.11
Table 6.11: Recall of UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT Using the Mutation-Injection Experiment
Sendmail BlueJ
# Tool System Lang. LOC Class mOP Count RS RL FN RS RL FN Comment
1. UNO Sendmail-8.12.11 C 102k C3 mC3 1000 0.66 0.66 0.34
M1 mM1 1000 0.43 0.43 0.37
M4 mM4 1000 0.00 0.00 1.00
2. FindBugs BlueJ-3.0.9 Java 86k C1 mC1 1000 0.90 0.90 0.10
C2 mC2 1000 0.87 0.87 0.13
C3 mC3 1000 0.79 0.79 0.21
L1 mL1 1000 0.68 0.68 0.32
L3 mL3 1000 0.70 0.70 0.30
L5 mL5 1000 0.70 0.70 0.30
L7 mL7 1000 0.68 0.68 0.32
M1 mM1 1000 0.88 0.88 0.12
D1 mD1 1000 0.65 0.65 0.35
D2 mD2 1000 0.79 0.79 0.21
D3 mD3 1000 0.77 0.77 0.23
3. SPLINT Sendmail-8.12.11 C 102k M1 mM1 1000 0.61 0.61 0.39
M2 mM2 1000 0.57 0.57 0.43
M3 mM3 1000 0.60 0.60 0.40
M4 mM4 1000 0.51 0.51 0.49
RS = Recall (Strict Estimation)
RL = Recall (Lenient Estimation)
FN = False Negative Rate
As it can be seen from the table, despite missing a number of defects in the experiment, SRTA’s perfor-
mance is not behind the other three tools in any of the cases. SRTA outperformed UNO and SPLINT in
almost all cases, and performed either above or equal to findbugs in most cases.
6.5.3 Comparison with Other Tools
This section describes SRTA’s comparison with other tools. The evaluation was carried out in two phases.
First, SRTA was compared against the three tools mentioned earlier using experimental data. Second, the
data obtained from the experiments were compared against the data reported in literature for seven tools,
five of which were not used in the direct comparison.
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Comparison Using Data Obtained from Experiment
The results of the direct comparison, using all defect classes described in the Taxonomy in Chapter 3, are
presented in Table 6.12. In the table, as SRTA was involved in two Mutation-Injection experiments, the data
was used from two different tables. If, under a defect class, a direct comparison was made with other tools,
the average of the direct comparison data was used for SRTA. In absence of such comparison, the data from
Table 6.7 and Table 6.10 was used. For the other three tools, the precision and recall were taken from Tables
6.8 and 6.11.
In Table 6.12, it can be observed that SRTA clearly covers more defect classes than the other three
tools. Compared to UNO’s support to three classes under two groups, FindBug’s 11 defect classes under
three groups, and SPLINT’s four under one group, SRTA supports 18 defect classes in three groups, with
individual precision and recall as good as, if not better, than the other three tools in different classes. Only
FindBugs performed better than SRTA in both precision and recall for the L1 defect class, in addition to
having slightly better precision in M1 and better recall in D2. The defect classes L4, L8, S1 and S2 were
not supported by any of the tools. In case of SRTA it was due to the requirement of design involvement for
L4 and L8, and the infeasibility of detecting S1 and S2 using static analysis. Classes L6, D4 and D5 were
covered by SRTA alone. Thus, in comparison to the three other tools, SRTA is found to be covering more
defect classes, with precision and recall higher than others in most cases, and close to the other tools in the
few other cases.
To provide an additional view on the results, we have presented the data from Table 6.12 using an
ROC-type plot as used by Zitser et al. [168]. The ROC-type plots, abbreviated from Receiver Operating
Characteristics plots, are borrowed from wireless transmission analysis where they are used frequently to
compare receiver peroformances. Following the procedure of Zitser et al. [168], we identified the Probability
of Detection, P(d), and the Probability of False Alarms, P(f), as the following:
P (d) =
DD
N
(6.9)
where,
DD = Defects detected correctly.
N = Total number of defects.
P (d) =
ND
N
(6.10)
ND = Detection of non-defects as defects.
N = Total number of defects.
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Table 6.12: Summary of Experimental Comparison of SRTA with UNO, SPLINT and FindBugs
SRTA UNO FindBugs SPLINT
# Class Precision* Recall* Precision Recall Precision Recall Precision Recall Comment
1. C1 0.94 0.93 - - 1.00 0.90 - -
2. C2 0.81 0.89 - - 1.00 0.87 - -
3. C3 0.92 0.84 0.75 0.66 0.67 0.79 - -
C 0.89 0.89 0.75 0.66 0.89 0.85 - -
4. L1 0.63 0.69 - - 0.71 0.68 - -
5. L2 0.77 0.87 - - - - - -
6. L3 0.92 0.77 - - 0.67 0.70 - -
7. L4 - - - - - - - - Not supported
8. L5 0.74 0.81 - - 1.00 0.70 - -
9. L6 0.88 0.81 - - - - - -
10. L7 0.86 0.88 0.67 0.68 - -
11. L8 - - - - - - - - Not supported
L 0.80 0.81 - - 0.79 0.69 - -
12. M1 0.80 0.89 0.00 0.43 0.80 0.88 0.50 0.61
13. M2 0.81 0.88 - - - - / 0.57 Note 1
14. M3 0.86 0.92 - - - - 0.50 0.60
15. M4 0.77 0.92 0.25 0.00 - - 0.38 0.51
M 0.81 0.90 0.13 0.22 0.8 0.88 0.46 0.57
16. D1 0.86 0.78 - - 0.50 0.65 - -
17. D2 0.36 0.77 - - 0.33 0.79 - -
18. D3 0.85 0.74 - - 0.75 0.77 - -
19. D4 0.65 0.87 - - - - - -
20. D5 1.00 0.77 - - - - - -
D 0.74 0.79 - - 0.53 0.74 - -
21. S1 - - - - - - - - Not supported
22. S2 - - - - - - - - Not supported
S - - - - - - - - Not supported
Average (over C, L, M, and D) 0.81 0.85 0.43 0.44 0.75 0.79 0.46 0.57
*Lenient variant used
/ = Supported but data is not available
- = Not Supported
Note 1: Neither SPLINT nor SRTA detected any defect of class M2 in Sendmail.
As the same systems were used in both the precision and recall measurements, and the recall measurement
systems only had one injected fault per system (repeated 1000 times), it can be assumed that the false
positives were the same as they were for the precision assessment. In other words, although for the mutation
experiment, we generated 1000 different variations of the same system with one defect injected to each,
this approach was adopted only to facilitate accurate comparison. From a defect detector’s point-of-view,
injecting one fault in each of 1000 identical systems and injecting 1000 faults in one system have the same
consequences.
Figure 6.3 shows the results presented in Table 6.12 in the ROC-type plot. SRTA’s instance was marked
as SRTALL to indicate that the Lenient Variant of precision and Recall were used in this comparison. The
horizontal axis shows the probability of false alarms, while the vertical shows the probability of detection.
The diagonal line represents the probabilities where P(d) = P(f), signifying the performance of a purely
random detection procedure. To be considered as a tool with reasonable performance, the performance of
the tool has to be significantly above this random guessing line. To compute the significance, we have used
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Figure 6.3: ROC-type Plot to Compare SRTA, UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT
the simple variance calculation, again following Zitser et al. [168]. The formula computes,
σ2 =
p(d)(1− p(d))
N
(6.11)
where,
σ2 = The variance in estimation.
N = Total number of defects existing in the system.
The figure shows the significant distance using a ±σ error bar shown above and below the random guess
line. The error bars are small in expanse due to the large sample set involved. The representation shows, that
SPLINT, under our experiments, performed below the random guess line, and therefore is not considered
a tool with significant performance. Same fact is observed for UNO. FindBugs and SRTA both perform
significantly well above the line, with SRTA showing slightly better performance than FindBugs in both
precision (as indicated by low false alarm rates) and recall (as indicated by high probability of detection).
Comparison Using Data from Literature
Table 6.13 shows the precision and recall data on the tools selected, along with their sources. In case a
tool’s precision or recall was reported by more than one sources, an average was taken into consideration.
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Table 6.13: Comparison of SRTA’s Precision with Other Tools Using Data from Literature
# Tool/Author Precision Recall Source Comment
1. SRTASS 0.65 0.76 This Experiment Strict Precision and Recall
2. SRTASL 0.65 0.85 This Experiment Strict Precision
3. SRTALS 0.81 0.76 This Experiment Strict Recall
4. SRTALL 0.81 0.85 This Experiment
5. ARCHER 0.56 0.01 [163, 168]
6. SPLINT 0.48 0.52 [50, 103, 168]
7. Marple 0.71 0.95 [97]
8. UNO 0.43 0.12 [103, 29, 168]
9. Parfait 1.00 0.75 [103]
10. Polyspace 0.67 0.94 [29, 168]
11. Coverity 0.80 0.48 [29]
For SRTA, four different precision-recall sets were considered, using the four combinations of the lenient and
strict variants of the precision and recall measurements. None of these tools, except Coverity, considers so
many defect classes as SRTA. Most of them focuses on memory defects only. Comparing SRTA’s performance
in only the common defect classes with every tool would have guaranteed a better stand for SRTA, owing
to the fact that the lower performance counts for SRTA comes from the logical defects, which none of these
tools even consider. Still, instead of the common defects, the entire SRTA’s performance was chosen to be
compared with the entire performance of these tools to estimate the benefit of the technique as a whole.
The findings from Table 6.13 are presented in Figure 6.4 in another ROC-type plot. Although this
representation differs with the previous ROC plot in one point - unlike the previous plot, a test of statistical
significance could not be incorporated in this particular plot due to the secondary nature of the data, as
the sample size could not be determined. Four versions of SRTA were presented in the table using the four
variants of the precision and recall (over strict and lenient).
Intuitively, it can be said that the ideal tool should have the position (0.0, 1.0), showing zero false positives
and detecting all defects that are present. Of the tools that have been compared, ARCHER and UNO clearly
had performance below the random guess lines. SPLINT’s characteristics was on the random guess line.
SRTA, Polyspace, Coverity, Parfait and Marple performed well above the random guess line. With
Polyspace and Marple performing better than SRTA in terms of Recall. A closer look at Marple’s evaluation
[96] revealed its individual precision and recall measurement for different classes as, C1 = (0.80, 0.97), M1
= (0.8, 0.8), M3 = (0.5, 1.0) M4 = (0.87, 1.0), as it was reported by Le and Soffa [96]. This evaluation
was obtained over Zitser’s Benchmark [168] only. In comparison, assessing over a large-scale automated fault
injection framework, on the BugBench Benchmark and on six industry applications, SRTA’s corresponding
precision and recall are found as C1 = (0.94, 0.93), M1 = (0.80, 0.89), M3 = (0.86, 0.92), M4 = (0.77, 0.92),
as presented in earlier sections. The specific performance of SRTA was close with Marple in the specific
common defect classes, although SRTA’s evaluation was performed in a much larger scale. SRTA’s average
precision and recall were lowered by the performance in Logical and Data related defects, which Marple does
not consider. This argument adds to SRTA’s favour as an accurate tool.
For the tool Polyspace, little information is available on the detailed internal structure except that it is
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Figure 6.4: ROC-type Plot for Tool Performance Comparison
based on abstract interpretation and can detect C1, C3 and M4 defects [168, 29]. The average precision and
recall, as reported by two studies [168, 29], were (0.75, 0.80), while against the same three defect classes,
SRTA’s average precision and recall are measured as (0.81, 0.85), almost at the same point as Polyspace,
with a better recall. Like Marple, Polyspace does not consider the defect classes that lowered the average
precision and recall of SRTA (i.e., Logic and Data related defects).
6.5.4 Practicality
Figure 6.5 shows the measures obtained from the controlled experiment. The graphs PMn, SMn, PMnC and
Tn expresses the Primary Memory, Secondary Memory, Primary Memory Limit and Time, respectively, for
System n. The scale in the vertical axis shows the memory units as multiples of 50MB and Time units as
multiples of five minutes.
As apparent from the observations of the graphs, the system memory consumption, for both System 1
and System 2, are increasing with the increase of software size (although not in a linear trend). But as soon
as the primary memory reaches the limiting capacity, the consumption on secondary memory increases more
dramatically. This same pattern is displayed on both Systems. For TS3, System 1 reaches the limit but
System 2 does not. As expected, System 1’s secondary memory consumption graph matches the increasing
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Figure 6.5: Different Performance Measures for Scalability and Practicality Assessment
requirement for secondary memory, while System 2’s graph continues its previous gradual increment.
The graphs show that SRTA can balance itself on limiting resources, provided the secondary backup is
sufficient. Also, as the processing power of System 1 is more limiting than System 2, the timing graph shows
a more steep trend of increment. This observation can be substantiated into the conclusion that SRTA does
not stop working for low-capacity systems, but requires more memory and time. On the other hand, using
more processing power shall allow SRTA to run in less memory requirement.
6.6 Evaluation Outcome
Through direct experiment and the experiment involving the Mutation-Injection Framework, SRTA was
found to exhibit high precision and recall, proving the point on its accuracy. In comparison with three other
tools SRTA was found to be performing better than the others in most cases both in terms of precision and
recall, and close to the others in the few exceptions. A controlled experiment verified SRTA’s scalability
and practicality, as well as all of the experiments establishing the argument in favour of its generality. If
the outcome of all the experiments described in this chapter are combined together, the case for SRTA is
established in that, it is highly accurate, scalable to systems of varying sizes, practical to perform within
reasonably strict environmental constraints and general to detect multiple dissimilar classes of defects over
widely varied test systems (by programming language, purpose, structure and complexity).
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6.7 Answering the Research Questions
This section attempts to answer the research questions mentioned in Chapter 1. Answers to two research
questions (RQ1 and RQ2), as provided in the previous chapter, are reinforced using experimental evidence
in this section. In addition, this section answers two more research questions (RQ3 and RQ4).
6.7.1 RQ1: Detecting Multiple Dissimilar Classes of Defects
In answering the question “Can a specific abstraction provide sufficient means for detecting multiple dissimilar
classes of defects?”, this chapter extends the statement provided by Chapter 5. Of the four experiments
conducted in this research, three concerned on multiple defect classes.
As it is presented in Section 6.5, SRTA was able to detect 18 out of 22 classes of defects belonging to
different similarity groups. The implementation worked entirely on the abstraction created by SRTA using
the range tuples. The range tuples, and the four aspects of detection as were identifier by the previous
chapter, was able to result into these multiple detections.
In summary, the experiments conducted proves three points - (a) SRTA is able to detect multiple dissimilar
classes of defects, (b) the detection is carried out over a specific abstraction, instead of the source code, as
outlined in Chapter 5, and (c) dissimilar defects can be represented by the same abstraction, proved by
SRTA’s ability to detect them. When combined, the three points confirms the claim that it is possible to
represent multiple dissimilar classes of defects over specific abstractions.
6.7.2 RQ2: Scope of Detection
The second research question, provided the first research question is answered affirmative, was stated as
“To what length can such a technique go in terms of dissimilar classes of defects?”. This chaper provides
the answer to this question by presenting the specific defect detection data. Of the 18 out of 22 defect
classes SRTA detected, 13 defect classes were covered fully, as the defects belonging to these 13 classes were
completely contained in the source code. The five other classes contained defects that, in some cases, are
contained entirely in the source code but require architectural and design information in other cases and thus
were partially covered. For the four classes of defects SRTA did not cover, two required runtime information
and two required exclusive design information.
In summary, the experimental results described in this chapter confirms two points - (a) SRTA can detect
the defects that are completely contained in source code in full, and (b) SRTA can sometimes detect defects
that are not completely contained in source code, but whose footprint is prominent in source code. These
two points collectively prove the hypothesis established in Chapter 5 that SRTA is able to detect defects that
are contained in souce code.
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6.7.3 RQ3: Accuracy and Performance
The third research question, provided the first research question is answered affirmative, was stated as,
“What is the general effectiveness of such a technique in terms of accuracy and performance?”. To answer
this question, extensive experiments were conducted. The outcomes of the experiments are reported in this
chapter.
Three of the four experiments reported the accuracy of detection in using different input set that contained
six real world systems, 34000 mutated systems and one benchmark. Of all the detections, average precision
was found to be 0.81 with the five-number statistical summary1 for average precisions per defect class located
in [0.36, 0.77, 0.83, 0.88, 1.00]. Average recall was found to be 0.85 with the five-number statistical summary
for average recall per defect class located in [0.64, 0.77, 0.85, 0.89, 0.96]. The five-number summary expresses
two qualities of the dataset. First, the more even are the distances among the the five components, the more
evenly distributed are the data. Conversely, the less the distance among Q1, Q2 and Q3 are from the even
value, the more the data are clustered around a region. Second, if the data is clustered, the location of the
Q1, Q2 and Q3 determines the region of clustering. From the results presented in this section, it can be
concluded that the data is clustered, and the clustering is towards the higer end of the spectrum.
To answer the research question, two points need to be considered from the data - (a) average precision
and recall are high, as proven by the direct average and the five-point summary and (b) most of the data
lie in the high end of the spectrum of all precisions and recalls measured - with 67% values over median for
precision and 66% for recall. Both points considered together states that SRTA is a generally high performing
tool for different defect classes, answering the first part of the research question.
To measure the performance, a controlled experiment was conducted. The performance was found to be,
(a) almost linerarly increasing with the increase of code size, and (b) not limited by the primary memory of the
computer SRTA runs on. The outcome of the controlled experiment confirmed SRTA to be a well performing
tool under different environmental and input constraints, answering the second part of the research question.
6.7.4 RQ4: Effect of System Complexity
The fourth research question was stated as, provided a technique utilizing a specific abstraction to detect
multiple dissimilar classes of defect exists, “What is the effect of system complexity on the applicability of
such a Technique?”. Relevant data to answer this question comes from all four of the experiments. SRTA
was able to process systems with varying sizes - from small IDEs to the massive Linux Kernel. If the recall
for specific systems are considered, SRTA was tested with 2000 mutated variants of two systems (Sendmail
and BlueJ) that came from different domains (mailing demon and IDE), were implemented under different
1The five-number summary for a dataset D = d1, d2, d3, ...dn is defined as the five-number set [Limitmin, Q1, Q2, Q3,
Limitmax]. Limitmin and Limitmax are the minimum and maximum values in the dataset. Q1 is the value that segregates the
dataset in two portions, with 25% of the data at or below it. Q2 splits the dataset into half and Q3 splits the dataset with 75%
values below it. This particular number-collection is used to measure the bias in a dataset.
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languages (C and Java), and used different technologies (Sendmail is a system demon, BlueJ is an application
software). The different coefficients of variation of recall over these two systems using different defect classes
were found to be in the range 0.05 to 0.07. Although the experiment to measure precision was not so
extensive, it included six systems and the coefficient of variation of precision over the six systems for different
defect classes were found to be in the range 0.08 to 0.21.
To answer the question, the specific point that needs to be considered is, the coefficients of variation are
smaller than one and are closer to zero in the range [0, 1]. This observation signifies that the precision and
recall did not vary widely over different system types for the same defect class. Therefore, it can be concluded
that SRTA is able to retain its processing accuracy over varying system complexities.
6.8 Summary
This chapter provides the data and analyses from the experiments conducted to evaluate SRTA. The chapter
started by establishing the mathematical framework used for evaluation and then described the four exper-
iments conducted to evaluate SRTA. In the next section, the chapter described the evaluation outcome on
the four perspectives - Accuracy, Scalability, Generality and Practicality. The analyses showed that SRTA
is able to keep an average precision 0.81 and an average recall of 0.85, both high in comparison with the
state-of-the-art, while generally applicable to multiple dissimilar defect classes, practical to work without
special requirements or overhead and scalable to systems of arbitrary complexity. The data was provided in
in this chapter in only the most relevant format required for establishing the points, the details are provided
in Appendix C and B. The next chapter concludes the dissertation.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This chapter contains the conclusive remarks to the dissertation, continuing the discussion from Chapters
3, 5, and 6. The chapter begins by describing the anticipated impacts of the research (Section 7.1), continues
on describing the threats to validity of this research (Section 7.2) and finally describes the future work
(Section 7.3)
7.1 Impact
This research demonstrated the possibility of using symbolic analysis, path summarization and state-space
modelling through range analysis in the detection of multiple dissimilar classes of defects. The expectations
from this research is to improve the trade of software maintenance, especially, the task of quality assurance.
Subsequent sections specify the detailed outcome and expectations.
7.1.1 The Defect Model
Using symbolic analysis, path summaries and range analysis, a new symbolic model was built that captures
the source code artifacts and their interactions. The model uses a three-tuple of symbolic range values derived
from the state-space of the software. The 3-tuple signifies the three different phases of an entity’s life cycle.
The model provides a few key benefits,
(i) It is scalable to large systems, as it was demonstrated through the experiments in Chapter 6. The
model successfully processed systems as large as the Linux Kernel.
(ii) The model is able to process incomplete code, as it is apparent from its construction. The model uses
abstractions over source code that can ignore ambiguity at the code level. Two supportive cases were
discovered while verifying false negatives in Chapter 6
(iii) It has Low False Positives, as it was demonstrated in the experiments described in Chapter 6
(iv) It has Low False Negatives, as it was demonstrated in the experiments described in Chapter 6
(v) It is Practical, as it was evident from the controlled experiment described in Chapter 6
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(vi) It is General, as it was demonstrated by processing software systems implemented in three different
languages (C, C++ and Java), and by comparison with other tools.
7.1.2 Multiple Defect Detection
Analysis techniques were developed to analyze the defect model to find anomalies as indications of defects.
As the model is a simplified summarized representation, analysis techniques were free from the complexities
associated with such detection, and thus became more manageable for the users.
The collective system of the model and the analysis techniques, specified under the name SRTA, was
found to be accurate and scalable. A prototype tool under the same name was implemented and used in
experiments.
7.1.3 FlexTax
As a prerequisite to this research, FlexTax was developed as a User-Driven Automated Framework for Defect
Classification. FlexTax is aimed at balancing the human supervision and automated approach in taxonomy
generation and is specifically designed to address the problems of inflexibility and non-extensibility in tax-
onomies. FlexTax utilizes the concepts from feature representation and comparison, and takes advantage of
the accuracy of objective generation and mapping techniques, while providing for the flexibilities of human
judgement through the user-driven nature.
Through a case study that involved more than 25000 real world defects, FlexTax was found to be capable
of developing defect taxonomies that are complete, orthogonal, non-redundant, flexible and extensible. Ad-
ditionally, FlexTax is a practical approach, as proven by the large number of defects it was able to map in a
practically feasible time.
FlexTax can serve in the industry as it is and reduce maintenance overhead associated with defect mapping
and taxonomy generation. FlexTax shifts the effort intensive tasks from the user to the automated system,
allowing the mapping and / or remapping of a large number of defects in a fast and effective manner that
can have a direct impact on the maintenance activities associated with re-creation of taxonomies.
7.1.4 The Defect Taxonomy
FlexTax was applied on the more than 25000 real world defect data as collected from CVE. The result was
a defect taxonomy comprising of 27 defect classes organized in two hierarchical layers.
The taxonomy generated by FlexTax is generic in a sense that it was developed from the defect data
coming from multiple projects that follow multiple languages, development paradigms, styles and structure.
The taxonomy generated from this diverse set of defects, under the same formal framework as FlexTax, is
thus applicable to general software defect scenarios.
The taxonomy can be readily adopted, adapted or extended as needed for the industry. This taxonomy is
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able to have a direct impact on reducing maintenance overhead as a ready solution to many software defect
classification scenarios.
7.1.5 Defect Similarity
Using the underlying principles of FlexTax that rely on feature representation, different feature comparison
metrics were compared to measure defect similarity. Although performed in the most basic form, these
similarity metrics were able to provide different similarity measures towards the real-world defects. These
similarity metrics can be applied as they are, and pave a direction for further development in the field.
7.2 Threats to Validity
• SRTA performs well above most tools, but there are a few specialized detection tools (as presented
in Chapter 6) that outperform SRTA. This point needs to be considered from three aspects. First,
although SRTA performs lower than some tools in specific cases, the general accuracy of SRTA is not
low. Second, in the specific performance points where SRTA performed not as good as some other
tools, SRTA did not perform significantly below the other tools. In fact, the difference was small for
all cases. And Third, SRTA provides multiple defect detection capabilities which are not implemented
by the other tools SRTA was compared against.
• A question may arise about the necessity of SRTA, where there are multiple specialized tools available
for the task. If defect detection in software maintenance is carried out by a collection of specialized tools,
two problems arise. First, the acquisition and maintenance of the multiple tools require maintenance
overhead, and second, as different tools are different in their input specifications and requirements,
they claim specialized human effort for their application. SRTA resolves both problems, as it covers
the same defect types using one simple model.
• Another concern about the working principle of SRTA can be raised on the consideration of three
different phases of an entity’s life-cycle. Although it provides a better accuracy, as it was demonstrated
in Chapter 6, there can be other intermediate or transient phases of an entity’s life cycle that can have
equally important effect on the detection. We recognize this question, and put the investigation on the
topic as a future research direction.
• About the Taxonomy generated by FlexTax, which was the basis for the development for SRTA, a
question may arise on the future processing capabilities of SRTA if the taxonomy is extended. In
reality, SRTA’s specification mechanism is soft-coded. As long as a new defect can be represented
through static range analysis, SRTA can be configured to detect the defect.
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7.3 Future Work
It is expected that the research presented in this dissertation shall be able to reduce maintenance overhead
associated with the defect detection activity. Despite its rate of high accuracy, scalability, practicality and
generality, there are multiple scopes for improvement for this research.
• The three-tuple used for SRTA has the capability to extend to multiple, but not all, defect types. The
three-tuple signifies the three important phases of an entity’s life cycle. The impact of other non-
major phases of the entity’s life cycle in its probability of being a defect is established, but extensive
experiments on this topic can also be conducted. Research needs to be conducted into finding further
extensions to the tuple, and to find whether additional phases, or especially, transition phases, can have
an impact on the defects.
• SRTA, although general in specifications to process code from almost any statically-typed languages,
was tested only on systems written in C++ and Java, further experiments can be performed to evaluate
SRTA on systems developed using other industry adopted languages.
• This research specifies a defect taxonomy and evaluates the taxonomy against multiple procedures. The
taxonomy, although is readily applicable to real-world systems, can be used to analyze defect impacts
and distribution.
• This study provides introductory treatment to defect similarity assessment. The concept of similarity,
as outlined in this dissertation, can be extended to large scale studies on defect similarity.
• The symbolic model developed and used in this research can be modified into detecting a challenging
types of code clones, namely, the semantic clones [137]. A specific future plan for this research is to
extend the model into developing a semantic clone detector, in collaboration with the state-of-the-art
clone detectors like NiCad and SimCad [152, 151].
7.4 Additional Information
The SRTA prototype, the FlexTax prototype, data from the experiments, the specifications to use the pro-
totypes, and other supplementary materials to this dissertation are provided through the website of the
Software Research Lab of the University of Saskatchewan [11].
7.5 Summary
This chapter describes the expected impact, threats to validity and future works regarding the principles
and techniques outlined in this dissertation in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. The chapter started with a statement
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of expected impact of FlexTax, SRTA, the Taxonomy and Defect Similarity in the current state-of-the-art.
The chapter then described the specific problems encountered on the research, and the approach to their
solution. Next, the chapter provided a summary of future works planned as continuation of this research.
This Chapter concludes this dissertation.
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Appendix A
Taxonomy Framework Parameters
This appendix provides a list of the parameters used in generating the taxonomy in Chapter 3.
A.1 Perspectives
Unlike most defect repositories, CVE data is reported by personnel directly connected to the development
and usage of the software. The reporters include systems analysis personnel, software engineers, security
analysts, programmers and other personnel connected to the development of the system, or in its use in
different places. These defect data are interpreted by people of the same trade. This unique nature of CVE
makes it a repository where developers communicate defect data to the developers.
Despite being more technically oriented than general user groups, developers acting as users have the
same limitation for closed source systems, and often with open source ones. Their communication tends to
be using a black-box approach. The interpreters, however, have white-box access to the components.
A.2 Perspective 1
To model the reporting entities, the first perspective is chosen as the one describing the affiliation of the
defect to the most visible major software component.
This perspective was chosen to consider CVE’s defect reporters, who are usually technical professionals
like System Analysts, Programmers or Security Analysts. Their description becomes detailed in technicality,
but is limited only to the visible phenomena as the reporters do not usually have access to code.
A.3 Perspective 2
The second perspective was chosen as the one describing the exact technical issue that acted as the root
cause for the defect.
This perspective was chosen to model the descriptions of CVE’s developers who interpret the defect
information as reported by the reporters. Being the professionals with access to the code, the developers are
able to use more precise description of the defect with its detailed technical cause.
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Table A.1: List of Attributes and Their Compliance to Defect Classes Developed in Chapter 3
W
e
ig
h
t P1 P2
Comp. Logic Memory Data Sync.
# Attribute C L M D S C1 C2 C3 L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 M1 M2 M3 M4 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 S1 S2 Comment
1.1. Wrong Output 10 # # ## # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.2. Wrong Format 20# # ## # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.3. Memory Error 30##  ## # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.4. Involves multiple entities 40## #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
1.5. Involves multiple processes 50## # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.1 Truncated Values 5 ## # ##  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # #
2.2. Expanded Values 1 ## # ## G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # #
2.3. Rounded Values 5 ## # ##  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # #
2.4. Specific Offset 10## # ## #  # # # # # # # # # # # # G# G# # # # # # #
2.5. Unpredictable Values 20## # ## # #  # # # G# # # # # G# # # G# # G# # # # # #
2.6. Garbage Values 1 ## # ## # # G# # # # # # # # # G# # # # # G# # # # # #
2.7. Missed a check 5 ## # ## # # #  # # G# # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # #
2.8. Wrong condition in an if 5 ## # ## # # #  # # G# # # # # G# # # # # # G# # # # #
2.9. Wrong terminal in a loop 20## # ## # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.10. No terminal condition 1 ## # ## # # # G# G# # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.11. Wrong Operator 30## # ## # # # # #  G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.12. Wrong precedence 1 ## # ## # # # # G# G# G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.13. Wrong operand 1 ## # ## # # # # # G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.14. Failed to save 14## # ## # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.15. Failed to update 14## # ## # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.16. Failed to set 14## # ## # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.17. Missed / misinterpreted relation 1 ## # ## # # # # # # G# G# # # G# # # # # G# # # # G# # #
2.18. Extra complex logic 1 ## # ## # # # G# # # G# # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # #
2.19. Failed to terminate a loop 15## # ## # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.20. Terminated a loop early 15## # ## # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.21. Made a tautology/contradiction 15## # ## # # # G# # # # # #  # # # # # # # G# # # # #
2.22. Made more than required checks 26## # ## # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.23. Made invalid extra checks 26## # ## # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.24. Didn’t catch an exception 16## # ## # # # # # # G# #  # G# # # # # # # # # # # #
2.25. Caught wrong exception 16## # ## # # # # # # G# #  # G# # # # # # # # # # # #
2.26. Caught exception, didn’t handle 16## # ## # # # # # # G# #  # G# # # # # # # # # # # #
2.27. Caught exception, handled wrong 16## # ## # # # # # # G# #  # G# # # # # # # # # # # #
2.28. Made never-taken branch 15## # ## # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.29. Made always-taken branch 15## # ## # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # # #
2.30. Wrong connections 4 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # # # # # #  # # # G# # #
2.31. Wrong interactions 1 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # G# # G# # #
2.32. Changed algorithm in code 43## # ## # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # #
2.33. Changed implementation 43## # ## # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # # #
2.34. Access non-allocated memory 4 ## # ## # G# G# # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # #
2.35. Access memory out of valid range 22## # ## # G# # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # #
2.36. Access memory with wrong attitude 4 ## # ## G# # G# # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # # #
2.37. Deallocated deallocated memory 8 ## # ## # # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # #
2.38. Deallocated unallocated memory 8 ## # ## # # G# # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # #
2.39. Tried improper deallocation 8 ## # ## G# # # # # # # # # # # #  # # # # # # # # #
2.40. Failed to deallocated 17## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # # # #  # # # # # # # #
2.41 Failed to allocate 4 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # #  # # # # # # # # # #
2.42. Deallocated parts 17## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # # # #  # # # # # # # #
2.43. Allocated less than required 22## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # # # # #  # # # # # # #
2.44. Wrong interface values 4 ## # ## G# G# G# # # # G# # # # G# # # # #  # # # # # #
2.45. Wrong interface types 4 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # #  # # # # # #
2.46. Default interface values 4 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # #  # G# # # # #
2.47. Use interface without enough data 8 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # #  G# # # # #
2.48. Assign non-matching data 8 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # #  G# # # # #
2.49. Cast up or down 17G## # ## G# # # # # # # # # # # # # # # # G#  # # # #
2.50. Changed data to meet requirements 17## # ## # # # # # # # # # # G# # # # # # G#  # # # #
2.51. Extra inputs supplied 22## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # #  # # #
2.52. Insufficient input supplied 22## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # #  # # #
2.53. Wrong data format 8 ## # ## G# # # G# # # G# # # # G# # # # # #  G# # # # #
2.54. Wrong access to members 27## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # # #  # #
2.55. Failed to provide access 27## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # # #  # #
2.56. Deadlock 5 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # # # #  #
2.57. Race 5 ## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # # # #  #
2.58. Out of Sync 10## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # # # # G#  
2.59. Lock and release problem 10## # ## # # # # # # G# # # # G# # # # # # # # # # G#  
 = Compliant as an essential attributeG#= Compliant as an optional attribute#= Non-Compliant
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Appendix B
Additional Mutation Operators
Table B.1: Mutation Operators for the Three Complex Defect Classes (D3, D4, D5)
# Defect mOP Language Element Mutation Construct Example Comment
1. D3 mD3 C, C++, Java TP < if >< (>< expr ><) > if(x > 0)
ST < expr > contains idn x > 0
ST < type >< id >< (> ... < type >< idn > ... <) > void function(int x)
MP < if >< (>< 1 ><) > if(1)
D3: The mutation changes a validation of a function parameter inside the function. The first subject-to condition ensures that a
parameter is validated, and the second condition ensures that it is done inside a function.
2. D4 mD4 C, C++ TP < struct >< type1 >< {> ... < type >< idn > ... <} >
ST < type >< id >< (> ... < type1 >< id1 > ... <) > void Shuffle(Cards cards[])
ST < expr > contains idn
MP // < type >< idn >
3. D4 mD4 Java TP < class >< type1 >< {> ... < public >< type >< idn >
... <} >
ST < type >< id >< (> ... < type1 >< id1 > ... <) > void Shuffle(Cards cards[])
ST < expr > contains idn
MP // < public >< type >< idn >
D4: The mutation creates an insufficient input problem. The first subject-to condition ensures that a composite structure is passed as
a parameter, with the second condition ensuring that the specific value from the parameter is being used inside the function.
4. D5 mD5 C, C++ ST < type >< id1 >< (> ... <) > int ∗ function()
ST < class >< id >< {> ... < public :>< type >< id1 >< (>
... <) > ... <} >
ST < class >< id >< {... < private :> ... < type >< id >
... ><} >
private : int x;
MP < return >< id > return x; Inject.
5. D5 mD5 Java ST < public >< type >< id1 >< (> ... <) > int ∗ function()
ST < private > ... < type1 >< id > ... > private : Item x;
MP < type1 >< id2 ><=>< id >< return >< id2 > Item y = x; return y; Inject.
D5: The mutation injects an improper access to a member entity to outside entitites. For Java, the matter is tricky due to the security
already enforced by its constructs. The reference to a mutable item is created using the assignment which was then used to return the
values, exposing the private member to the outside.
TP = Token Pattern
MP = Mutation Pattern
ST = Subject to the existence of (condition)
<> = Token
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Table B.2: Mutation Operators Developed for C++
# Cls mOP Mutation Example Comment
1. C1 mC1
TP < id ><=>< num ><;> x = 10;
MP< id ><=>< num1 ><;> x = 10 + 99999999999999; num1 = a large number
2. C2 mC2
TP < id >< OP >< num > x < 100; OP = {<,>,<=, >=, ! =
,==}
MP< id >< OP >< num1 >< + >< num2 > x <= 100 + 10; num1 = [1, 10]
3. C3 mC3
TP < type >< id ><=>< num ><;> int x = 0; type =
int|float|double|long
MP< type >< id ><;> int x;
4. L1 mL1
TP < if >< (>< id ><==>< expr ><) > if(id == 10)
MP< if >< (>< id ><=>< expr ><) > if(id = 10)
5. L2 mL2
TP < for >< (> ... < id >< OP1 >< num > ... <) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x+ +) {OP1,OP2} = {<,>},{>
,<},
MP< for >< (> ... < id >< OP2 >< num > ... <) > for(x = 0; x > 100; x+ +) {<=, >=},{>=, <=},{<
,<=}
6. L3 mL3
TP < for >< (> ... < id >< OP1 ><) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x+ +) {OP1,OP2} =
{++,−−},{−−,++}
MP< for >< (> ... < id >< OP2 ><) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x−−)
7. L5 mL5
TP N/A
MP< type >< id >; intx;
8. L6 mL6
TP N/A N/A Inject.
MP< try >< {>< throw >< new >< type ><} ><
catch >< (>< type1 >< id ><) >
try{throw new MyException}
catch(Exception e)
9. L7 mL7
TP < if >< (> ... <) > if(x < 100)
MP< if >< (1) > if(1)
10. M1mM1
TP < id ><=>< new >< type >< [>< num ><
] ><;>
p = newchar[100];
MP< id ><=>< 0 > p = 0;
11. M2mM2
TP < delete >< id ><;> delete p;
MP< delete >< id ><;>< delete >< id ><;> delete p; delete p;
12. M3mM3
TP < delete >< id ><;> delete p;
MP< / >< / >< delete >< id ><;> //delete p;
13. M4mM4
TP < id >< [>< num ><] > p[30];
MP< id >< [>< num >< + >< num1 ><] > p[30+10];
14. D1 mD1
TP < id >< (>< id1 ><,>< id2 > ... <,>< idn ><
) >
function(x, y, z);
MP< id >< (>< id1 ><,>< id1 > ... <,>< id1 ><
) >
function(x, x, x);
15. D2 mD2
TP < id >< (> ... < num > ... <) > function(10, 20, 30);
MP< id >< (> ... < num1 > ... <) > function(10, 0, 30);
Cls = Defect Class mOP = Mutation Operator
TP = Token Pattern MP = Mutation Pattern
<> = Token
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Table B.3: Mutation Operators Developed for Java
# Cls mOP Mutation Example Comment
1. C1 mC1
TP < id ><=>< num ><;> x = 10;
MP< id ><=>< num1 ><;> x = 10 + 99999999999999; num1 = a large number
2. C2 mC2
TP < id >< OP >< num > x < 100; OP = {<,>,<=, >=, ! =
,==}
MP< id >< OP >< num1 >< + >< num2 > x <= 100; num1 = [1, 10]
3. C3 mC3
TP < type >< id ><=>< num ><;> int x = 0; type =
int|float|double|long
MP< type >< id ><;> int x;
4. L1 mL1
TP < if >< (>< id ><==>< expr ><) > if(id == 10)
MP< if >< (>< id ><=>< expr ><) > if(id = 10)
5. L2 mL2
TP < for >< (> ... < id >< OP1 >< num > ... <) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x+ +) {OP1,OP2} = {<,>},{>
,<},
MP< for >< (> ... < id >< OP2 >< num > ... <) > for(x = 0; x > 100; x+ +) {<=, >=},{>=, <=},{<
,<=}
6. L3 mL3
TP < for >< (> ... < id >< OP1 ><) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x+ +) {OP1,OP2} =
{++,−−},{−−,++}
MP< for >< (> ... < id >< OP2 ><) > for(x = 0; x < 100; x−−)
7. L5 mL5
TP N/A
MP< type >< id >; intx;
8. L6 mL6
TP N/A N/A Inject.
MP< try >< {>< throw >< new >< type ><} ><
catch >< (>< type1 >< id ><) >
try{throw new MyException}
catch(Exception e)
9. L7 mL7
TP < if >< (> ... <) > if(x < 100)
MP< if >< (1) > if(1)
10. M1mM1
TP < id ><=>< new >< id >< [>< num ><] ><
;>
p = newchar[100];
MP< id ><=>< 0 > p = 0;
13. M4mM4
TP < id >< [>< num ><] > p[30];
MP< id >< [>< num >< + >< num1 ><] > p[30+10];
14. D1 mD1
TP < id >< (>< id1 ><,>< id2 > ... <,>< idn ><
) >
function(x, y, z);
MP< id >< (>< id1 ><,>< id1 > ... <,>< id1 ><
) >
function(x, x, x);
15. D2 mD2
TP < id >< (> ... < num > ... <) > function(10, 20, 30);
MP< id >< (> ... < num1 > ... <) > function(10, 0, 30);
Cls = Defect Class mOP = Mutation Operator
TP = Token Pattern MP = Mutation Pattern
<> = Token
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Appendix C
Detailed Evaluation Data
Table C.1: Precision of SRTA in Processing the Test Systems
Detection Data
Firefox Thunderbird Notepad++ Sendmail Linux BlueJ
# Class CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND Comment
1. C1 8 2 2 11 2 2 2 0 0 3 1 0 21 5 2 2 0 0
2. C2 7 1 2 13 1 3 0 0 0 1 0 1 12 1 1 1 0 0
3. C3 2 0 0 17 1 4 1 1 0 5 0 1 14 2 3 2 1 0
4. L1 1 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 4 2 2 9 2 3 5 1 3
5. L2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 1 2 1 0 0
6. L3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 2 2 3 0 0
7. L5 0 0 0 3 0 2 2 0 1 2 0 1 28 0 9 1 1 0
8. L6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 0 0
9. L7 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
10. M1 12 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 2 68 8 17 6 0 1
11. M2 2 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 - - -
12. M3 4 1 1 6 0 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 87 5 26 - - -
13. M4 6 0 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 102 12 46 4 1 1
14. D1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 9 3 9 2 1 0
15. D2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 7 5 1 1 0 1
16. D3 19 4 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 2 18 2 2 3 1 0
17. D4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0
18. D5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
Precision
Firefox Thunderbird Notepad Sendmail Linux BlueJ
# Class PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP PS PL FP Comment
1. C1 0.67 0.83 0.17 0.73 0.87 0.13 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.75 1.00 0.00 0.75 0.93 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.00
2. C2 0.70 0.80 0.20 0.76 0.82 0.18 - - - 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.86 0.93 0.07 1.00 1.00 0.00
3. C3 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.77 0.82 0.18 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.83 0.83 0.17 0.74 0.84 0.16 0.67 1.00 0.00
4. L1 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.40 0.60 0.40 - - - 0.50 0.75 0.25 0.64 0.79 0.21 0.56 0.67 0.33
5. L2 0.25 0.50 0.50 - - - - - - - - - 0.70 0.80 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.00
6. L3 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.67 0.83 0.17 1.00 1.00 0.00
7. L5 - - - 0.60 0.60 0.40 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.76 0.76 0.24 0.50 1.00 0.00
8. L6 - - - - - - - - - - - - 0.75 0.75 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.00
9. L7 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - 0.50 0.75 0.25
10. M1 0.71 0.82 0.18 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.40 0.60 0.40 0.73 0.82 0.18 0.86 0.86 0.14
11. M2 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - 0.75 0.75 0.25 - - -
12. M3 0.67 0.83 0.17 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.74 0.78 0.22 - - -
13. M4 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.75 0.75 0.25 - - - 0.60 0.80 0.20 0.64 0.71 0.29 0.67 0.83 0.17
14. D1 - - - - - - - - - 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.43 0.57 0.43 0.67 1.00 0.00
15. D2 - - - - - - 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.54 0.92 0.08 0.50 0.50 0.50
16. D3 0.70 0.85 0.15 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.82 0.91 0.09 0.75 1.00 0.00
17. D4 0.50 0.50 0.50 - - - - - - - - - 0.80 0.80 0.20 - - -
18. D5 - - - - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - -
CC = Detected under the Correct Class PS = Precision (Strict Estimation)
IC = Detected under Incorrect Class PL = Precision (Lenient Estimation)
ND = Detected, but not a defect FP = False Positive Rate
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Table C.2: SRTA’s Recall Assessment from the Mutation-Injection Experiment
Detection Count Recall
Sendmail BlueJ Sendmail BlueJ
# Defect mOP Mutants CC IC ND CC IC ND RS RL FN RS RL FN Comment
1. C1 mC1 1000 896 0 104 892 12 96 0.89 0.89 0.11 0.89 0.90 0.10
2. C2 mC2 1000 856 52 92 857 17 126 0.86 0.91 0.09 0.86 0.87 0.13
3. C3 mC3 1000 878 0 122 780 8 212 0.88 0.88 0.12 0.78 0.79 0.21
4. L1 mL1 1000 619 112 269 634 12 354 0.62 0.73 0.27 0.63 0.64 0.36
5. L2 mL2 1000 773 103 124 812 36 152 0.77 0.88 0.12 0.81 0.85 0.15
6. L3 mL3 1000 711 81 208 732 21 257 0.71 0.79 0.21 0.73 0.75 0.25
7. L5 mL5 1000 726 127 147 691 19 290 0.73 0.85 0.15 0.69 0.71 0.29
8. L6 mL6 1000 667 187 146 751 18 231 0.67 0.85 0.15 0.75 0.77 0.23
9. L7 mL7 1000 794 166 40 791 6 203 0.79 0.96 0.04 0.79 0.80 0.20
10. M1 mM1 1000 815 68 117 896 2 102 0.82 0.88 0.12 0.90 0.90 0.10
11. M2 mM2 1000 791 89 120 - - - 0.79 0.88 0.12 - - -
12. M3 mM3 1000 839 76 85 - - - 0.84 0.92 0.08 - - -
13. M4 mM4 1000 817 81 102 890 42 68 0.82 0.90 0.10 0.89 0.93 0.07
14. D1 mD1 1000 709 98 193 729 10 261 0.71 0.81 0.19 0.73 0.74 0.26
15. D2 mD2 1000 751 102 147 672 9 319 0.75 0.85 0.15 0.67 0.68 0.32
16. D3 mD3 1000 618 162 220 599 100 301 0.62 0.78 0.22 0.60 0.70 0.30
17. D4 mD4 1000 702 119 179 753 152 95 0.70 0.82 0.18 0.75 0.91 0.09
18. D5 mD5 1000 686 139 175 594 103 303 0.69 0.83 0.17 0.59 0.70 0.30
Average 1000 758 98 144 782 32 187 0.76 0.86 0.14 0.78 0.81 0.19
mOP = Mutation Operator RS = Recall (Strict Estimation)
CC = Detected under Correct Class RL = Recall (Lenient Estimation)
IC = Detected under Incorrect Class FN = False Negative
ND = Not Detected
Table C.3: SRTA’s Recall Assessment by Application on BugBench
Detection Data
bc cvs gzip man ncompress polymorph squid
# Class CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND CC IC ND Comment
1. L3 - - - - - - - - - 1 0 0 - - - - - - - - -
2. M2 - - - 1 0 0 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. M4 3 1 0 - - - 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Recall
bc cvs gzip man ncompress polymorph squid
# Class RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN RC RL FN Comment
1. L3 - - - - - - - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - - - -
2. M2 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
3. M4 0.75 1.00 0.00 - - - 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
Avg 0.75 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
CC = Detected under correct class RC = Recall (Strict Estimation)
IC = Detected under Incorrect Class RL = Recall (Lenient Estimation)
ND = Not Detected FN = False Negative
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Table C.4: Comparison of SRTA’s Precision with UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT Using Experimental
Data
Tool SRTA
# Tool System Language LOC Class CC IC ND PS PL FP CC IC ND PS PL FP Comment
1. UNO Sendmail-8.12.11 C 102k C3 3 0 1 0.75 0.75 0.25 5 0 1 0.83 0.83 0.17 SRTA: Table C.1
M1 2 0 2 0.00 0.00 1.00 2 1 2 0.40 0.60 0.40 SRTA: Table C.1
M4 4 0 3 0.25 0.25 0.75 3 1 1 0.60 0.80 0.20 SRTA: Table C.1
2. Findbugs BlueJ-3.0.9 Java 86k C1 2 0 0 1.00 1.00 0.00 2 0 0 1.00 1.00 0.00
C2 1 0 0 1.00 1.00 0.00 1 0 0 1.00 1.00 0.00
C3 2 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.33 2 1 0 0.67 1.00 0.00
L1 5 0 2 0.71 0.71 0.29 5 1 3 0.56 0.67 0.33
L3 2 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.33 3 0 0 1.00 1.00 0.00
L5 1 0 0 1.00 1.00 0.00 1 1 0 0.50 1.00 0.00
L7 2 0 1 0.67 0.67 0.33 2 1 1 0.50 0.75 0.25
M1 4 0 1 0.80 0.80 0.20 6 0 1 0.86 0.86 0.14
D1 2 0 2 0.50 0.50 0.50 2 1 0 0.67 1.00 0.00
D2 1 0 2 0.33 0.33 0.67 1 0 1 0.50 0.50 0.50
D3 3 0 1 0.75 0.75 0.25 3 1 0 0.75 1.00 0.00
3. SPLINT Sendmail-8.12.11 C 102k M1 1 0 1 0.50 0.50 0.50 2 1 2 0.40 0.60 0.40 SRTA: Table C.1
M2 0 0 0 - - - 0 0 0 - - - None was present
M3 3 0 3 0.50 0.50 0.50 1 1 0 0.50 1.00 0.00 SRTA: Table C.1
M4 5 0 8 0.38 0.38 0.62 3 1 1 0.60 0.80 0.20 SRTA: Table C.1
CC = Detected under Correct Class PS = Precision (Strict Estimation)
IC = Detected under Incorrect Class PL = Precision (Lenient Estimation)
ND = Not a Defect FP = False Positive
Table C.5: Comparison of SRTA’s Recall with UNO, FindBugs and SPLINT Using Experimental
Data
Tool SRTA
# Tool System Lang. LOC Class mOP Count CC IC ND RS RL FN CC IC ND RS RL FN Comment
1. UNO Sendmail-8.12.11 C 102k C3 mC3 1000 661 0 339 0.66 0.66 0.34 896 0 104 0.88 0.88 0.12 SRTA: Table C.2
M1 mM1 1000 434 0 366 0.43 0.43 0.37 815 68 117 0.82 0.88 0.12 SRTA: Table C.2
M4 mM4 1000 5 0 1000 0.00 0.00 1.00 817 81 102 0.82 0.90 0.10 SRTA: Table C.2
2. FindBugs BlueJ-3.0.9 Java 86k C1 mC1 1000 896 0 104 0.90 0.90 0.10 892 12 96 0.89 0.90 0.10
C2 mC2 1000 871 0 129 0.87 0.87 0.13 857 17 126 0.86 0.87 0.13
C3 mC3 1000 792 0 208 0.79 0.79 0.21 780 8 212 0.78 0.79 0.21
L1 mL1 1000 681 0 319 0.68 0.68 0.32 634 12 354 0.63 0.64 0.36
L3 mL3 1000 702 0 298 0.70 0.70 0.30 732 21 257 0.73 0.75 0.25
L5 mL5 1000 698 0 302 0.70 0.70 0.30 751 18 769 0.69 0.71 0.29
L7 mL7 1000 678 0 322 0.68 0.68 0.32 791 6 203 0.79 0.80 0.20
M1 mM1 1000 887 0 113 0.88 0.88 0.12 896 2 102 0.90 0.90 0.10
D1 mD1 1000 652 0 348 0.65 0.65 0.35 729 10 261 0.73 0.74 0.26
D2 mD2 1000 791 0 209 0.79 0.79 0.21 672 9 319 0.67 0.68 0.32
D3 mD3 1000 772 0 228 0.77 0.77 0.23 599 100 301 0.60 0.70 0.30
3. SPLINT Sendmail-8.12.11 C 102k M1 mM1 1000 609 0 391 0.61 0.61 0.39 815 68 117 0.82 0.88 0.12 SRTA: Table C.2
M2 mM2 1000 568 0 432 0.57 0.57 0.43 791 89 120 0.79 0.88 0.12 SRTA: Table C.2
M3 mM3 1000 602 0 398 0.60 0.60 0.40 839 76 84 0.84 0.92 0.08 SRTA: Table C.2
M4 mM4 1000 507 0 493 0.51 0.51 0.49 817 81 102 0.82 0.90 0.10 SRTA: Table C.2
CC = Detected under Correct Class RS = Recall (Strict Estimation)
IC = Detected under Incorrect Class RL = Recall (Lenient Estimation)
ND = Not a Defect FN = False Negative
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